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formalising these concepts into a reference case model.  Particular attention is drawn 
tlining the role that the NICE has played in  for an effect, before ou (MWTP) 
statistics and the Maximum Willingness To Pay  (INMB)  Net Monetary Benefit 
Effectiveness Ratio (ICER), Incremental  - summary concepts of the Incremental Cost
introducing the core  : er begins by outlining the reference case model The chapt
Wales.  
medications are assessed for their suitability for reimbursement in  England and 
(NICE) reference case model, the framework by which new technologies and 
meet the requirements of the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence  to
prescriptions from family doctors to community pharmacists.  The model is designed 
is designed to share the burden of the regular treatment of the elderly on many repeat 
In chapter two I build an economic evaluation model of a medical intervention which 
hesis Outline of T 1.1
among primary schools.
outcomes based on different allocations of funding  educational consequences for 
in England and Wales and the potential  education of funding formulae in 
and finally a review of the economics of the use  offs should be extended - whether play
offs on regular season game attendance and  - season play - identifying the impact of post
elderly on many repeat prescriptions from family doctors to community pharmacists;  
ifting some of the burden of care of treating the  national reimbursement a policy sh
for  approve he questions addressed are: whether to  T making by policy makers.  
decision aimed at addressing policy issues and hopefully leading to more informed 
of econometric methods based on a theoretical framework  ation applic chapters is the 
interests.  Although very distinct fields, the common theme running through the 
to topics in health, sports and education which reflect my professional and personal 
microeconometric essays applied  represents a selection of empirical  dissertation This 
Introduction 1
1sures which may  literature but identifies that there were no existing sufficient mea
attendance.  The chapter thus spends some time reviewing the demand for attendance 
distribution of demand drivers across individual games and thus may influence 
tions for the creation and  offs have different implica - different designs of play
model of production of demand for individual games.  The intuition being that 
The theoretical model underpinning this chapter is one which is based on a simple 
placed top three teams.   - n for the final promotio
divisions relative to the old system of automatic  football tier of the professional 
the second top  f system in a single season of  of - promotion play English of the current 
ition.  The chapter is illustrated with an empirical estimation of the impact  that compet
season outcome, increase attendance during  - of - opportunity to achieve a desirable end
virtue of prolonging the extent to which participants within a competition still have an 
off systems, by  - ree I address the conventionally held wisdom that play In chapter th
intervention.
effective  - according to the NICE reference case framework, points towards a cost
is rather weak, but  on benefits I find that the evidence expected to change over time.  
re and after misleading if costs and benefits are naturally  simple comparison of befo
econometric models is motivated by the data generating process which may make the 
econometric analysis of data generated by an interrupted time series trial.  The use of 
is produced populated by parameters derived from a five part  more prescriptions 
An economic evaluation model of pharmaceutical care plans for the elderly on 5 or 
to fit reference case needs. fulfil that models should 
there may be an increasing need for such models.  I outline three main requirements 
s and then why  in health economic evaluation marginalised models) has been rather 
I then discuss the reasons why the use of econometrics (with exception of survival 
decision as to whether (and where) future research is required.
orrect decision, it is used to inform the  c n this probability with the cost of making an i
.  Furthermore by combining  (CEACs) Effectiveness Acceptability Curves - by Cost
making, it is used to identify the probability of an incorrect decision and represented 
hesis test and thus the basis for decision  reject hypot - being used as reject or not
2the integrity of the competition.
to the question as to whether the increase in attendance is worth the relative threat to 
(less than 1%) and not uniform across teams.  This leads  however the effect is small 
off system has increased attendance at regular season games,  - I find that the play
an area in which further refinement is required.
significance.  Although the measures have prima facia validity, it is likely that this is 
tch  likely extent of the impact.  A final data issue remains in the calculation of ma
reveals the  analysis remains an issue that remains unresolved though a sensitivity 
Multicollineairity, specifically a strong correlation between significance variables, 
ion.   averaged variables in the specificat - effects is also catered for by including team
variables and the potential problem it may create via a correlation with team random 
affected demand variables on bigger teams.  The endogenous allocation of demand 
off  - play to allow for a bigger impact of  mechanism random effects thus creating a 
specific  - log link creates an interaction between demand variables and the team
data by using Random Effects in a GLM framework.  The multiplicative nature of the 
dastic nature of the  The econometric estimation accounts for the skewed and heterosce
outweighs the effect of redistributing significance to matches involving smaller teams.
ability. It is thus an empirical question whether the creation of significant games 
limited  teams with to attendance to  with a greater ability to turn demand drivers in
likely to redistribute significance from bigger teams to smaller teams i.e. from teams 
it tends to distribute significance down the league and thus more  , games.  Furthermore
ance across more  match outcome, it does so by distributing a fixed stock of signific
do create more games where there is still some significance in the  off designs - play
although  In identifying match significance, an important stylised fact comes to light:
egression model. in a r
directly affected by competition design and may also enter as right hand side variables 
season outcome.  These match significance measures are  - of - a team achieving the end
I develop measures of match significance which are based on the probability of  odds,
via betting  its solution  found and hypothesis, which suffered from the same issue
the Uncertainty of Outcome  has (largely) been resolved i.e. economics topic
meaningfully enter a demand function.  Taking a cue from how another sports 
3methodological issues (notably  other arguing, that the findings are beset by 
flat part of the education production function and a whole host of economists on the 
arguing that the results are valid and indicative of the fact that we are operating on the 
economists with Hanushek on side  (and counting) argument between a number of
a situation which has led to a fifty year  – educational outcomes is somewhat inelastic 
findings that the relationship between funding and  contentious but  consistent
dissertation) is possibly due to the generally  I add to with this admittedly (which
production function literature dwarfing the social welfare literature.  This discrepancy 
two important elements required for optimal decision making is stark with the 
of volume of research, the difference between these  social welfare functions.  In terms
production functions and education  education I then present a literature review of both 
crisis’.
making process has been largely ignored and in no small part led to the ‘2003 funding 
ue that this element of the decision  of the education social welfare function.  I arg
for.  This requires knowledge not only of the education production function, but also 
exactly where on the production function frontier that policy makers should be aiming 
unding formula should consider just  leads to the suggestion that a fourth generation f
choosing a specific but arbitrary point on the production possibility frontier.  This 
the formula generation to show that the current third generation formula is essentially 
ity frontier and definitions of  education production function, the production possibil
formula ‘generations’.  I then explicitly tie together the underlying theory of the 
of funding  evolution with specific reference to education and the  funding formula 
for  nomenclature the rationale and  The chapter therefore begins with a clarification of
how to allocate funding across schools.  
lose out on national to LEA level funding and secondly to provide any guidance on 
on whether the latest version of national formula funding was causing them to  them
Authority (LEA).  The research was motivated by a request from the LEA to advise 
outcomes from all primary schools located in a single English Local Education 
production function using three years worth of data on the spending and educational 
ducation  the estimation of an e provided by  In chapter four the empirical content is 
4version of  ranked abstract plenary presentation at SMDM in Boston 2006 and a  - a top
n oral presentation of this research was presented as  authors in the RESPECT team.  A
ocus of this chapter, though I benefited from the advice and guidance of all fellow  f
modelling and application of results in the NICE framework are my own work and the 
accompanying model parameters (i.e. costs of primary care use).  The econometric 
evaluation and Zoe Philips was responsible for the initial collection of trial results and 
University of York.  Mark Sculpher was responsible for the overall delivery of the 
three economists: Professor Mark Sculpher, Dr Zoe Philips and myself, all of the 
economic evaluation component of the overall project which was the responsibility of 
on the  .  This chapter focuses  G0001150) Medical Research Council (grant reference
by the funded  Huddersfield as part of a larger evaluation of the RESPECT project
Committee, University of Leeds, University of Kent and the University of 
Hull local Pharmaceutical  Corporation, The University of Hull, East Riding and 
from the University of York, University of London, Swansea University, RAND 
The research contained in chapter two was conducted with a number of colleagues 
cknowledgements A unding and  , F ublications P 1.2
. correcting for the endogenous allocation of funding
line with the other two chapters, the practical effect is very modest, even after 
I find that increased funding does indeed lead to improved outcomes.  However in 
ation to allow for endogenous funding.   estimated with an adapt
school production functions, a random coefficient model is  heterogeneous incorporate 
conditional impact of funding of successful pupils across higher levels.  In order to 
the  assess logistic model to  - nimum score and a second ordered registers at least a mi
that a pupil  probability nature of the outcome data with a logistic model estimating the 
model  - part model is estimated to account for the bi - at key stages one and two.  A two
of pupils achieving set levels in mathematics and english  funding on the probabilities 
I then present an econometric model which attempts to estimate the impact of   
as painted by Hanushek. inelastic
or  endogeneity of funding) and a belief that the results are not as  insignificant
5help, support and permission to allow this work to contribute to my thesis.
colleagues and Swindon LEA for their - of that original work.  My thanks go to my ex
Dick Downing and Mary Atkinson and this chapter may be regarded as an extension 
was conducted with National Foundation of Educational Research (NFER) colleagues 
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who provided access to data on their primary and secondary schools over a 3 year 
inform the funding allocation decisions of the Swindon Local Education Authority, 
mmissioned to help  The work contained in chapter four was originally a project co
upon Tyne in 2010.
an invited speaker for the department of economics at the University of Newcastle 
(they had a special sports section prior to the conference meal) and more recently as 
2008 in Philadelphia in Annual Meeting of the Society for Medical Decision Making
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) and has been presented at the first European  7 Thinking in Sports (Bojke, 200
ook Statistical  A version of this chapter was published as a chapter in the b unfunded.
k that originates from my personal interests and was  wor Chapter three contains 
, 2010). et al (Bojke 
chapter was published in the British Journal of General Practice in January 2010  this
6The  . (2 part model) and medical costs seen from the perspective of the national payer
(HRQoL) (2 part model)  intervention of survival, the Health Related Quality of Life
part econometric model is estimated which estimates the impact of the  - A 5
RESPECT trial.  
role for econometrics is then derived and illustrated using the analysis of the 
ensitivity analysis.  A  s to produce a probabilistic such as the requirement  , described
NICE and the influence they have on the requirements of economic evaluation is 
Net Monetary Benefit identified and defined.  The role of national bodies such as 
l Cost Effectiveness Ratios and  care are outlined with key concepts such as Incrementa
The chapter is structured as follows: the objectives of economic evaluation in health 
national reimbursement bodies such as NICE.
ed ‘reference case’ framework of assessing and presenting evidence for  highly specifi
where the emphasis is on structuring the econometrics such that it conforms with the 
econometrics may be used in the developing field of economic evaluation in health, 
to demonstrate the means by which advanced  component is  econdly The s
. of an important theme within national health care policy
thus, this analysis represents an economic evaluation  , such as community pharmacists
government to spread the burden of primary care on other health care professionals, 
standing policy of the current  resources of GP time in primary care, it has been a long 
Given the increasing pressures on the limited  . 5 or more repeat prescriptions with 
of Pharmaceutical Care (PC) in the management of the medications of elderly patients 
effectiveness analysis  - a cost ,  ubstantive components.  Firstly This chapter has two s
Introduction 2.1
Care for the Elderly
Effectiveness Analysis of Pharmaceutical  - Cost 2
7Typically this  medication would be likely to secure higher returns if used elsewhere.  
ed to fund this particular  available, partly on the basis of whether the money requir
can then choose which medications etc to reimburse, subsidise or otherwise make 
L  o higher salaries, etc.  A national body charged with maximising a populations’ HRQ
education schemes; paying nurses  uses including pharmaceutical products; health
consistent meaningful comparisons across the whole spectrum of potential resource 
currency.  The use of generic measures of cost and benefit/effect potentially permit 
the national  s used, typically measured in rce (QALYs) and a measure of the resou
Adjusted Life Years  - , usually measured by patients’ Quality L o return in HRQ
interventions in health care has thus focussed on measuring an expected incremental 
ation of pharmaceutical products, medical devices and other  Economic evalu
medication for one patient cannot be spent on the care of another.  
as a Pound, Dollar or Euro spent on providing care or  - therefore the opportunity cost 
related quality of life subject to a fixed health care budget.  The cost concept is  - health
health care, this often translates to a desire to maximise a population’s health or 
scarce resources with which to address unlimited needs and wants.  In  limited and 
Economic evaluation addresses possibly the most fundamental problem in economics: 
General Objectives 2.2.1
Economic Evaluation in Health Care 2.2
very high value for future research.
translate to costly uncertainty (mostly around the health benefits) which implies a 
an observed within the trial.  However, the lack of statistical significance does  th
effective  - out may be more cost - life national roll - effective to treat, suggests that a real
- the fact that the econometric model suggests those at the margins are most cost
rmore, the limiting nature of the trial design in terms of population selected and  Furthe
,000 per QALY, well within the levels stated by NICE.    0 approximately £1
effective with an ICER of  - cost recommendations, the intervention is found to be 
reference case model, which does not use statistical significance in its 
ss according to the NICE  though the latter is not statistically significant.  Neverthele
to raise costs and improve the HRQoL  research finds the PC for the elderly appears 
8McEwan, 2001).  Nevertheless, both cost effect and cost  Levin and ility analysis ( ut
referred to as cost  th, then such analyses should really be (QALYs) is used in heal
based effect  - allocation of resources.  Note that as a utility , counterfactual ultimately, 
potential and,  would be achieved under one resource allocation and any other 
hat  signifies the difference between outcomes t ’ incremental difference an ‘ to.  Where 
is expected to make measured across the population the intervention is to be applied 
difference in effects against the mean incremental difference in costs an intervention 
l  attempts to measure the mean incrementa s analysis effectivenes - In general, cost
alues Threshold V
and  Benefit - et : Ratios,  N ffects Incremental Costs and E 2.2.2
incorporating model uncertainty (e.g. choice of survival models).
recent work is looking at formally  model (as typified by standard errors) though more
i.e. uncertainty surrounding individual parameter estimates within the  uncertainty
Typically this has been limited to parameter  for resolving that uncertainty.  
tached to it, then there is little rationale  something is very uncertain but has no value at
f  .  I uncertainty in the model) multiplied by the cost of making an erroneous decision
based on the probability of making an erroneous decision (which is based on the 
rationale underpinning this requirement is  The  value of resolving that uncertainty.  
quantify the uncertainty that surrounds the model or rather quantify the monetary 
requirement for economic evaluation in health, at least in the UK, is to  A further 
ocess rather than to determine the decision. making pr - decision
the  Thus, in practice, the main role of economic evaluation in health care is to aid 
alternative, national bodies may choose to reimburse almost regardless of the cost.)  
r any other treatments exist for a condition (if there is no other  evaluation) or whethe
population (though this element could be formally incorporated into an economic 
whether the implied resource use may reduce inequalities in health across the 
factors may enter the decision maker’s decision making process, for example  Other
after safety, efficacy and quality for purpose. hurdle
fourth  called  - the so – QALY  has been aided by comparison to a reference cost per
9confidence intervals difficult to construct.
effective or not and it is this property that makes meaningful  - intervention is cost
know whether an  negative.  Thus knowing the sign of the ICER is not sufficient to
intervention dominates usual care, note however that the ICER would again be 
If an intervention is both less costly and more effective then the  provision.  
ention in favour of the usual care  evidence clearly points to a rejection of the interv
and the intervention is dominated by usual care.  From a decision perspective the 
then the ICER is negative  ) 0 <    ( nd less effective a ) 0 >    ( is both more costly 
mics, a cost per QALY.  If an intervention  intervention, and in the case of health econo
The ICER therefore gives an expected cost per unit of change as a result of the 
mean effect across population under usual care conditions =   
mean effect across population under intervention conditions =   
mean cost across population under usual care conditions =   
mean cost across population under intervention conditions =    Where
(2.1) 	
   
   
   
    =    
   = 
expected incremental difference in the costs by the incremental difference in effect i.e.
Effectiveness Ratio (ICER), which divides the - is in the form of an Incremental Cost
evaluation. A common means of presenting the outcomes of an economic evaluation 
determined outside the economic  often  something that is  of the effect explicit, but
value  ry  makes the issue of determining a moneta ination of the two in practice) determ
which do not share the same metric (though there may be correlation between the 
The separation and comparison of outcomes into two separate conceptual components 
ce unit cost.   referen
monetary value via measuring the outcome in its natural metric and multiplying by a 
resource use such as nurse time or bed days in a general ward, may be converted to a 
tcome which has no obvious monetary measure.  On the cost side of the equation,  ou
naturally measured in (or converted to) monetary terms (and labelled costs) and an 
utility analysis separate outcomes into an expected difference in all things that may be 
10historical spending i.e. what has been the previous cost per QALY of spending in the 
economic rationale (e.g. the shadow price) but rather an approximation based on 
idance are based not on  question of interest.  The levels reported in the NICE gu
uch an ongoing  appropriately set level (£20,000 to £30,000 per QALY) is very m
However whether the UK has an  concern over the level of the threshold set.
rationing rather than a  - be inherently anti ) appearing to Daily Mail (notably the 
the general standpoint of the popular press  learning process is just beginning with 
indicates that for the UK at least, the  , effective drug breached the threshold limit
this  that  jection of reimbursement on the grounds  Herceptin and specifically the re
cancer ‘wonder’ drug  appraisal of breast  reaction to the  public the In the UK 
learning process will continue.’
marketplace, it is possible that a general consensus will emerge.  Until then, the 
op experience in this new  the medical profession and the general public devel
gain experience in allocating resources under increasing economic pressure, and as 
As public and private organizations  cost in the absence of one, but concludes that ‘
budget constraint or the opportunity  value, such as the shadow price of an explicit
a price for an intervention.  Weinstein suggests a number of ways of obtaining such a 
worth, is very explicitly separated from the mechanics of producing  is an effect much
that the decision of how  benefit, is  - utility) over cost - effectiveness analysis (or cost
- ’  Thus a benefit of cost consideration of unquantified factors must come into play.
making context, judgement and  - regardless of the decision and that ‘ number’
‘any algorithm for calculating such a  nor of  no magic number’ that he knows of ‘
) argues  1998 ( Weinstein  ceiling value),  (a.k.a. threshold value or 	
 In 
(2.2) 
     
  
effective if: - , then an intervention may be considered cost 
 effect i
decision maker’s maximum willingness to pay for an  effective.   For example, if a
- cost is  an intervention  whether  order to determine whether an ICER indicates 
maker’s monetary value of a unit of effect, which needs to be explicitly specified in 
difference in effect?  The answer will depend on the decision  difference and a positive
a result say of a positive cost  - on when the ICER is positive  What is the implicati
11(2.5) )    
    ( 
 )    
    ( 
 = 
across the population: competing technologies
differences between expectations or averages of outcomes and resource use for 
NMB into  I NMB may be written in a manner which splits the  I As with the ICER, the 
(2.4) 0 > 
 C  
  E  = 
and so the decision rule is:  

 b
incremental cost  NHB) which divides the  I Net Health Benefit ( Incremental  And the 
(2.3) 0 >    
    
 = 
: and so the decision rule is 

 multiplies the incremental effect b
NMB) which  I Net Monetary Benefit ( Incremental  formulisations are suggested: the 
ero.  Two  benefit is greater than z - effective if the net - intervention is considered cost
benefit framework suggests a subtle reworking of the decision rule such that an 
- ).  The net cit , op et al confidence intervals for ratios has well known problems (Hoch 
producing  when it comes to capturing the impact of uncertainty as, for example,
benefit approach is suggested as an improvement over the production of ICERs  - net
, 2002).  The  et al benefit approach (Hoch  - decision making is in the form of the net
er amenable to aiding  effectiveness analysis in a mann - presenting the results of a cost
further means of  	











years.
evaluation process is recognised and likely to be a research priority over the coming 
tainty in the  The need to address this rather important but neglected uncer NHS?
12limited budget.  As such it presents a set of rules and methods which should be 
sparent and consistent with the NHS objective of maximising health gain from a  tran
reference case model is there to ensure that methods used are valid, unbiased, 
The  . (NICE 2004) as outlined in the ‘Guide to the methods of technology appraisal’
At the heart of the NICE technology evaluation process is the ‘reference case’ model 
. 2003) (
et al  Hill  an obvious recognition of their credibility.’ – international benchmarks 
are already being used as  [which] technology appraisals internationally … 
represent an important model for  the NICE appraisal process found that it does ‘
review of  In addition a World Health Organization (WHO) Netherlands and Sweden.
tional bodies with similar functions exist in Scotland, Canada,  Na . population
for the relevant  effectively defines demand for medications it has reviewed
ce, to all intents and purposes,  constraints that bind PCT spending, NICE guidan
by NICE within 3 months of the guidance being issued.  And given the financial 
resources in England and Wales for medicines, devices and treatments recommended 
has been legally obliged to provide funding and  Since January 2002, the NHS
with specific diseases and conditions within the NHS.
guidance on the appropriate treatment and care of people  - clinical practice  
treatments and procedures within the NHS
guidance on the use of new and existing medicines,  - es  health technologi 
and voluntary sector
ill health for those working in the NHS, local authorities and the wider public 
guidance on the promotion of good health and the prevention of  - public health  
NICE produces guidance in three areas of health:
health. of ill 
on the promotion of good health and the prevention and treatment  England and Wales 
in  NICE is the independent organisation responsible for providing national guidance 
ole of NICE R The 2.2.3
13legitimate reference for the Committee.
with other programmes that are currently funded are possible and are a 
comparisons of the most plausible ICER of a particular technology compared 
inappropriate,  below which it would. … Although the use of a threshold is
which a technology would automatically be defined as not cost effective or 
6.2.6.7  The Appraisal Committee does not use a fixed ICER threshold above  
uide as follows: g specified within the 
lues is  effectiveness.  This range and adoption of threshold va - to rule in or out cost
a range of values beyond which rather substantial external factors would be required 
accordance with Weinstein this is not a single absolutely determining figure but rather 
. In   One of the roles NICE adopts is the formalisation of the threshold value, 
Regular review 
Independent decision making 
Robust assessment 
Inclusiveness 
Transparency 
adhere to:
e following key principles which models should  are based on th production processes 
NICE guidance  as whether to use a markov chain or decision tree model, however, 
such  – The methods guide does leave some degree of freedom in many model options 
effectiveness plane. 
- CEAC) and scatter plots on the cost Effectiveness Acceptability Curve ( - a Cost
combined implications of uncertainty in parameters and the outcomes demonstrated in 
(PSA) should be conducted on models to reflect the  Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis
Effectiveness Ratios (ICERs);  - remental Cost outputs should be summarised as Inc
be viewed from the perspective of the NHS and Personal Social Services; model 
5D); discounting should be at 3.5% p.a. for both costs and QALYs; costs should  - EQ
expressed in QALYs derived from validated instruments (e.g.  outcomes should be
adhered to unless there are substantial mitigating circumstances. For example, 
14Not only are NICE  standard.’ presently undeveloped or where there is no agreed 
is  ’ especially in areas of technology appraisal that ‘ methods of technology appraisal
further development of the  methodology rapidly developing, NICE are amenable to ‘
assessment is relatively young and the  However, as the field of health technology 
for a NICE rejection on exactly such grounds.
2003)  ( et al See Clark  effect with no empirical (trial based or otherwise) justification.  
aceutical company has made a favourable assumption of the length of a drug  a pharm
may lead to an analysis being rejected: for example, where an industry submission by 
measures), legitimate justification is required.  Failure to conform to the guidance 
iations from the reference case are permissible (e.g. disease specific outcome  var
And although  ) outputs, relevant comparators, time horizons, etc. be assessed (e.g. 
are to  explicit details on the means by which new technologies in England and Wales
The guide not only contains the notional range of threshold values but contains very 
have been taken into account, in the ‘Considerations’ section of the guidance.
l be explained, with reference to the factors that  the Committee’s decision wil
technology on these factors has to be increasingly strong.  The reasoning for 
6.2.6.11 Above an ICER of £30,000/QALY, the case for supporting the  
Where appropriate, the wider societal costs and benefits o
technology
eceiving the  The particular features of the condition and population r o
The innovative nature of the technology o
The degree of uncertainty surrounding the calculation of ICERs o
reference to factors including:
ive use of NHS resources are more likely to make more explicit  as an effect
ICER of £20,000/QALY, judgements about the acceptability of the technology 
effectiveness estimate.  Above a most plausible  - based primarily on the cost
the acceptability of a technology as an effective use of NHS resources are 
judgements about  6.2.6.10 Below a most plausible ICER of £20,000/QALY, 
15guidance and now has several explicit mentions:
to the reference case model in the technology assessment update to the original 2001 
tic sensitivity analysis was added as a requirement  thinking.  For example, probabilis
responding to academics’ (and perhaps to economists in other fields, controversial) 
hypothesis testing.  Arguably it is this shift that shows that policy makers are 
analysis combined with a lack of emphasis on traditional  probabilistic sensitivity 
notably a shift of emphasis to – in health from other branches of economics 
treatment of this uncertainty which probably most distinguishes economic evaluation 
, 2005).  It is the  et al ainty contained within the evidence (Claxton  in the face of uncert
the growing awareness of the role of economic evaluation in aiding optimal decisions 
he emphasis on PSA is a fairly recent change to the NICE methodology and reflects  T
industry submission to NICE.  
is) is a formal requirement of any  (never mind simple univariate sensitivity analys
op cit).  However, in NICE guidance, probabilistic sensitivity analysis  ( and McEwan
Levin  is less common than its importance dictates’  effectiveness texts, but in practice ‘
- ivity analysis is stressed in cost sensitivity analysis (PSA). The importance of sensit
economic evaluation is relatively more advanced is in the area of probabilistic 
attribute outcome measure in education.  Another area in which  - utility based multi
tives.  For example, there is no generic  many of the fundamental concerns and objec
arguably more advanced than it is in related fields such as education, despite sharing 
As a result of this openness to academic thought, economic evaluation in health is 
tive definition of appropriate methods.’ prescrip
authority demanding formal economic analysis of new technologies based on a highly 
making  - appraisal process in the UK provides the most stark example of a decision
The NICE technology  argues that ‘ (2005) s such, Sheldon A . other areas of research’
concern has been that it is distorting the balance of health economics away from
executive board, to its secretariat …that a real  - so many economists into its non
has drawn  argues that NICE ‘ (2005) considerable academic presence.  Indeed Buxton
contained a  Methodology Working Party and four Task Groups which have
methods and, indeed, this current published guidance has been heavily influenced by a 
s further research into new  in recognised areas, it promote amenable to innovations
16Claxton statistically significant or fall outside a Bayesian range of equivalence’
(posterior) mean net benefit irrespective of whether any differences are regarded as 
should be selected on the  maximise health gain for a given budget, then programmes 
coherent health care system and impose unnecessary costs.  If the objective is to 
Bayesian counterpart are arbitrary, are inconsistent with the objectives of any 
ssical statistical inference and its  the rules of cla … ‘ , then decision making tool
he case that as economic evaluation is essentially a  strongly t economists have argued 
The reason for the omission of inference/ statistical significance, is that many health 
econometric significance testing.   simply finds no formal role for statistical/
silent on the appropriate level of statistical significance as befits a document that 
levels of discount rates to be applied to costs and benefits over time, it is entirely 
document is very prescriptive in say,  within the entire document.  And whilst the
mention of ‘hypothesis test’, ‘hypothesis testing’, ‘statistical significance’ or similar 
and synthesising evidence on the technology being appraised.  Contrast this with zero 
e appropriate methods for assembling  analysis within the chapter which deals with th
references to probabilistic sensitivity  are some eight separate bullet point Indeed there 
effectiveness acceptability curves. - effectiveness plane and cost
- re confidence ellipses and scatter plots on the cost of presenting uncertainty a
cost effectiveness of the options being compared.  The most appropriate ways 
imprecision in all input variables into a measure of decision uncertainty in the 
…. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis should be used to translate the  5.9.3.1 
use of probabilistic sensitivity analysis.  
parameters can simultaneously be reflected in the results of the model by the 
technology before making the decision.  The uncertainty associated with 
ble to ascertain the true cost effectiveness of each  reached if we were a
that is, the probability that a different decision would be  – with a technology 
5.8.4 It is important for models to quantify the decision uncertainty associated  
reflect the combined implications of uncertainty in parameters.
models to  5.8.1 … Probabilistic sensitivity analysis should be conducted on  
17(CEAC).  
Effectiveness Acceptability Curve  - y a Cost effectiveness plane and/or b - the cost
ellipse on  - degree of uncertainty surrounding an ICER be represented by a confidence
NICE recommend that the  techniques which may be unfamiliar to general economists. 
on PSA motivates further detailed discussion of the  The emphasis that NICE places
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis 2.2.4
an EVPI requirement is somewhat surprising.
relatively small jump from PSA and thus the lack of  a calculating the EVPI which is
ow in the next section there is a method of  rch?  As I will sh value future resea
favourable ICER? And why does the reference case model not require submissions to 
uncertainty would cause decision makers to reject an intervention that had a 
what level of  NICE guidance is rather quiet on both these issues.  For example
However the  . also in the initial decision as to whether or not to adopt the technology
, but  a separate decision about the value of acquiring further information informing
as  The quote illustrates that the uncertainty enters at two points, most distinctly 
additional evidence required to support the adoption or reimbursement decision?’
the current uncertainty surrounding outcomes and resource use? …Secondly, is 
a technology be adopted or reimbursed given the existing evidence and  Firstly, should 
distinct but simultaneous decisions that must be made within any health care system.  
There are two conceptually  explanation, ‘ the following provide  (2006) et al Claxton
what exactly is the motivation for its prominence in the NICE guide? technology, then
uncertainty is obvious: if uncertainty is not to be used in accepting or rejecting a new 
statistics or econometrics in the traditional role of hypothesis testing where the role of 
ing puzzle for anyone who has been primarily trained to use  So this leaves an interest
. alternative treatments/technologies
simply based on the expectations of the difference in the costs and benefits of 
result of some statistical test based on arbitrary level of significance, but instead 
ective or not, is not the  eff - 1999).  That is, whether a technology is considered cost (
18been willing to pay for such a (positive) change in effect.
reduction in effect comes with a cost saving that is in excess of what they would have 
effective if the  - this also makes less effective interventions cost effect.  Notice that
which is less than the decision maker would have been willing to pay for that size of 
costly, more effective) the increase in effect has come at an expected increase in cost 
nt) as even for those ICERs in the upper right quadrant (more  of the upper left quadra
effect (note this includes the whole  - ICERs to the left of this line are considered cost
by the dashed line).   (shown 
 via a line which intersects the origin and has the slop
effectiveness plane  - t may be incorporated into the cost willingness to pay for an effec
effective new treatment.  The  - required to know whether the evidence points to a cost
, is  
 circumstance some knowledge of the maximum willingness to pay for an effect
quadrants.  In such  the upper right and lower left er of ICER lies within eith
therefore dominated by the conventional treatment.  It is not so straightforward if an 
the second instance, the new treatment is both more costly and less effective and 
ess costly and therefore dominates the conventional treatment. In  more effective and l
implied decision is straight forward.  In the first instance the new treatment is both 
If an ICER falls within either the upper left or bottom right quadrants, then any 
. effective but less costly
tains technologies which are both less  more costly; and the lower left quadrant con
costly; the lower right quadrant contains technologies which are less effective and 
upper left quadrant contains ICERs for technologies which are more effective and less 
both more costly and effective; the  ed is ew technology being assess which imply the n
is generally divided into four quadrants.  The upper right quadrant contains ICERs 
, the plane  or negative zero , benefits can be positive incremental  and  s cost incremental 
s both  A epresents one plot on the plane. such that each paired draw r (x axis) 
(y axis) against incremental costs  /effect incremental utility simulated or bootstrapped 
carlo  - paired monte plots )  1 - Figure 2 (as shown in effectiveness plane  - cost A 
19Effectiveness Plane - : An Illustrative Cost 1 - 2 Figure 
x
less costly
new treatment 
more effective
new treatment 
x
x
x
x
x
x
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0
less effective
treatment  new 
more costly
new treatment 
- NMB has the Cost I effectiveness plane, the  - ar.  Instead of a cost increasing popul
NMB approach is becoming  I Partly as a response to both of those questions, the 
the point of a 95% confidence interval?
) and secondly, given the ‘irrelevance of inference’, what exactly is  op cit et al  (Hoch 
c  the ellipse may be problemati one quadrant of the plane, the actual construction of
This however leaves two issues.  Firstly, where the simulated ICERs cover more than 
effectiveness place and a 95% confidence ellipse constructed.    - plotted on the cost
d.  The simulated ICERs may then be  strappe - data) and new ICERs simulated/boot
strapped from patient level  - according to the distributions implied by the data (or boot
effectiveness plane as follows: incremental costs and benefits may be simulated 
- vity analysis may be demonstrated on the cost The impact of probability sensiti
decision maker’s willingness to pay for that size of effect.
difference on effect but come at an expected incremental cost which exceeds the 
dashed line are those interventions which have an expected positive incremental  of the
right quadrant.  Those ICERs that are in the upper right quadrant but fall to the right 
this contains the whole of the lower  e effective, again not - evidence imply are not cost
those ICERs which fall to the right of the dotted line are those which the  Conversely, 
20effectiveness. - would meet the NICE criteria for cost
effective for threshold values above £20,000 it  - as the intervention is probably cost
it will asymptote to values above 0.5.  For this particular example,  effect, means that 
effective for very high values of  - it is more effective and likely to be found as cost
effective when the effect is valued low and hence starts at or near the origin. And that 
- ntervention is more costly means it is less likely to be cost more effective.  That the i
would represent a CEAC for an intervention that was both more costly and  2 - Figure 2
. (without having to repeat the simulation) gives the full CEAC
 of ating across all relevant levels .  Repe 
 lity is obtained for that level o probabi
exercise across all of a sufficient number of simulated values, then a measure of the 
effective.  If one does this  - considered higher), then the intervention is considered cost
higher than the cost (even if both are negative, where closer to zero is  benefit is 
if money valued  – monetary valued incremental effect against the incremental cost 
, then compare pairwise, the  
  simulated benefits and multiply them by a give
summarising uncertainty.  To plot a point on the CEAC one can simply take the 
tation  coming in the step that translates the simulation results to the graphical represen
or boot strapped distribution of costs and benefits.  The difference between the two 
construction of a confidence ellipse for ICERs by involving a Monte Carlo simulation 
he  axis.  In practice, construction of the curve is very similar to that involved with t - x
on the  
 axis agains - effectiveness on the y - does so by plotting the probability of cost
fective for different levels of a maximum willingness to pay for an effect.  It  ef - cost
probability that, given the statistical evidence, an intervention or new treatment is 
CEACs show the  . such as the British Medical Journal s economics publication
- now reached such a degree of acceptability that they now commonly feature in non
have  )  1994 ( et al attributed to Van Hout  CEACs, often demonstrating uncertainty.
Effectiveness Acceptability Curve (CEAC) as its analogous graphical tool of 
21research.  
as a means of valuing further  - y the other rationale for incorporating uncertaint
NMB approach is also useful in understanding  I The CEAC and  .   intervals for ICERs
So CEACs avoid the computational problems involved in constructing confidence 
uncertainty.
mity to 0 and 1 will depend on the  .  And, as discussed, the proxi   
 s 0.5 a
and asymptote to a value above  0 = 
 t  then CEACs will originate below the 0.5 line a
generally if an intervention is expected to be both more costly and more effective, 
discuss these issues in far more detail, but  2004) ( et al Fenwick  dummy variable.  
value surrounding the intervention  - p is the   e  , wher 2
 
 1 will asymptote to
show that the CEAC  )  (2002 et al ors capture the parameter uncertainty, then Hoch  err
example if a linear regression model is used to estimate the effect and the standard 
estimations and the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of effects and costs.  For 
Where the curve will originate from and end up is naturally closely associated the 
: Example CEAC 2 - 2 Figure 
22assumptions, is only a small additional step.  Since the empirical component of this 
intervention and simulated a CEAC, calculating EVPI, even without parametric 
NMB of an  I Furthermore, having calculated the  the next round of revised guidance.  
require a measure of EVPI.  This remains a paradox which may well be addressed in 
the NICE Guide. I.e. whilst the NICE reference model requires PSA, it does not 
it is therefore puzzling to find no reference to EVPI in  further evidence is available,
NICE do indeed make reimbursement decisions and then do revisit them later when 
second criteria (is further evidence needed to revisit this decision?) and given that 
s testing, but presumably as a means of informing Claxton’s  means of hypothesi
Accepting that the NICE rationale, as evidenced in the ‘Guide’, values PSA not as a 
. the decision to be revaluated
recommendation to permit the pharmaceutical under limited conditions, but also for 
with a  op cit) ( t al e uated in Clark  Infliximab in the treatment of Crohn’s Disease, eval
further information is available.  In practice this does occur, for example the use of 
current reimbursement position but also make a decision to revisit the evaluation once 
still make a decision on its  effectiveness and a high EVPI but - surrounding the cost
example, NICE could evaluate a technology, find there is a great deal of uncertainty 
pay for further research and thus also a means of prioritising research.  So, for 
cision makers should be willing to  therefore represents a theoretical maximum price de
is zero (cost of an error * a zero probability of making an error).  The EVPI also 
error * probability of an error) and the expected cost under perfect information, which 
n current information (cost of an  difference between the expected cost of an error give
probability of making a mistake reduces to zero.  The EVPI is therefore simply the 
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI), as perfect information implies the 
urther evidence.  This is known as the  reducing the uncertainty by obtaining f
function of the evidence, then the expected costs place an upper limit on the value of 
of the uncertainty surrounding the parameter estimates) and the uncertainty is a 
probability of making a mistake (i.e. a function  making a mistake is a function of the 
As the expected cost of  . respectively the probability of making an incorrect decision
show the costs of an incorrect decision and  NMB approach and CEAC  I mistake. The 
) and the probability of making that  
 a function o function of the cost of a mistake (
expected costs of making what turns out to be an incorrect decision; which in turn is a 
In general, the value of acquiring further information is essentially derived from the 
23  where , }  , … , 3 , 2 , 1 {   each for  that may be treated population ant  relev of the 
 a member  is defined for  s treatment for each  )    ,  (    Benefit  Monetary A Net
given population may be written as follows:
Formally, the decision facing any agency responsible for maximizing the HRQL of a 
Model ase C eference  NICE R the onstruct of  C Formal 2.2.5
mention them only for completeness.
.  Such models are beyond the scope of this thesis and I  such as the Gaussian Process
m,  led economists to seek means of modelling the outcomes rather than simulating the
tational expense of EVPPI has  requires simulations within simulations.  The compu
as it  expected cost and outcomes is not linear, for example in Markov models’ 
computation for models where the relationship between the parameters and the 
does require substantial additional  ‘ EVPI, EVPPI conceptually similar to
although  (2006) argue that  et al Claxton  useful than simple EVPI.  However 
used to identify where future research should be concentrated and is arguably more 
t; the effect on QALYs; the difference in costs; etc.).  EVPPI may then be  treatmen
effectiveness model (e.g. the time horizon of the  - the specific parameters of a cost
the partial EVPI.  This concept places a value of resolving the uncertainty surrounding 
ected Value of Perfect Information for a Parameter(s) (EVPPI) also known as  the Exp
A final ‘expected value’ concept which has entered the field of health economics is 
cost, etc.
the cost of increasing sample size in a study is matched or exceeded by additional 
mum price for a research proposal or can be used to determine whether  gives a maxi
endpoints, etc.) to work out the Expected Value of Sample Information (EVSI), which 
information methods may be applied to a proposed research design (sample size, 
h is unlikely to be able to promise absolution to that degree.  However value of  researc
willing to pay for further research which resolves all uncertainty.  In practice, further 
represents a theoretical maximum amount a decision maker should be  thus  The EVPI 
the computation technique till then.
, I leave a more detailed discussion of  chapter will contain a fully worked illustration
24balanced.
effectiveness analysis, but may be influential when a decision is finely  - cost
This parameter is not usually incorporated in a NICE  . population member
rameter is assessed across the expected life time of the representative  pa
, this  and some direct costs As with HRQoL . foregone income due to illness
such as  , the expected indirect costs from an individual’s perspective ,  ! 
may be subject to change.
his position is not universally agreed by the NICE technical committee and  t
they should not be included though from private correspondence I note that 
costs may not always be considered. Current NICE guidance suggests that 
Any direct costs related to the disease should be included but other ‘unrelated’ 
.  ifetime of the individual assessed over the l usually  costs are  not all , HRQoL
, excluding the treatment costs. Unlike  s under treatment i the individual
by  medical costs (from the payer perspective) created he expected direct  , t  ! "
events linked to the treatments.   of adverse  probability
due to expected differences in life span, quality of remaining life, or the 
effectiveness analysis. Differences in utility across population types may occur 
- as it represents ‘the effect’ in a cost E  is conventionally donated by an 
xpected HRQoL  and future health discounted by 3.5%. The e Years (QALYs)
reference case model, HRQoL will be measured in Quality Adjusted Life 
Following the NICE  the representative individual.  expected lifetime of 
strategy is to be implemented and also measured over the  treatment which the 
individual in the population in the year in  the the expected HRQoL for  ,  ! 
are:   The parameters contained in
s. e is considered in probabilistic sensitivity analys
easured with varying degrees of uncertainty, the impact of which  are m   contained in
he parameters  . It should be noted that t risk types and may vary across population
effectiveness parameters with values which  - represents a vector of appropriate cost
25: following decision
effectiveness, the decision maker is facing the  - in terms of cost . Therefore, benefit
that maximises the total population aggregated or population averaged net  treatment
, is thus the  #  , treatment e optimal  xpectation, th averaged e - obtained a population
Having  N. s from the population 1 to  $    represents a matrix of the individual 
averaged NMB and - subscript to represent the population i For convenience I drop the 
(2.8)
 %  
&
)  !  
  !  
 ( '

1
= )  ,  ( 
tive individual. a representative population rather than a representa
averaged across the whole population, it is therefore important to assess the NB across 
benefit for the average patient may not equal the expectations  - linear models, the net
- parameters are defined in non different age; sex; baseline risk). As several of the 
assessing the argument across a defined collection of representative individuals (e.g. 
These net benefits may be applied to a population of heterogeneous patients by 
. s associated with treatment  i individual 
for  and represents the composite cost parameter  !  +  ! " +  ! ( =  !  Where 
(2.7)  !  
  !  
 = )    ,  (   
Or more simply as:
(2.6) )  !  +  ! " +  ! ( ( 
  !  
 = )    ,  (   
us given by: is th for the representative individual  s B of any strategy  M N The 
, individuals, and possible treatment options assumed constant across time
This is  . the decision maker’s willingness to pay for an additional QALY 
. i individual
for the  s reatments t of implementing  s cost eatment  tr the expected  ,  ! (
26B will be negative.  M N I , the  
 ICER exceed
B will be exactly zero and if the  M N I , the  
 ICER B will be above zero, if the  M N I
, then the  
  B approach, if the ICER is belo M N I To draw equivalence with the 
attractive especially when probabilistic sensitivity analysis is required.
this simple means of comparison that makes the net benefit framework  nd it is  A
(2.11) ] 0 , )  ,  ( !  [ ) E ! ArgMax = # 
are negative), is equivalent to maximising the NMB.
With a common comparator, maximising the INMB (or taking zero, the baseline, if all 
effectiveness will be. - the larger the difference in cost
de of the INMB,  maximum willingness to pay for the effect. The larger the magnitu
effective given the  - equivalent; and less than zero, the comparator is more cost
s are  treatment effective; equal to zero the  - other common comparator is cost
being compared to the baseline or  treatment If the INMB is greater than zero then the 
(2.10) )  , *  (  
 )  ,  (  =
+ ! , ! 
’s NMB and the baseline’s, i.e., ference between the new treatment dif
is simply given by the  treatment then the INMB of any other  atment comparator tre
thus common  and as the baseline treatment *  . If we defined treatments two 
Net Benefit (INMB), which is defined as the difference between the NMBs of any 
An alternative way of looking at the decision problem is to calculate the Incremental 
averaged net benefit. - maximises the total or population
 which, given the expectations of the uncertain parameters s treatment i.e. choose 
(2.9) ] )  ,  ( !  [  E ! ArgMax = # 
27but also those future patients who may benefit from the treatment.  They argue that 
argue that population of interest includes not only all current patients,  et al and Briggs 
ary of interest  However, it is the EVPI summed across the population that is the summ
EVPI per patient.  
Averaging across all simulations gives the population averaged EVPI or average 
.  )  ,  (  ) E ! max > )  ,  (  ! max to the difference between the two where 
is equal  the opportunity loss , the parameters meant that the other choice was optimal
.  If however the realisation of  )  ,  (  ) E ! max = )  ,  (  ! max loss is zero i.e. 
simulation choice, then the treatment choice is the correct one and the opportunity 
averaged  Where the individual simulation choice equals the . )  ,  (  ! max
option would have been the best for that realisation of the world i.e.   
One can then look over all the simulations and choose which  . )  ,  (  ) E ! max
according to  effective i.e. choose s ost cost  which treatment is on average the m
one can determine  

 necessary for construction of a CEAC, then for a given value o
possible to obtain a measure of this.  For example, having conducted the simulation 
Having simulated incremental outcomes it is  maximum expectation of the NMB.  
That is the EVPI is equal to the expectation of the maximum NMB minus the 
(2.12) )  ,  (  ) E ! max 
 )  ,  (  ! max ) E = -.
he EVPI is given by: 2006) show that t ( et al Briggs 
. 

 the societal maximum willingness to pa (univariate) sensitivity regarding
Effectiveness Acceptability Curve which has the additional benefit of incorporating 
- a Cost as The impact of such uncertainty is usually presented  . uncertainty
work is most amenable to demonstrating the impact of parameter  B frame M N
economics decision making framework, the  - recognisable and requested in a health
straightforward, whilst the ICER is the summary measure that is most immediately 
The answer is  . necessary to formulate the decision framework in two analogous ways
is  Indeed one may question why it  . optimal strategy will be the same in each case
Given the equivalence of the two approaches there should be no surprise that the 
28.  Firstly and possibly most importantly,  ory of using econometric models a greater hist
There is an interesting contrast with economic evaluation in education where there is 
SA. averaged outcomes and input for P
The difficulty involved in converting econometric results into population  
to making predictions on the original scale.
tests and so an emphasis on models and techniques which are not so amenable 
eans to conduct hypothesis  The use of econometrics by practitioners as a m 
less need for more complicated econometric techniques.
of effect.  As confounding effects are balanced by the randomisation, there is 
permits simple comparison of treatment and control arm means as a measure 
The prevalence of Randomised Controlled Trial clinical data in health, which  
Additional reasons may be: 
based methods.   - regression
The main statistic of interest, the ICER, being a ratio, is not amenable to  
est that the main reason for this is that:  sugg et al Hoch 
the economist’s main statistical toolkit within economic evaluation in health care. 
2002)  identify a lack of use of  ( et al Hoch thus  mainstream econometric techniques’
Evaluation is often seen as a branch of health economics divorced from  ‘Economic 
Economic Evaluation (Health)  The Role of Econometrics in 2.2.6
Where r = discount rate (NICE state a rate of 3.5%)
(2.13)  % /
0 / ) 1 + 1 ( / /  2 . EVPI EVPI for the population =  
) and that:   t I estimates of incidence over this period (
), and  T ology ( this requires some estimate of the expected lifetime of the techn
29constructed.  That is, it must be: 
ly developed framework that health economists have  must be geared to fit in the high
However in order for econometrics to reach its potential in economic evaluation it 
comparisons.
A means of combining data from separate trials e.g. mixed treatment  
selection models. - self
iable techniques or Heckman style  which may be addressed by instrumental var
random attrition  - selection issues such as non - A means of correcting for self 
whose characteristics are different to those which generated the data
extrapolating over increased time horizons or across a population  A means of  
benefit from the technology.)
subgroup analysis (e.g. 2.2.1.1 the capacity of different patient subgroups to 
An increasing interest on heterogeneous effects across a population or  
echniques which can eliminate confounding factors. implies a bigger role for t
randomised trial data  - sources including observational data.  The use of non
effectiveness models often draw evidence from a number of  - Complex cost 
to be:
ic models in economic evaluation in health, the main reasons would appear  econometr
There has, however, been a growing awareness of the benefits of implementing more 
, there would appear to be little cost in using econometrics. ) from hypothesis testing
and away  ( tion has not (yet) reached the same emphasis on predictions and PSA  educa
And on the ‘cost’ side of using econometrics, as economic evaluation in  . models
difference  - in - regression methods are an obvious solution, in particular difference
econometric  – accounting for confounding factors lest omitted variable bias occurs 
for  there are relatively very few RCTs in education and so some means is required 
30illustrates this issue. 3 - Figure 2 . averaged across the relevant population effect
evaluation is concerned with an  specific effect, whereas economic - produce a subject
ric model will  economet linear - t the coefficient produced in a non evaluation in tha
This has a major implication for economic  . the other covariates (Ai & Norton, 2003)
incremental effect of a technology on the original metric will not be independent of 
and therefore the  linear (any of the standard link functions other than the identity link) 
- However GLM regression models tend to be non .   framework, are often justified
models, or GLM in a panel data  odels (GLM) M inear  L eneralized  the use of G
s awkward in this sense and so  .  And cost and QALY data are almost alway models
linear  - and lead to non zero (or a boundary at 1 for QALYs) - skewed, strictly non
are  forward when the original data are awkward i.e. demonstrate heteroscedasticity, 
the original metric is not always straight  dentification of the incremental effect on I
latter half of requirement 1 which causes the most substantial changes.  
) it is the  where substantial changes are implied more than a difference in semantics
effect, rather than the marginal effect (which is  al increment evaluation is about the 
the usual hypothesis test).  And although economic  least, place less emphasis on
ignore or, at the very  change to usual practice (with the exception that we simply 
would therefore require little  effect of a variable which arginal identification of the m
Requirement 1 would seem to coincide with the core objective of econometrics, 
Able to compute Expected Value of Information calculations. 3.
Effectiveness Acceptability Curves - production of Cost
bility sensitivity analysis and  Amenable to the requirements of proba 2.
averaged across a population measured in terms of QALYs and costs.
A means of identifying the incremental effect of a technology,  1.
31and though there is  2 3 4
5
5 6 7 8 6 7  6 same as the expectation of the average effect i.e.
linearity is that the average expected effect is not the  - The consequence of the non
. 2 e larger incremental change in probability of 
individual in the population, has a much  average , in many respects the  individual 2
whereas  3 e and  e1 of  3 shows two small changes for individuals 1 and  diagram 
The  not translate to a shared consistent shift on probability scale for each individual.  
scale does  9: e  .  However the effect of this consistent shift on th  : consistent amount
scale by the  9: the effect on each individual will be to move them all along the 
Thus  .  : regression model has identified an incremental effect of an intervention of
scale at positions i1, i2 and i3.  Suppose the  9: place them on the  characteristics 
Now suppose there are three individuals in the population whose individual 
to a probability, a metric with a policy relevance.   9: maps the linear combination
.  The familiar sigmoid  ranging from 0 at the base of the axis to 1 at the top axis - the y
probability of a positive response (of say achieving a remission in a given month) on 
axis and the  - located on the x 9: model with  logit a standard  represents 3 - Figure 2
Linear Model - in a Non mpacts Incremental I iffering  D xample of  E :  3 - 2 Figure 
32covariance matrix may be used to simultaneously draw all parameter  - of the variance
in a meaningful manner.  Use  to the original metric and demonstrate the uncertainty
parameters simulated from an appropriate normal distribution may then be converted 
Thus  may assume approximate normality of regression coefficient estimators.’
Thus, if sample sizes are large, then we  be expressed as weighted sums of responses. 
improves as the number of random variables increases.  Regression coefficients can 
variables are approximately normally distributed and that the approximation 
hich roughly state that weighted sums of independent  central limit theorems, w
This premise is reasonable because of the  ‘ Frees (2004) argue that  regression) and 
assumption that underpins standard hypothesis testing in  same  (and this is the 
ed, it is assumed that the regression coefficients approximately are  normally distribut
data indicates they may be.  Although the outcome on the original metric may not be 
simulate alternative values for the parameter estimates with the likelihood that the 
sure of the uncertainty surrounding the point estimate, one may then  errors as a mea
variables, but also the standard error of those estimates.  Treating these standard 
example, regression equations produce not only point estimates of the effect of 
uirements 2 and 3, are related and also pose no practical restrictions.  For  Req
general population in certain characteristics.
if it is known that sample population differs from the  9 marginal distribution of 
generates the conditional distribution, one could even apply this to a different 
lation.  Indeed as the regression method  out the general popu through 9 distribution of 
estimate the conditional expectations may be used as a representative sample of the 
especially if the data used to  , a fairly trivial step potentially  is  9 distribution of 
onditional expectation and a marginal  given the c ; marginal distribution of 
.  However the step from generating expectations from the  9 marginal distribution of
the  and which is a function  of the econometrically derived conditional expectation 
, ; in the mean of the marginal distribution of decision makers are more interested 
,  9 n o ; states that whilst econometricians focus on the conditional expectation of
values of the explanatory variables will not suffice.   In statistical terms this argument 
a meaningful scale at evaluated at average  coefficients or coefficients converted to
of primary interest to decision makers acting on behalf of society.  Thus a table of 
some interest in the variation of the effect, it is the former rather than the later that is 
33be willing to pay to resolve this uncertainty.  This exercise may be repeated for 
of £100 per patient and thus represents the maximum value a decision maker would 
This leads to an average value of loss  cases, the decision would have been incorrect.
is correct and the simulated realisation of the world leads to no loss, but in 10% of 
In 90% of cases the decision  . per patient intervention is cost reducing, by say £1000
ave thrown up 10% of cases where the  intervention, however the simulation may h
simulations.  For example at a MWTP of zero, the data may point to a rejection of the 
inconsistent with the final decision and then averaging this value across all 
determining the INMB for each simulation which is  This is constructed by 
estimate of the EVPI.   an also be used to construct  microsimulation results may  The 
range.
can be used to construct the whole CEAC over an appropriate  
 differing levels of
.  Conducting this exercise for  
 e for that level o effectiv - that an intervention is cost
NMB is positive may then be used to plot the probability  I simulations for which the 
NMB for each simulation.  The proportion of  I and therefore work out the  
 a value of
h iteration and multiply the incremental QALYs by  sufficiently large, one can take eac
Repeat steps 1 to 3 for a sufficient number of simulations.  Once the simulation set is 
QALYs.
over population to obtain population averaged incremental effects on cost and 
for expectations for individuals and average  Convert to the original metric 3.
individuals within a population.
Apply the drawn parameter values to the fixed characteristics of the  2.
realisation of the world; 
covariance matrix, treat this draw as a one possible  - parameters and variance
from the regression  Sample new parameter values for all parameters  1.
model, one can: 
So in practice, in order to conduct a PSA and construct a CEAC from a regression 
the true values is essentially a Bayesian view of what is a frequentist technique.
ure of the probability of  Note however, the treatment of the standard errors as a meas
variables in a model thus accounting for correlation between parameter estimates.  
34are perhaps more in need of improved prescribing than those in younger age groups.
2003). Therefore, the elderly population  , et al rug therapy (Crealey  to problems with d
been reported that as many as 31% of geriatric hospital admissions are directly related 
1995). It has also  , has been estimated at $76 billion annually (Johnson and Bootman
2000), the cost of which  , et al Thomas  1998; , et al Gray  1991; l , et a (Leape  treatment
his includes both over and under  t priate medication, people may receive inappro
p to 80% of elderly  and u related adverse events  - are more likely to experience drug
s a result, elderly people  and a 1996) , (Zermansky m 75% of the roximately  review app
doctors are believed to only  Of these repeat prescriptions, see the doctor. required to 
being  issued without the patient  - often re 1997). These are prescriptions that are 
, ptions for older people are repeat prescriptions (Royal College Physicians prescri
pproximately 78% of  an a and  59 years)  - 5 than younger adults (those aged 1
n average those aged 60 or over have 3.6 times more prescriptions  o counterparts:
than their younger  re prescribed a greater number of medications  diseases and a
e chronic  mor m known to suffer fro are UK population  Members of the elderly 
Background Trial  2.3.1
RESPECT trial: Pharmaceutical Care for the Elderly The  2.3
trial. over Time)
of Shared Prescribing for Elderly people in the Community  (Randomised Evaluation 
ng data from the RESPECT  next section I attempt to illustrate these concepts usi
type of regression models chosen i.e. a move towards the GLM framework.  In this 
decision makers.  This change in end product however may have implications for the 
d in formats which are meaningful to  implication of these results in metrics an
move beyond producing tables of coefficients with hypothesis tests to producing the 
requires an extension to the way results are produced; the econometrician needs to 
ostly  This m .   framework this highly specified techniques chosen must fit in within
in order to be policy relevant, the econometric  economic evaluation in health and 
given the framework and requirements for , This section has thus argued that
relevant values of MWTP.
e used to construct a curve over all  different willingness to pay for an effect and can b
35impact on health related quality of life, as measured by the SF36 and achieved small 
d some  2001). The results of the study suggested that PC ha Bernstein, month period (
- randomised controlled longitudinal clinical trial with repeated measures over an 18
Pharmaceutical care of the Elderly in Europe Research (PEER) study was a 
this population. The  to simultaneously assess the health outcomes and costs of PC in
of just one randomised trial that has attempted  1998). The RESPECT team are aware
, et al Kennie  assessment of the cost effectiveness of PC in an UK elderly population (
ating to the prospective  literature rel there is relatively little 2000), , et al (Bond 
potentially achievable by implementing pharmaceutical care in specific populations 
population. Moreover, whilst modelling studies have suggested that savings are 
es or are specific to an elderly  the US and few come from community pharmaci
2003), evidence is predominately from  , et al patients with specific diseases (Crealey 
hilst there is evidence that systems of pharmaceutical care can benefit  However, w
include some element of pharmaceutical care. services could 
services commissioned locally by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). These enhanced 
allows for nationally set essential and advanced services and enhanced  , April 2005
went live in  , which  Services Negotiating Committee and the NHS Confederation
ical  for England and Wales between the Department of Health, the Pharmaceut
Moreover, the new contractual framework for community pharmacy that was agreed 
term drug treatment of patients.  - should take on the extra role of looking after the long
that pharmacists  1999) recommends , In addition, the Crown Report (DoH patients. 
vide ‘pharmaceutical care’ for their  recommend that UK pharmacists pro ciation  Asso
he Royal Pharmaceutical Society of GB and the UK Clinical Pharmacy  Both t
and improve patients’ quality of life. 
related problems,  - outcomes.  This has the potential to reduce the drug bill and drug
therapeutic  compliance and concordance with treatment, and achieve specified 
PC aims to improve communication, promote  , making - patients in decision
implementing and monitoring a ‘pharmaceutical care plan’ (PCP).  By involving 
octors, patients and carers in designing,  operate with d - doing so pharmacists co
moderating their drug care.  In  their patients, pharmacists take a greater role in  of
care  be ultimately responsible for the  (PC).  In this system, while doctors continue to 
proposed a system of ‘pharmaceutical care’  1989)  ( Hepler and Strand , In the US
36the perspective of the health service and include all NHS costs and community 
Costs are evaluated from  to receive the intervention were excluded from the analysis. 
d atients who died before being randomise P used the EMIS medical records system.
randomised to receive the intervention and who were registered with GP practices that 
effectiveness analysis is based on patients alive at the time they were  - The cost
the PCP. alternative treatments. PC involves the setup and monitoring of 
the identification of potential drug interactions, appropriate doses and feasible 
related problem and  - medications, the establishment of therapeutic goals for each drug
he patients history and  , 2010), but in brief, consisted of a detailed record of t et al
Pharmaceutical Care Plan (PCP). The PCP is described in detail elsewhere (Richmond 
operate with doctors, patients and carers in designing, implementing and monitoring a 
- in which pharmacists co The intervention is the provision of ‘pharmaceutical care’ 
4. - Figure 2 see followed up until May 2005, 
ere  intervention in March 2003 and the last in September 2003. All patients w
irst PCT being randomised to receive the  lasted a period of 12 months; with the f
and so acted as controls. All patients were recruited by May 2002. The intervention 
received training, community pharmacists provided their usual dispensing services 
ervention in a random sequence.  Until each group  controls until they received the int
patients) began pharmaceutical care in five successive phases.  All five acted as 
Each PCT (the five groups of practices, pharmacies and  their consent to take part. 
ome, well oriented in time and place, and able to give  required), who were living at h
with repeat prescriptions for five or more drugs (excluding drugs taken only when 
aged more than 75 years  and East Yorkshire were recruited. Eligible patients were 
es, from each of the five Primary Care Trusts (PCT) in North  community pharmaci
general practices, each associated with about three  24 time series. 760 patients from 
randomised multiple interrupted  cluster  trial design is a pragmatic  RESPECT  he  T
Statistics and Descriptive Trial Design 2.3.2
effectiveness.  - cost
imates of  any attempt to synthesise the data on cost and health outcomes to produce est
2003). However, the study did not make  , et al but insignificant cost savings (Sturgess 
37a cost per unit to the drugs prescribed as recorded on the prescription (i.e. strength, 
and applying  ug tariff dr appropriate  t.  Medications were costed using the each patien
For each resource element, costs were aggregated by month for  appropriate unit cost.
the  A&E visits over the same period. Each resource element was valued by 
ified all inpatient hospitalisations, length of inpatient stay, outpatient visits and  ident
(or electronic paper records if letters were scanned on to the EMIS data base). This 
resource use was identified by manually checking each recruit’s paper medical record 
GP or nurse and telephone calls to the GP or nurse.  In addition, secondary care 
to see a doctor, nurse or to attend a primary care clinic, all home visits made by the 
laboratory tests ordered through primary care, all visits to the general practice surgery 
2005 included all medications prescribed (acute and repeat prescriptions), all  May 
items that were downloaded from the EMIS databases for the period May 2001 to 
and supplemented by examination of the patients’ paper medical records. Resource 
Resource use was downloaded directly from the EMIS database within the practice 
.   l’ period) contro - (this is henceforth referred to as the ‘pre intervention costs - pre
use data were available for identifying the  - worth of resource - that an additional year’s
the period May 2001 to May 2005. Given that the trial began in May 2002, this meant 
ecords for  Health service resource use by patients was obtained from general practice r
pharmaceutical care visits.
locum cover were varied to the extremes of no locum cover and locum cover for all 
all home visits. For sensitivity analysis, the assumptions regarding  and the recruit, and 
up visit between the pharmacist  - cover the pharmacist’s time spent on the initial set
appropriate unit cost. For the base case analysis, it is assumed that a locum would 
sting the intervention, the time in minutes was multiplied by the  basis. In co
meeting with the recruit. This information was sent to the trial office on a monthly 
GP to discuss the care plan was recorded. Pharmacists recorded these data after each 
monitoring visit. In addition, the time spent liaising with the patients  between each
amount of additional time spent dealing with the patients pharmaceutical care plan 
Pharmacists recorded the amount of time (in minutes) spent with each patient and the 
QALYs.
5D instrument to  - years using the EQ - adjusted life - terms of quality measured in
pharmacy costs. All costs are presented at 2004/5 prices.  Health outcomes are 
38These  to death and a negative score indicates a state of health that is worse than death. 
health, a score of 0 is equivalent  y score of 1 corresponds to perfect assigned. A utilit
245 possible health states, for which a global value (i.e., a “utility score”) is  one of
A recruit’s response effectively locates them into  od and at the end of the trial. peri
at recruitment, at the start of the intervention, 3 and 12 months into the intervention 
5D questionnaire at five time points throughout the study:  - completed an EQ Patients 
oints P ollection  C ata  Design and Utility D rial  : RESPECT T 4 - 2 Figure 
provided by the Hull Royal Infirmary.
cluding blood tests, were costed using published estimates in combination with data  in
was not specified, a cost of a practice nurse clinic visit was applied. Laboratory tests, 
costed by type of consultation and location of consultation. Where the type or location 
er diem cost to each day spent in hospital. Primary care consultations were  specific p
- length of stay based on the admission and discharge dates and applying a specialty
resources were costed by specialty. Inpatient care was costed by calculating the total 
ad been discontinued the latest available price was applied. Secondary care  the drug h
dose and drug name). In addition, a dispensing fee was applied to each item. Where 
39220.00 (1208) 240.00 (1179) 190.00 (1000) 149.00 (643) Total
132.90 (991) 151.70 (1252) 107.10 (794) 71.90 (557) Secondary Care
23.00 (46.70) 23.50 (41.70) 19.30 (34.20) 21.50 (39.60) Primary Care
4.36 (17.42) 4.50 (17.51) 3.47 (15.24) 3.13 (14.69) Laboratory Results
52.70 (71) 52.40 (129) 53.90 (274) (280) 46.20 Repeat Medications
7.16 (30.30) 7.99 (35.00) 6.74 (22.70) 6.75 (26.00) Acute Medications
Interven - Post Intervention Control Control - Pre
Unadjusted Monthly Costs by Trial Period. Mean (SD) £ :  2 - 2 Table 
13.5% Withdrawn during observation
3.84% Deaths during observation
20 5 2.17 7.2 No. of repeat prescriptions
56% Gender (female)
98 75 4 80 Age
Max Min Std. Dev Mean Variable
Trial Descriptive Statistics : RESPECT  1 - 2 Table 
population.
the sample descriptive statistics for the trial  s show 3 - Table 2 through  1 - Table 2
control period.
control period from the  - U1 is the point which separates the pre and 12 months).
the intervention period (0, 3  the intervention period as they were collected relative to 
through U4 depend on when the PCT started  however utility points U2 , respectively
t 13 and 48 months  be seen all patients had their first and last utility collection taken a
e relevant PCT.  As can  th utility data collection for a patient in th x x represents the  U
y data collection points where  shows the fixed and staggered nature of utilit 4 - Figure 2
(QALYs).
adjusted life years  - years in order to calculate quality - scores are used to weight life
40However if data are Missing Not At Random (MNAR) then ignoring this missing 
, 2003). et al Briggs techniques used will accommodate these missing mechanisms (
dom (MCAR) or Missing At Random (MAR) then the maximum likelihood  Ran
out is Missing Completely At  - implications for the econometric modelling.  If drop
out process and the  - not to participate.)  Thus some comment is possible on the drop
illness; and the remaining 38% to other reasons (e.g. spouse dying, or general wish 
to  patients moving to nursing homes or to addresses outside the trial area;  27% due 
withdrawal obtained where possible.  Of the withdrawn patients: 35% were due to 
period).  Withdrawals were followed up by the research team and reasons for the 
e observation  attrition (not due to death over th (full)  a 13.5% rate of  general there was
and there is a high degree of attrition in respondents.  In  recruitment and baseline) 
(with the only tangible dip being between  virtually unchanged over the time period 
values are  time.  However the differences are not statistically significant, the median 
effective intervention as you would expect the natural course of utility to fall over 
before falling again when the intervention is finished.  This is indicative of an 
tervention  from recruitment to baseline then an increase over the period of the in
show a decrease in mean values  5D  - The descriptive utility scores as obtained by EQ
per patient monthly cost.
ndary care costs (i.e. hospitalisations) appear to be the major drivers of  model.  Seco
underlying upward trend in costs that should be taken into account by the regression 
intervention period indicating that there may be an  - costs over the early non
As can be seen there appears a general increase in monthly health  cost outliers.   - high
a number of  are also skewed with  costs  distribution of the  he  shown in the table, t
Although not  the dependent variable in the regression models).   is variable (which 
The descriptive statistics show the some of the major contributors to the total cost 
0.269 0.689 0.596 432 Final     U5 
0.261 0 0.69 0.600 452 12 Months  (end of PC) U4 
3 0.27 89 0.6 86 0.5 503 3 Months  (during PC) U3 
6 0.28 2 0.68 67 0.5 532 Baseline   (before PC)      U2 
6 0.27 0.691 0 0.58 611 Recruitment                     U1 
SD Median Mean N
eriod P rial  T by  Scores tility U 5D  - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of EQ :  3 - 2 Table 
41incorporating time.  
statistical analysis following the experimental design requires some means of formally 
up and include in the intervention estimate the negative effects of aging.  Thus the 
l inadvertently pick  then a simple one variable analysis of the intervention effect wil
declines and they are more likely to require more hospitalisations, prescriptions, etc. 
time from the analysis may induce bias.  If we expect that as patients age their health 
thus omitting  not particularly reasonable to assume that time has no causal effect, and 
intervention variable and time.  As we are dealing with elderly patients it is therefore 
control observations before the intervention then there is a correlation between the 
he  t rve  related characteristics as a source of bias.  However due to the fact we obse
patients and thus (in the absence of attrition) eliminates omitted experimental unit 
intervention is independent of the characteristics of the PCT and the individual 
o control or  individual (i.e. the data are longitudinal) and that the allocation t
observations.  The design ensures that we observe multiple  observations per 
intervention)  - months, before a final period of control (or perhaps more precisely, post
rvention regime for 12  conditions before they are cluster randomised into the inte
we observe observations from individuals (in clusters of PCTs) under control 
series.  That is  - The experimental design of this analysis is a cluster interrupted time
Econometric Framework 2.4.1
Model ic  Econometr of Pharmaceutical Care 
Effectiveness  - Estimation of the Costs, Benefits and Cost 2.4
refinements needed to the econometric model.
assumption that attrition is mostly MAR or MCAR and there are no further 
trial and is a random event, we proceed on the  cancer is independent of the
shows that cancer is the single most listed ailment, on the assumption that the onset of 
falls into the area of MNAR.  However further inspection of the withdrawal reasons 
d with an outcome measure (costs) then this potentially  measure (QALY) or correlate
individuals who withdrew from the trial due to illness.  As illness is partly an outcome 
or the general attrition group may be classified as ignorable, this still leaves some 20 
mates.  Assuming that attrition due to moving away  mechanism may lead to biased esti
42interest that is neither a cost nor a benefit, is the probability of death and is modelled 
regression framework as opposed to retransformation.  Finally a further outcome of 
ty outcomes that are not zero or one, we use GLM  nature of the cost and utili
that a difference has occurred.  To deal with the skewed heteroscedastic and bounded 
of an individual reporting perfect utility and then expected difference from 1 given 
.    Similarly for utilities, we estimate the probability  zero cost - expected value of a non
a given month is then given by the probability of a cost occurring multiplied by the 
zero cost.  The expected cost in  - expectation of a cost conditional on there being a non
ccurring in a particular month and then model the  probability of say a cost o
part model.  That is, we model the  - nature of outcomes we model them as a two
modal  - and skewed. We deal with these data issues as follows: to account for the bi
modal  - nstrates similar properties being bounded (this time by 1), bi 5D demo - the EQ
negative distribution.  Utility, as measured by  - skewed, heteroscedastic, strictly non
modal distribution with a spike at 0 and a  - of the cost outcome variable shows a bi
combination of theory and data considerations.  For example, the nature  resolved via a
such as the choice of regression technique and the means of modelling time, these are 
However, adoption of the DiD framework still leaves a number of modelling issues 
attributed to an intervention over a given time period. 
fits that may be  we may estimate the incremental differences in costs and bene
analyses: once we have a formal means of identifying counterfactual transition rates, 
effectiveness  - separate transition paths makes it a natural means of informing cost
licitly identifying these  However, the emphasis of the econometric model on exp
than the choice of a particular regression technique such as Ordinary Least Squares. 
difference in the difference).  DiD thus represents an approach to modelling, rather 
t/programme conditions (i.e. the  the transition that would occur under treatmen
Such models work by estimating a natural transition over time (i.e. the difference) and 
outcomes over time, even when there may only be two time points: before and after. 
DiD models is the formal modelling of  , 2004).  The key component of Frölich (
identification strategy in the assessment of the effects of treatments or social policies 
Difference regression model (DiD).  DiD econometric models are considered a main 
- in - mplement in this research is the Difference For this reason, the analysis model we i
43Finally as it is not clear how  utility data are conducted on the remaining 599 patients.
should not have their utility or cost data included in the trial analysis, thus cost and 
otocol stated that patients who died prior to the intervention starting (30)  The trial pr
emental difference. thus a means of calculating the incr
one, gives the expectation for the same individual under intervention conditions and 
with the same variable values with the exception of the intervention dummy set to 
hazard or survival function. Repeating this process  natural/control hazard, cumulative
repeats, time and setting the intervention dummy to zero and calculating the 
regression results/estimates, plugging in some values for age, gender, number of 
onditions as implied by the regression model i.e. by taking the  under different c
given time point may then be calculated by taking the expected values of the outcome 
dummy.  Note that the incremental effect of the intervention on an individual at a 
D approach is implemented by the inclusion of this latter intervention  month.  The Di
prescriptions and a dummy variable indicating whether the month is an intervention 
fit with the following explanatory variables: a patient’s age, gender, number of repeat 
parametric model was  Weibull t which patients are at risk of death.  A time interval a
the first 12 months of observed data, the survival analysis takes month 13 as the first 
period, they are excluded from the analysis, and there are thus no recorded deaths in 
the research protocol excluded individuals who died in the control  period.  As  control
Survival is modelled using all 629 patients who were alive at the beginning of the 
Expected difference from perfect utility given a difference occurs 
Probability of perfect utility 
Expected cost given cost has occurred 
cost occurring Probability of a  
Survival  
models in a DiD framework.
Thus the econometric component of the analysis consists of five conceptually separate 
framework are that costs and utilities are set to zero.
plications of death for costs and benefits within this  using a survival analysis. The im
44impact will depend on the value of their other characteristics.  Observations were 
, the impact of that estimate will be different across individuals as the marginal  month
stimate a single parameter for say  linear although the model will e - the models are non
change, captured by the time intervention interaction.  It is important to note that as 
related  - as a time consistent shift captured by the intervention dummy and a time –
mental effect of the intervention  captured by the quadratic time variables; and the incre
linear transition over time  - patient and PCT random effects); a natural/control non
observable characteristics (age, gender and number of repeats) and unobservables (the 
ents’ cost and utility based on  allows for heterogeneous starting points for pati
level giving PCT and patient specific constant terms.  The specification of the model 
).  Random effects are estimated at patient and PCT  int_month intervention month (
d set to the value of month if it is an  month is not an intervention month an
); and an month intervention interaction set to zero if the  inter intervention period (
); and intervention dummy set to one if the month is in the  month_sq month squared (
);  month ); the month number ( norepeat observation ( having at the start of the period of 
); the number of repeat prescriptions the patient is recorded as  sex patient is female (
); gender dummy variable set to one if the  age start of the period of observation (
survival models are: a patients age at the  - ll non explanatory variables contained in a
The  linear.  - commonly used with the Gamma distribution and makes the model non
skewed and heteroscedastic.  The link function chosen was the log link which is 
as chosen on the grounds that it is bound by zero and may be  Gamma distribution w
suited.  For the ‘costs’ and ‘differences from one’ models, the  - and logit were not well
costs or perfect utility was relatively scarce and the symmetric properties of probit  - no
obit link functions was on the grounds that the outcome of  more common logit or pr
(cloglog) link function.  The adoption of the cloglog link function as opposed to the 
log  - probability models the distribution chosen was Binomial with complementary log
For the two  .   Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004) - (Rabe Stata  package for
gllamm survival models were estimated using the  - within patients and PCTs.  All non
level setting to incorporate the clustering of outcomes  - Models (GLMs) in a multi
The remaining four regression models were all estimated using Generalized Linear 
intervention ended was not used in the model.
contamination of pharmacist behaviour) then data collected after the  - the post
intervention data (are there lagged effects of the intervention or is  - to incorporate post
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 exponential model was rej
properties are better understood amongst the target audience.  An even simpler 
264) but the Weibull model is chosen as its  - 263 as opposed to  - likelihoods of  - (log
survival models had a marginally superior fit to the Weibull model  logistic - and log
normal  - on fit and other considerations such as ease of interpretation.  For example log
Numerous regression models were estimated and the final choice of models is based 
egression Results R 2.4.2
. relationship
trial and so we implement a linear  extrapolation beyond the time frame of the
linear transitions between these time points.  This approach would not permit any 
quadratic relationship but to estimate dummies for each of the time points and assume 
ing this may have been to impose no linear or  which we have no data.  One way of do
the year.  This requires us then to have some measure of utility at time points for 
requirements of the economic evaluation require us to estimate the utility throughout 
time points, but the  four  tility is available on  on u much of the data.  Secondly, data
a quadratic relationship from just 12 data points (on costs) may have been asking too 
dependent effect of the intervention.  Attempting to obtain  - which to estimate the time
onship, but only twelve discrete months from  from which to estimate a quadratic relati
discrete months per patient  tion.  For example, there are up to 43 for economic evalua
is motivated by the periods for which we observe observations and the requirements 
ope possible difference for the intervention,  simpler linear constant and straight line sl
The parameterisation of time in the model, as a quadratic natural progression and a 
converge  
were used for both patients and PCT level but not practice level as the model failed to 
.  Similarly random effects  correlation between parameter estimates across outcomes
separately.  The estimated parameters will still be unbiased however there will be no 
, however the likelihood would not converge and the outcomes were modelled  gllamm
ing the mixed response options in  would have been modelled simultaneously us
zero cost or difference from perfect utility. Ideally all the (GLM) outcomes  - was a non
of observation and in the expectation models if the patient were still alive and there 
he patient were still alive at the time  included in the probability regression models if t
46147730 - 5558.92 - 722.60 360.83 - 264.45 - likehd - Log
0.02 (0.01) (0.01) 0.14  0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) PCT RE
0.34 (0.01) 1.06 (0.05) 0.17 (0.01) 8.62 (1.73) Pat RE 
1.75 (0.18) 

0.01 (0.00) - 0.03 (0.01) - 0.01 (0.01) - 0.01 (0.09) - PC Month
0.14 (0.03) 0.39 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.76 (0.77) 0.02 (0.23) PC
0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) - 0.00 (0.03) - 0.36 (0.39) Month Sqd/100
0.01 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.02) 0.19 (0.21) - Month
0.13 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) (0.10) 0.45 - 0.18 (0.04) No. Rx
0.03 (0.00) 0.08 (0.01) - 0.01 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) - 0.09 (0.02) Age
0.19 (0.03) - 0.31 (0.04) 0.08 (0.03) 0.47 (0.32) - 0.88 (0.23) - Sex
1.90 (0.21) 6.67 (0.52) 2.06 (0.36) - 4.44 (4.08) 15.94 (2.06) - Constant
Log
Gamma/
Cloglog
Binomial/
Log
Gamma/
Cloglog
Binomial/ Weibull Model
Cost  P(cost  Utility Loss P(Utility =1) Survival
) Statistically significant results in bold , Standard Errors in brackets (
Regression Results : RESPECT Trial  4 - 2 Table 
the other three models.
ith the modelling approach used in  in the binomial utility model so it is consistent w
level effect, statistically significant in three of the four models.  The PCT RE was kept 
effects at patient level was justified in all four models and the use of a higher PCT 
GLM models the use of random  boundaries of 1 and 0 respectively.  In the four 
heteroscedasticity and the inability of OLS models to incorporate the natural 
link GLM models were preferable to OLS models on the grounds of fit,  - Gamma, log
symmetric models.  The  - cantly better for the non costs with model fit being signifi
models which identified whether there was a 1 in utility or a deviation away from 0 in 
significant.  Additional sophistication was warranted however for the binomial 
was very small and never statistically or economically  impact of the intervention
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in the Weibull regression was statistically different from 1 (the null hypothesis 
47loss, the effect is negative (less loss) and increasing in magnitude over time. 
elow zero).  In terms of utility  at which the intervention effect is predicted to fall b
positive (indeed it would be at month 55, a time point well outside the sample period, 
is positive but declining over time, within a 12 month period the effect is estimated as 
fect of the intervention  For the probability of reporting perfect utility the ef by time.  
given time is a function of the constant dummy plus the slope coefficient multiplied 
Similarly the incremental impact on the linear component of the intervention at any 
a loss increases. perfect utility falls and the loss where there is
down: the probability of  – over the 43 months is unambiguously in one direction 
within sample period of 43 months, the utility loss very gently rises.  The net effect 
o 40 months before declining.  Over the  a utility loss, gently increases over time t
The amount of utility loss over time, given that there is  recording perfect utility falls.  
.  Over the period of 43 months, the probability of a patient  again starting to rise
nes from month 1 to month 26 before  the probability of perfect utility decli For utility, 
impact over the 43 months of data is of an increasing trend in costs.
The overall  given that a cost has occurred is always increasing over the time frame.
ining but the impact on the amount of a cost,  maximised at 24 months before decl
The values are such that the impact on the probability of a cost occurring is 
cost variable, the probability is increasing with time but decreasing with time squared.  
time frames).  For example with the probability of a  points (and indeed over different
take into account the values of more than one parameter evaluated at different time 
In terms of the transitions over time, the picture is more complicated as one has to 
direction.
nt in all cases and always in the ‘right’  number of repeat prescriptions is significa
surprising as the fewer number of observations reduces the power of the test.  The 
significant results occurring most frequently in the utility regressions.  This is not  - non
nerally statistically significant with  Results are ge cost given that a cost has occurred.
a cost/resource use per month and a higher  ility, a higher probability of incurring ut
report high deviations from  , higher hazard of dying, less likely to report perfect utility
numbers of repeats have a  ly patients and patients on greater starting points, elder
The regression results are broadly in line with a priori expectations.  In terms of 
48female patient with 7 repeats (average characteristics for a member of the study 
.  Thus for an average 80 year old  ) 9: ( exp y  log link models the inverse is simpl
and for the  ) ) 9: ( exp 
 ( exp 
 1 For the cloglog models the inverse link function is
. ) < :  9 (  , = 
 ) < :  9 (  , = combinations i.e. 
effect in an original metric one must apply the inverse link function to both linear 
linear.  To understand the incremental - the inverse link function as the model is non
point, but it does not represent a difference on a meaningful scale even if put through 
represents the difference in the linear component at any given time  < :  9 
 < :  9 hus T
dummy is set to one and the intervention time interaction set to the relevant month.  
same individual over the same time scale with the exception that the intervention 
, for the  < :  9 then create a linear combination, I  the relevant regression equation.   from
are the estimated coefficients  < : intervention time interaction set to zero, where the 
each month that we wish to evaluate (0 to 12), with the intervention dummy and 
for  < :  9 create a linear combination  set of given characteristics I a patient with a or  F
transitions over time.
of the random effects i.e. zero) and show the differences in their starting points and 
individuals with differences in their observed characteristics (I assume the expectation 
illustrative cases representing  als we present four ent individu be different on differ
transformation bias and the predictions are unbiased.  As the incremental effect will 
- entered the regression model in their original untransformed metric there is no re
ons.  As GLM has been used and the outcome variables  under intervention conditi
original metric via the inverse of the link function for individuals under control and 
For this purpose we convert the linear functions to the expected outcomes in the 
.   in a meaningful metric difference the intervention has made expected incremental 
and not the  9: , they show the estimated linear component and general trends testing
lthough the regression results are informative and may be used for hypothesis  A
Deterministic Expectations 2.4.3
to calculate the impact over time. surprising given the lack of data points, especially
The lack of significance of several of the parameter values in the utility models is not 
49systematic differences in expectations rather than produce a representative sample.
note the choice of individuals is to identify  – in the trial to the most frail  the healthiest
nce in outcomes for a set of individuals ranging from  expected outcomes and differe
random effect for the individual is set to zero.  The diagrams therefore show the 
By average I mean that the  and an average 90 year old female with 15 repeats.  
with 10 repeats  female  an average 85 year old ent with 7 repeats;  year old female pati
for an average 75 year old female with 5 repeats; an average 80  and expected costs
utility costs  expected  show the probabilities of survival;  7 - Figure 2 through  5 - igure 2 F
. } 
> ) 9: ( exp 
 { exp
= ) > (  by  t ity of being alive in a given month  component is converted to a probabil
The effect on the probability of survival is conducted in a similar manner, the linear 
there is approximately no incremental effect in month 12.
f a cost occurring by 5% in the first month which steadily declines until  probability o
the intervention over time.  Thus for an average patient the intervention increases the 
and it is the difference in these probabilities which represents the incremental effect of 
convert the estimate of the linear component into a probability  The inverse functions 
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 ) ? ( prob 
0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 ) < :  9 (  , =
0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 ) < :  9 (  , =
1.30 1.31 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.32 < :  9
1.21 1.19 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.01 0.99 0.96 < :  9
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Month
atient P verage  A or an  Probability of a Cost Occurring Over Time f : 5 - 2 Table 
5. - Table 2 shown in 
population), the expected transition over time of the probability of a cost occurring is 
50ntuitively appealing with expected  Comparing across individuals, the results here are i
multiplied by the expected utility loss if a utility loss occurs. ; reporting perfect utility
one minus the probability of  individual is alive at that time point; multiplied by 
: the probability that the  the mathematical expectation of as derived by  over time 
shows the expectations of reported utility for the same average individuals  6 - Figure 2
difference attributable to the intervention.
etely overlapping survival curves show that there is no substantive  almost compl
As expected from the regression results the  graphs rather than between the graphs.
expectations under control and intervention conditions i.e. the difference within the 
erest, the intervention effect, is captured by the difference between the  impact of int
probability of dying in any given month relative to the 75 year old.  However the 
expectations in that a 90 year old with many repeat prescriptions has a higher 
The results are in line with a priori  .   axis runs from 1 to just below 0.9) - the y
(though notice the scale of  between individuals with differing observed characteristics
difference in the probability of survival  shows the clear systematic  5 - Figure 2
Over Time Probability of Survival : 5 - 2 Figure 
51number of prescriptions.  
the incremental effect is clearly largest for the elder population with the greater 
s to higher costs and specifically higher costs at the beginning of the intervention,  lead
systematically differs across types of individuals.  Although the intervention always 
of the intervention.  Unlike utility the incremental effect of the intervention 
number of repeat prescriptions and like utility, there is a clear incremental effect  and
survival and utility the graphs show an intuitively correct picture rising costs over age 
and is calculated in an analogous manner to utility (survival*prob cost*cost).  As with 
shows the expected costs over time for the four representative individuals  7  - Figure 2
ver Time O Expected Utility  :  6 - 2 Figure 
case. utility with the incremental effect being broadly similar in each 
higher expected  the latter six months of the period with the intervention suggesting 
over  expectations predicted under control and intervention conditions.  Specifically
between the utility  here we can see daylight  – that the intervention makes 
occurs when we consider the differences within individuals  5 - Figure 2 difference to 
The  as we move from the healthiest to the frailest individual. utility declining 
52approximately 7 days in perfect health), the statistic of interest from a NICE 
Although these are relatively modest changes (0.02 QALYs represents  + £703). to
thiest (+ £89  heal costs is nearly 9 times higher for the frailest group compared to the
+ 0.020) attributable to the intervention whereas the difference in  to types (+ 0.016 
that there is a pretty much constant incremental effect in QALYs across population 
and confirms  7 - Figure 2 nd 6 a - Figure 2 The table quantifies the picture portrayed in 
£35,185 £703 £4977 £4274 0.020 0.383 0.363 90 year old with 15 repeat drugs
£17,980 £302 £2510 £2207 0.017 0.537 0.520 85 year old with 10 repeat drugs
£9,515 £155 £1566 £1411 0.016 0.620 0.604 80 year old with 7 repeat drugs
£4,661 £89 £1080 £991 0.019 0.680 0.661 75 year old with 5 repeat drugs
 PC Usual  PC Usual (£/QALY)
ICER Costs (£) QALYs
ear Y ver a  O ifferences  Totals and Incremental D Expected : 6 - 2 Table 
ver Time : Expected Costs O 7 - 2 Figure 
age*prescriptions population.
period and the associated ICER for the average representative of that 
summed over a 12 month  shows the expectations of costs and utilities  6 - Table 2
53across individuals of the population.  Given the nature of  of the intervention  effect 
systematically different  One final note should be made on the implications of the 
the individuals and averaged across the population. 
relatively modest effect of the intervention on both expected costs and QALYs across 
.  The analysis shows the  per QALY 10,000 £ Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of  - Cost
ntal  .  Giving an Increme 92 £1 with an incremental cost increase of  QALYs  9 0.01
he population averaged incremental effect of the intervention was an increase of  T
characteristics such as age or gender.
the individual specific random effects as if they are fixed  That is we treat and PCT.
cost and utility regressions, including the estimated random effects for each patient 
averaged effect across the 599 patients who were part of the  - we report the population
which we believe to be representative,  ter the population  As we have no reason to al
correcting for differences in population.
effectiveness parameters via a regression model provides a reasonable means of 
- population is thought to be different to the study population, then obtaining the cost
out  - less if the roll olds with 2 or fewer repeat prescriptions).  Neverthe - 50 yr
whose characteristics are beyond those that were used in estimating the results (e.g. 
population, although it would be unwise to apply the regression results to individuals 
lysis to a hypothetical  data generating mechanism is uncovered one may apply the ana
scope in defining the population and is not restricted to the study population.  As the 
n calculating the average effect across the population the analyst has some  However i
of the expectations. patient will not be the same as the average
produce an expectation for the average patient as the expectation of the average 
linear it is not sufficient to  - As the models are non population which is required. 
across the  averaged  these differences  tive it is  pec From a societal decision making pers
one that would be outside that usually reimbursed.
a range well under the NICE threshold to  – £4,661 per QALY to £35,185 per QALY 
anges can have a relatively large effect.  In this case the expected ICERs range from  ch
perspective is that of the ICER and as QALYs enter as a denominator, then small 
54of the parameters around their expected values does not equate to an assumption of a 
interpretation of a frequentist matrix.  The assumption of normality of the distribution 
covariance matrix, a Bayesian  - parameter uncertainty is characterised by the variance
This approach thus assumes the  . st statistical packages though easily recoverable mo
regression parameter estimates.  This matrix is typically hidden in the background in 
covariance matrix of the  - defined by the parameter estimates and the variance
from a multivariate Normal distribution with expectations, variance and covariances 
models  s for all variables in the regression  < : regression model, we simulate a set of
s contained in the  < : i.e. instead of just using the point estimates of the model 
parameter values with a probability derived from the standard errors of the regression 
native  .  A Monte Carlo simulation method is used to provide alter expectations
means of constructing the CEAC are similar to those used to produce the 
detailed.  The practical  previously  We will illustrate the uncertainty using a CEAC as 
urrounding the estimate. consider the probabilistic uncertainty s
very small effects may cause decision makers to exercise their prerogative and 
primarily be base on the value of the ICER as it is under £20,000, the estimates of 
n the NICE Guide indicates that a NICE decision will  analysis.  Although 6.2.6.10 i
Economic evaluation of health care technologies require probabilistic sensitivity 
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis 2.4.4
trial population.
effects of the intervention on a wider population making small extrapolations from the 
he  this chapter, but the regression results produced could plausibly used to estimate t
receive the intervention and have the lowest ICER of all.  It is beyond the scope of 
(slightly less than 75 or with fewer repeat prescriptions) who would potentially 
ation  plausible that trial design has omitted the effect on some members of the popul
that had the biggest expected health gains and the lowest increase in costs, then it is 
bitrarily drawn a line at age 75 and 5 repeat prescriptions, given that it as this group  ar
not draw up PCPs for all patients).  However the nature of the evaluation has 
desirable) to deny the expertise to groups of patients (although presumably they will 
of patients, once a pharmacist has been trained then it is perhaps not possible (or even 
groups - PC, it is not one of those treatments that it easy to target towards specific sub
55clear in this case.
The issues which make the quantitative interpretation of a CI for a ratio are  plane). 
Y gain (simulations located in the North West  show a higher cost with negative QAL
effectiveness plane) and 5%  - East corner of the cost - (simulations located in the South
outcomes show a lower cost of PC associated with a higher QALY outcome 
tion of the simulated results as more than 5% of the simulated  qualitative interpreta
for the ICER is the  The CI effectiveness plane.  - these simulations plotted on the cost
shows  8 - Figure 2 The upper half of  the simulation results.   Bayesian interpretation of 
a  Interval as implied by  redible the expectations and a 90% C shows  7  - Table 2
PC dominated PC dominates £10,000 ICER
0.102 0.023 - 0.019 Incremental QALYs
0.790 0.405 0.614 QALYs in PC
0.736 0.402 0.595 QALYs in usual care
£579 £150 - £192 Incremental Costs
£2,777 £1,109 £2,001 Cost of PC
£2,484 £1,005 £1,809 Cost of usual care
(upper limit)
Centile
th Simulated 95
(lower limit)
Centile
th 5 Simulated 
mean
ulation pop
Expected 
Sensitivity Analysis Simulated  Monte Carlo  :  7 - 2 Table 
construction of the CEAC. 
rmits  comparing this against the paired simulated value of the incremental cost pe
and  
 framework,  converting effects on QALYs to a monetary values according to
population averaged incremental costs and benefits recorded.  Adopting the NMB 
imulations with each  used to produce a distribution of outcomes from multiple s
is  onte Carlo simulation  and the M the same procedure as the deterministic results
derived distributions may then be converted to expectations in the original metric via 
om draws from the estimation  The new parameter estimates as defined by the rand
linearity of the model. - non
normal distribution of the effect on the original metric.  Again, this is a function of the 
56some rather extreme values.
results, a ratio constructed from two values fairly close to zero and the sampling of 
inty in the  value lower than £10,000 as may be expected.  This is due to the uncerta
£8,500.  Accordingly the CEAC crosses the 0.50 probability line at a  approximately 
, deterministic calculation that of the different to  is  CER simulation mean I
that occurs because the  The simulated results do throw up one slight surprise and
for costs.
to see that the need for greater evidence on utility exceeds that  dissertation, it is clear
in this  formal EVPPI the costs is not surprising.  And although I do not conduct a 
rather than  there is more uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the intervention 
picture that  discrepancies in the available evidence for these components, the overall
baseline utility points and 2 intervention data points for utility.  With such 
pared to just 3  transition of costs and 12 to estimate the incremental effect, com
utility.  There were 36 observations per individual from which to estimate a baseline 
of the levels of uncertainty that surround the estimation of the cost and that of the 
h 1 is a function  zero and does not approac bove a from (just)  That the curve originates 
effective lies between 0.775 and 0.812. - cost
,  the probability that pharmaceutical care is  consistent with NICE’s threshold range)
threshold between £20,000 and £30,000  per QALY (as is  and converges to 0.85.  At a 
the MWTP for a QALY increases from £0 to infinity, the CEAC increases from 0.1 
effective, quantitative measures of limits have a clear and distinct meaning.  As  - cost
CEAC shows the implied probability that the intervention is  simulation data.  As the
hows the CEAC constructed from the same set of  8 s - Figure 2 The lower half of 
57not shown here)
s; assuming the 
lausible values: 
ernative costing 
nal  io Addit ums.  
two additional 
use if the GP or 
ultation with the 
GPs and nurses 
used within the 
s  ptotes to 82% a
uggests that the 
EAC
58
(n n costs.  The univariate sensitivity analysis
ssuming the lower band of intervention costs
three assumptions at the boundaries of pl
t the sensitivity of the analysis to alte to tes
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intervention is 74% likely 
Nevertheless, even given 
: Simulated Impact 8 - 2 Figure simulated outcomes, the local maximum occurs at an earlier point around £8,500.
i.e. a local maximum at £10,000.  However as this graph is based on the  changes
a local maximum at the point at which the decision  is expected to have The EVPI 
: Expected Value of Perfect Information 9 - 2 Figure 
. 
 function o
which show EVPI per person as a  9 - Figure 2 cient to produce  is suffi 
  range o
and conducting the exercise across a  
 simulations gives the EVPI for that level o
world makes the choice incorrect and the cost of that decision.  Averaging across all 
may be used to identify the likelihood that the realisation of the  individual simulations 
choice between intervention or traditional care.  Once the choice has been made, the 
an expected NMB may be calculated and a decision made for the  
 each level o
s are conducted using the simulated data in the following manner: for  EVPI calculation
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) 2.4.6
no change in decision is implied.
the analysis is largely robust to different costing assumptions and  demonstrates that
59% of the time at a threshold value of £20,000 per QALY. be correct 74 PC would 
.  Furthermore the PSA indicates that a decision to implement  sufficient to reimburse
the range that a national body like NICE would consider the evidence to generally be 
.  This is in  , with an ICER of £10,000 effective in an elderly population in the UK - cost
ESPECT trial has shown that the evidence points to PC being  The analysis of the R
Conclusions 2.5
utility as the key parameter on which to focus future research.
Although not conducted here the EVPPI would be expected to identify the effect on 
ion of a large number of elderly population on many repeat prescriptions.   the assumpt
being a function of  s The high value EVPI ranging from £99 million to £112 million.
This works out a population  . individuals per year envelope population of 272,000 
s per practice (derived from original RESPECT data), this implies a back of the  patient
with approximately 8,500 practices in England with a relevant population of 32 
5 years and  respectively.  Assuming an intervention lifespan of  is £78.04 and £88.27
mber of the population  £20,000 and £30,000 the EVPI per me For threshold values of 
probability is weighted by an increasing value of a QALY.
of the value of a QALY and hence the EVPI becomes a straight line as this constant 
intervention has a negative impact on QALYs.  This particular statistic is independent 
ly the probability that the  probability of an error in decision occurring is effective
effect is that the EVPI initially falls.  As the value of a QALY increases, the 
value of a QALY increases, the likelihood of an erroneous decision falls.  The net 
, however as the  large s relatively local maximum, the probability of making an error i
Around the  maximum at the point at which the implementation decision switches.
the cost of making an error also increases and leads to the local  making an error and 
the probability of  f a QALY increases,  incorrect decision is quite low.  As the value o
uncertainty surrounding the impact on QALYs, the cost and probability of making an 
$
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
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 the conventional treatment.  
minimising option which is  - oice is the cost effective ch - the cost 
 or small values o F
60ess, furthermore by (marginally)  possibility in their decision making proc
implementation of the programme.  Decision makers may wish to incorporate that 
underestimated the benefits and overestimated the costs of the effects on a national 
n it is plausible indeed likely that the trial has  trial (with the lowest costs).  The
may be affected, and given that it was the younger patients who benefited most in the 
intervention and that should the intervention be rolled out nationally, younger patients 
subset of the population that may receive the  example, as the trial was limited to a 
for  – characteristics and this may have important consequences for this study 
provided a means of identifying heterogeneity between individuals with differing 
th costs and QALYs.  However the econometric approach has  uncertainty of bo
of would have been able to incorporate the correlation in the  bootstrapping
unable to conduct PSA over both costs and benefits simultaneously, whereas a simple 
l transition over time and furthermore, because of convergence problems, I was  natura
stage models and a quadratic form for the  - analysis.  For example, I have assumed two
this may be seen as both a cost and a benefit whose magnitudes differ according to the 
– ence of using these techniques is that a formal model structure is required  consequ
and use bootstrapping of evidence within the clinical trials to produce PSA.  One 
economic evaluation in place of simple analysis which compares means across groups 
The chapter has also illustrated that the techniques of econometrics may be used in 
es/is made available. evidence (particularly on the effect on QALYs) becom
intervention, but that this decision should be revisited in the future when further 
effective  - the current evidence clearly points to a cost – conclusion becomes clear 
rms two distinct questions, then the  criteria and accept that the evidence info
appeals to the underlying principles contained in the NICE guide and adopt Claxton’s 
relatively benign assumptions on population and lifespan of intervention.  But if one 
million based on  approximately £100 QALY,  quite substantial at £20,000 per
surrounding the effect on QALYs and the large (and increasing) elderly population, is 
extent this is reinforced by the calculation of EVPI which, because of the uncertainty 
s has caused some unease in the audience.  To some  team meetings and research forum
than relative) magnitude of these outcomes, presentation of these results in RESPECT 
per individual.  Although NICE draw no significance to the actual (rather  and £192
average of 0.019 QALYs  h period are rather modest at an utilities over a twelve mont
However the analysis has also identified that the incremental differences in costs and 
61methods.
means of addressing data issues that are beyond the reach of simple clinical trial 
ric model becomes a valuable  circumstances the structure imposed by the economet
attrition or selection rules (i.e. randomisation may no longer be relied upon).  In those 
random  - forward clinical trial data is being used such as trial data where there is non
ta other than very straight  techniques in economic evaluation may well occur where da
estimate of how great this bias was. Thus the major benefits of using econometric 
extrapolating beyond the population of the trial it would be possible to achieve an 
62Kuypers, 1995; Noll, 2003; Cairns, 1987). 
(Borland and Macdonald, 2003;  emand has not reduced this uncertainty  design to d
off  - limitations in the statistical techniques and the lack of a model which relates play
, in particular and on the impact of league design in general  demand within support 
n.  Although there exists an extensive literature on the determinants of  unknow
off designs on attendance at regular season matches is broadly  - impact of play
both within and across different sports, indicating that the size and nature of the 
off structure  - competitions, there is little consistency in the design and size of play
ing outcome.  However although a common feature of many professional sport
for which a team is still in contention for the end of season  games regular season 
argued to influence regular season attendance by increasing the proportion of  are  they 
is that  offs  - European soccer leagues.  One such motivation for the presence of play
partly determining promotion and relegation issues in open league formats such as the 
in North American sports such as Major League Baseball and American Football to 
ing champions  systems are common and feature in many diverse sports, from determin
off  - promotion/relegation to different divisions are finally determined.  Such play
end of season outcomes such as winning the overall championship or 
off system, whereby the allocation of  - season play - structures is the addition of a post
amenable element added to league  - competition formats.   One such common policy
the form of attendance is an important component in the design of league and cup 
acteristics and the demand for that product in  between a sporting competition’s char
Identifying and understanding the relationship  promotion or avoiding relegation.  
season goal such as winning a cup, a league championship, gaining  - of - desirable end
ome way to resolving whether a team will achieve some  a contest which will go s
giving matches between two teams some contextual meaning; a match can be seen as 
and American football are contested in league and cup competitions as a means of 
s such as association football (soccer), baseball, basketball, rugby  Popular team sport
Introduction 3.1
ttendance. A
Season Game  egular  R mpact on  Offs and the I
- lay Season P - ost P esign of  Economics of the D The  3
63match is televised and, importantly, the context or significance of the match in 
match such as: the teams/individuals competing, the cost of attendance, whether the 
is a function of the characteristics of that  j and  i between opponents  t of a match 
,  @/ ; microeconomic model of demand which argues that the demand for attendance,
ovided by a conceptual  The framework in which to assess this research question is pr
s esign Off D - lay P
mpact of  Demand for Attendance and the Theoretical I The 3.2
discuss the policy implications.
and  the results of the statistical estimation present I then  by heterogeneous teams.  
estimating the parameters of the model given skewed, heteroscedastic data generated 
discussing the statistical issues which arise in  and derived before describing the data 
off relevant variables are  - games.  Secondly I describe the method by which the play
off system may influence demand in regular season  - season play - introduction of a post
the demand for attendance which identifies the theoretical framework by which the 
which is structured as follows:  first I outline a simple model of the determinants of 
,  ing each step are thus covered to some degree within this text t methods for conduc
Although conceptually simple, all these steps have proved difficult in practice and 
identify the effects of different designs.
off designs to  - s under other hypothetical play ttendance Prediction of a 3.
empirical data; and finally using he relevant parameters  Estimation of t 2.
influence regular season games;
off design may  - he theoretical means by which play Identification of t 1.
and falls into three distinct steps:
conceptually simple  Premiership division.  The process of conducting this research is
tier  - matches in the English professional soccer league immediately below the top
off system on the attendance at regular season league  - impact of a promotional play
igation of the incremental  research gap and is illustrated with an empirical invest
approach that may be used to address this important  n This chapter therefore outlines a
64a match involving their own team, marginal consumers will always have the null 
rd matches played on the same day involving different teams as substitutes for  not rega
football clubs can be regarded as monopoly suppliers of the product and supporters do 
addiction models if individual level data were available.  However, even if individual 
es of quality of individual games.   It may also imply the use of rational  measur
underlying levels of demand given the differences in observable and variable 
loyalties imply a panel data approach, in which team specific fixed effects account for 
specific  - easures are secondary in nature.  From an analysis perspective, strong team m
a sporting contest is in fact the major constituent of demand and other quality 
assert that this ‘identification’ with a team in  op cit)  ( Borland and Macdonald  loyalty. 
highly heterogeneous, with clubs from prima facia similar areas attracting different 
characteristics of the game are relatively attractive.  Furthermore such loyalty appears
of utility from attending matches not involving their team, even if the other 
brand loyalty: supporters affiliated to one team are unlikely to derive the same degree 
f  The nature of the demand for football is characterised by a high and notable degree o
. @/ A those contained in
have a larger influence than   / A hypothesize that the factors contained within priori
a team supporters one would - d to be dominated by home As attendance at matches ten
whether the match is televised live, the match uncertainty, etc.
= a set of characteristics applicable to both teams such as ticket price,  / B
. t time of match 
at the  j gous set of team characteristics applicable to away team  = an analo @/ A
t etc. at the time of match 
season outcomes,  of the potential significance of the match in resolving end
season outcome,  of whether the team is still in contention for a desirable end
characteristics such as the quality of the home team,  i = home team   / A
Where: 
(3.1) ) / B , @/ A ,  / A ( C =  @/ ;
e.g. promotion, relegation or the championship itself.  
at the end of the overall competition  resolving who gets what end of season outcome
65of long run seasonal outcomes.  Long run seasonal outcomes refer to the extent to 
utcome; uncertainty of current season outcome; and uncertainty  of individual match o
In the context of football, three broad uncertainties have been identified: uncertainty 
competition as well as the quality is a function of the evenness between contestants.
in boxing, the length of the  – in just 2 minutes 8 seconds  ing defeated German Schmel
an Louis  match of 1938 where, in a match with high political tension, black Americ
- ing boxing re d after the Louis versus Schmel kills interest.  The paradox is name
supporters are attracted to winning teams, the certainty of victory  because although 
which states that a sporting competition is more profitable than a sporting monopoly, 
ling paradox  Schme - stems from the Louis ertainty of Outcome Hypothesis  The Unc
Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis 3.2.1
. ects of league structure changes examined the marginal eff
particular relevance for this paper.  Occasionally, and also relevant, papers have 
H) in the demand for football which has  O U rtainty of Outcome Hypothesis ( Unce
st factors, and many have been specifically geared towards testing the  demand and co
The scope of the empirical literature has largely been to identify and quantify these 
attendance will be limited by the volume of marginal consumers.
as promotional significance, but the extent to which they may practically affect 
duct, such  clubs, may thus affect demand via affecting certain characteristics of the pro
anticipated to alter the decision to attend.  League organisers, and indeed individual 
so strong that anticipated variations in the quality of the games over the season are not 
starting.  For these consumers it is possible that utility derived from team affiliation is
tickets for all their team’s home fixtures in a block booking prior to a new season 
by the observed phenomenon of season ticket holders; consumers who purchase 
rted  The notion of a strong component of utility being attached to affiliation is suppo
attend particular games. 
reflected in variations in attendance as marginal consumers decide to attend or not 
dividual games imply variations in quality or cost and will be  characteristics of in
option of choosing not to attend.  Thus, for a given team, variations in the 
66suspensions to key players; change of management; etc.  Furthermore, even if these 
uns of form; injuries or  capture other perceived significant factors such as recent r
between these factors.  For example, difference in league positions will not fully 
factors affecting the uncertainty of outcome, but also to specify the relationships 
y capture the full myriad of  hoc measure to not only full - is that it is difficult for any ad
isolate the effects of quality and uncertainty.  However, a potentially bigger problem 
the quality of the team, thus making it difficult to  measuring such as league rankings 
anatory variables,  that are used to construct proxy measures of other unobserved expl
One common problem with these measures is that they may use the same variables 
. (Price and Sen, 2003) m ; and runs of recent for and Perignon, 2000)
(Falter  ference in average goals scored ;  dif Wilson and Sim, 1995) ( points obtained
.  Other attempts are broadly similar and include difference in league  Rodriguez, 2002)
(Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson, 1996; Borland and Lye, 1992; Garcia and 
inty was assumed decreasing with larger differences lower ranked teams, uncerta
constructed from the difference in league ranking: with higher teams expected to beat 
uncertainty.  Unsurprisingly, the most common example was a simple measure 
expected to influence match outcome  a priori le variables that they  observab
outcome or an obvious available proxy measure, researchers tended to identify those 
arbitrary.  With no obvious direct measure of the uncertainty regarding a match’s 
Simple and mostly early measures of match uncertainty were essentially ad hoc and 
Match Uncertainty 3.2.1.1
. useful for the discussion involving a new measure of seasonal outcome uncertainty
specification, but observing the evolution of the definition of this measure over time is 
this enter as an explanatory variable in the econometric  also desirable: not only will 
off designs, but some detailed coverage of match uncertainty is  - for discussing play
and are not discussed further.  Uncertainty of seasonal outcome is the most relevant 
inty measures are not directly relevant to this research  However such long run uncerta
.   (Jennett, 1984) of the championship by the Glasgow giants Rangers and Celtic
division league football is anecdotally attributed to the increased long run domination 
xample, the declining aggregate attendances in Scottish top  competitive balance.  For e
which championships are dominated by certain teams and the long run distribution of 
67(Peel and Thomas  evidence of various forms of systematic deviations from efficiency
whilst others, mostly more recent studies, find  Thomas 1997; Pope and Peel 1989)
eel and  (P certain match outcomes. Early research found little evidence of bias
evidence on whether betting odds represent unbiased predictions of the true odds of 
As regards the efficiency of the market, there is mixed, though mostly negative, 
ric specification. and the form by which the betting odds enter the economet
whether it is reasonable to assume betting markets are efficient  : focussed on two areas
of match uncertainty.  However, criticisms of this method remain and have generally 
enerally preferred measure  increasing availability of betting odds has made this the g
market determined measure is naturally quite appealing to economists and the 
formed and obtain measurements of all the identified variables.  The existence of a 
ism by which these expectations are  outcome without having to construct the mechan
ante measurement of the uncertainty of each  - betting odds provide an unbiased ex
are assumed to be efficient and use all available information in a rational manner, then 
each possible match outcome.  If markets  direct market valuation of the likelihood of 
up, these odds represent the  - uncertainty.  It is argued that, less the bookmaker’s mark
where available, have since become the dominant form of measuring match 
betting odds,  , 1988) ( Peel and Thomas ttributed to fixed bookmaker betting odds. A
compresses it to a meaningful measurement of the uncertainty of outcomes: posted 
which not only may be assumed to capture all relevant information but also 
s had it not been for the emergence of an alternative proxy measure,  hoc measure - ad
Efforts may have continued further down the path of creating ever more elaborate and 
all elements other than measures of long term and shorter term form.
fans use adaptive expectations in updating their perspectives of outcomes and ignores 
measure of uncertainty of future match outcomes.  Note that the measure assumes
available data and an expected winning percentage is predicted and used as a proxy 
percentages of the previous two months).  The relationship is estimated using OLS on 
winning  season’s performance and current short term performance (measured by the
linear additive relationship between a team’s current game winning percentage, last 
, who specifies a  1988) ( Whitney  an attempt to link factors together is provided by
One example of  specification, it is not clear how they should enter the specification.
additional variables were observable and could be included in an econometric 
68which observations were made has left analysts unable to make the fine distinction 
interpretation.  However, the mathematical constraints and limited range of odds over 
odds and home odds squared for ease of  empirical specification as home
home win.’ and left their  a  odds of  the  was ‘essentially, a quadratic function of 
probability of a third.  In practice Peel and Thomas discovered that this Theil measure 
measured by deviations away from all outcomes having a  zero.  Thus uncertainty is 
a probability of one and the other outcomes, by definition, will have probabilities of 
away win all equalling one third. Minimum uncertainty occurs when one outcome has 
scaled) probability of a home win, a draw, and an  - e the (re same probability, in this cas
From this measure, maximum uncertainty is generated when all outcomes have the 
up. - is a scale factor accounting for bookmakers mark  %  
5
   2 =  and  respectively
= reported betting probabilities of home win, draw and away win     here W
(3.2)
 %  
5
D
  

E log .

  
' = THEIL
. uncertainty in their further research
used a Theil measure of  (1996) Incorporating this valid criticism, Peel and Thomas
emaining probability between the other two outcomes: a draw or an away win.    r
and Simmons, this measures the likelihood of a home win and ignores the split of the 
initial research simply included the odds of a home win.  As pointed out by Forrest 
s regards the econometric specification of the betting odds, Peel and Thomas in their  A
the specification.
of outcomes, then a case may be made for including the posted uncorrected odds in 
odds are unbiased representations of biased consumer expectations of the probability 
if the fixed posted  However,  f correcting for the bias they detect.  propose a means o
odds setters are primarily engaged in setting odds to maximise profit, but usefully 
not only provide evidence of systematic deviations, noting that commercial  1992)  (
Peel and Thomas  (2002) and  Forrest and Simmons  Notably,  Kuypers 2000). 2000;
1997; Pope and Peel 1989; Goddard and Asimakopoulos 2004; Cain, Law, and Peel 
69economics at the University of Groningen, Netherlands 2005.
emphasised by David Forrest at the recent first European workshop on sports  - And this point was re
1
uncertainty the outcomes were defined as a home win, draw or away win;  in match,
match uncertainty and could potentially be treated in the same manner.  For example, 
‘Outcome of season’ or seasonal uncertainty shares several common elements with 
Seasonal Uncertainty 3.2.1.2
of acceptance.
h has obtained anything near the same degree  established an equivalent measure whic
)  Notably the literature on seasonal uncertainty has not yet 
1 unbiased or not.
concerns do remain about specification and assumptions about whether they are 
hoc proxy measures (although  - ncertainty over a serious of ad expectation of match u
economists of a preference for using betting odds as a means of measuring fan 
Regardless of the empirical results, there appears to a broad consensus amongst 
so.
eam to be favourites, fairly strong favourites, but not overwhelmingly  do like their t
in sports (at least in sports other than football): home fans  exists Schmelling paradox
- games. Overall, although mixed, the evidence does suggest an element of the Louis
re is statistically significant evidence indicating fans prefer closer  in US football the
find that  1999)  ( Welki and Zlatoper  spread, another form of betting data,  - Using points
diminishing effect of the odds of a home win, maximising at approximately 0.6.   
with baseball find a  1992) ( Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert  th rugby and wi 1999) (
Carmichael, Millington, and Simmons  likelihood of a home win.  In other sports
win against away win find evidence that fans respond negatively to an increasing 
corrected odds of a home  - using ratios of bias 2002) ( Forrest and Simmons  Whereas
s. teams are overwhelming favourite
shaped relationship, attendances go up when home  - intuitive ‘U’ - find a counter ) (1996
, Peel and Thomas 2) and  199 ( Peel and Thomas  Results have been mixed.  In football,
odds of a home win.
hing marginal effect of increasing  between genuine match uncertainty and a diminis
70every team in that league/division qualifying for the  off qualifying spots i.e. - play
off design would be one that simply maximised the number of  - that an optimal play
Otherwise, by continuing this line of thought to its logical conclusion, it would appear 
season outcomes.    - of - ero probabilities of achieving end z - simply increased non
Further reflection indicates that there must be something more to this concept than 
betting data on seasonal outcomes in an analogous manner.
could invoke Peel and Thomas’s insight on match uncertainty and explore the use of 
then we  zero.  Note that if probability of success is the key measure of interest,  - non
season outcome is  - of - games for which the probability of obtaining the desired end
off systems typically increase the number of  - gaining automatic promotion, play
eague finishers  season objectives, such as the three highest l - of - of achieving end
offs may increase match attendance.  Relative to strict meritocratic means  - why play
surrounding the likelihood of obtaining it. This provides an intuitive motivation for 
an more uncertainty  season goal rather th - of - probability of obtaining an end
success.  The hypothesis thus becomes that fans are motivated by an increased 
focussed not on this uncertainty per se, but more on the effect of the probability of 
point out, empirical attention has  1986) ( Cairns, Jennett, and Sloane  However, as
away from this probability. 
could then be potentially tested by examining the effect on attendances of variations 
ing paradox  Schmel - ff structure.  The Louis o - design such as the imposition of a play
e extent to which it may vary may be influenced by league  teams and its value and th
course of a season, this probability is also liable to vary from match to match for 
where the probability of obtaining that goal themselves is 0.5.  Note that over the 
probability of achieving that goal and for individual teams,  FG H each team has a 
promoted), Theil measured uncertainty will be maximised across the league where 
season goal (e.g. three teams being  - of - teams can obtain the end m teams and if  n size 
ain when the probability converges to 1 or 0 and for a league of  Outcomes will be cert
the probability of obtaining the stated goal at that particular point during that season.  
uncertainty surrounding the outcome at any point during the season may be defined as 
ion to the lucrative European competitions.  Similarly the  gaining qualificat
goal such as winning the championship, obtaining promotion, avoiding relegation or 
with seasonal uncertainty the outcomes are typically defined as some end of season 
71function of how many teams are left competing.
Thus hinting that influence of time may be indirect and that significance may be a 
’ remaining take an even greater significance.
clubs drop out of contention, but the games of those  As the season progresses more  ‘
(pg 181)
time should have this impact on the notional measure of significance, though he notes 
season outcome.  However, Jennett does not provide a formal explanation of why  - of
- zero probability of obtaining an end - ust a non something more to significance than j
significance.  Again, this seems intuitively correct and again implies that there is 
Thus Jennett identifies a time element as well as a league position dimension to the 
.’ ges for clubs located at the top of the table sta
in the first weeks of the season, but have considerably more in the season’s closing 
Games have relatively little significance for the overall outcome of the championship  ‘
significance.  In defining this measure Jennett notes (pg 179)
measure of that  outcomes and, importantly, providing a much discussed original
season  - of - defines significance as the influence that a game has in deciding the end
‘significance’, a subtle deviation from uncertainty in outcome.  Jennett conceptually 
h, introducing the term  provides the basis for much of the current researc
1984) ( Jennett  In looking at seasonal uncertainty regarding the Scottish league,
ncertainty Measures of Seasonal U Current 3.2.2
to find an accepted single measure.
why the literature has struggled  anation as to  is one expl uncertainty and perhaps this 
measure of seasonal uncertainty appears inherently more complex than that of match 
Thus the  . (Gardner 2005) ular season games mean nothing’  that ‘most of the MLS reg
prompted US national coach Bruce Arena to comment  offs.  A situation that has  - play
ten Major League Soccer (MLS) teams qualify for the end of season championship 
is almost the case in the US, where eight out of  At the time of writing this offs.   - play
72the team has ten games remaining.   2)
the team has just two games remaining; or  1)
both cases a team requires just two more wins to secure the championship
has properties that seem counterintuitive. Consider the following examples where in 
known points total, the measure still  a priori However, even if one is able to justify an 
time.     number of points required to win the championship remains fairly stable over
not be untenable if one considers rational expectations of supporters and that the 
.  The assumption may  Jennett, and Sloane 1986; Cairns 1990; Peel and Thomas 1988)
(Cairns,  time consumers are using information they do not have at that point in
However this assumption has been criticised in the literature for assuming that 
hence increase the significance of the next game as measured by the reciprocal.   
ve the final points total and  is won will reduce the number of games needed to achie
mathematically possible: assuming teams will not be deducted points, any game that 
Jennett’s observation about significance increasing over time if the objective is still 
the definition coincides with  measure.  Furthermore, this assumption also means
other teams are effectively summarised in the points needed to win the championship 
other teams at given points during the season, as the important final positions of all 
ormance and league positions of all  Firstly, Jennett avoids having to model the perf
The assumption that the points needed to win the championship is known is crucial.  
game is 0.05, whereas if the team requires just 2 games, the significance is 0.5.
y possible, the significance of the next  another 20 games and this is mathematicall
needed to be won in order to reach that points total.  Thus if a team is required to win 
the measure of significance is defined as the reciprocal of the number of games 
on for that club are set to zero.  Otherwise  significance of all future games in that seas
games left for a team to mathematically achieve that number of points then the 
games are required to be won in order to achieve that points total.  If there are too few 
ip is known.  He then calculates how many  points needed to win the championsh
his measure of championship significance by initially assuming that the number of 
influence it (though not formally deriving how they influence it), Jennett constructs 
ept of significance and identified some factors that  Having described the conc
73for a win. In rugby 2 points rather than 3 are awarded
2
s the expected winning total at  i   I season divisional points winning points total.  So if
- of - the time if it is mathematically possible for that team to achieve the expected end
lue becomes one.  A team is assumed to be in contention at  out of contention, the va
conclusion and the importance of each individual match increases; for those that drop 
division, the championship significance increases towards two as the season nears its 
eams that remain in contention to finish at the top of the  greater than 2).  For t
between 1 and 2 (though it is not mathematically bound at the upper level to be no 
.)  In their paper, the measure of match championship significance ranges 
2 games
er game of previous league winners, 1.68, and the remaining number of  point p
and the expected amount of points the leader will gain (based on the historical average 
expectations of the winning total based on the current leaders actual accrued points 
and allow adaptive  a priori the assumption that the winning total is known  they relax
make, is that  et al  define an adapted Jennett measure.  The major contribution Dobson 
in an analysis of rugby league attendance,  2001) ( Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson 
and Lye 1992; Wilson and Sim 1995).
(Borland  sionally used in its original form the current literature and indeed is also occa
Despite the objections, Jennett’s method remains the most common starting point in 
seasonal objective.  
complex relationship between significance and the probability of obtaining the 
e: again implying a more  a higher probability being inversely related to significanc
winning the championship in case 2 than in case 1.  This example unusually suggests 
games of comparable match uncertainty, a team will have a higher probability of 
winning the championship: given  team Also note the respective probabilities of that
greater significance.
r  though intuitively it feels as if the next game in case 1 would appear to be of fa
measure would rate each of these matches as equally significant with a score of 0.5, 
will be another nine opportunities to gain the required two wins. Yet Jennett’s 
en there  won.  In case 2, the next game is clearly not so critical, if the game is lost th
In case 1, the next game is critical, in that if it is not won, the championship cannot be 
74fewer points behind the leader the more significant is the game.
points behind the leader.  Again the basic idea being that the fewer games left and the 
o be played and the number of  football, all of which are a function of games left t
suggests three potential measures for championship significance in  1997) ( Kuypers 
incorporated).
second half of the season (which is how the games remaining element is 
n only if the match occurs in the  5 games left; 6 points if 10 games left; etc.) and the
remaining games and the leading team(s) only win 50% (so only 3 points behind with 
a match as significant for a team if it can win the division by winning 80% of their 
idably arbitrary’, Cairns defines  season.  Acknowledging that ‘any definition is unavo
observes that championship contention is largely relevant to the second half of the 
points won relative to other teams and the number of matches played.  He also 
ue football, identifies two main factors:  in looking at Scottish leag , 1987) ( Cairns 
In a similar approach in considering an adaptive winning number of total points, 
current points total.
, an expected end of season final winning points total and  J K
   
 K
  I L distance between
ly via a diminishing  element of games remaining in the measure occurs indirect
point in time.  Note that, beyond determining whether the significance is 1 or not, the 
required points total, to measurements of distance from the seasonal outcome at that 
next game could make to a  marks a shift of emphasis from, what contribution the 
This measure removes the fixed known winning total points assumption and it also 
is the measure of significance. K
   Where 
(3.3)
F J K
   
 K
  I L 68 . 1 + 1 = K
   then   I M J K
  H 
 G L 2 + K
   if
1 = K
   then   I < J K
  H 
 G L 2 + K
   if
.    Then i gained of  the team at the time of fixture 
is the points  K
   is the total number of  games a team will play in a season and  n and 
;  i is the number of games played by the home team by fixture  K
  H ;  i e  the time of fixtur
75proximity to winning championship.
trend variable (game number) to capture  uses a 1997) ( Baimbridge  tournament, 
these measures remain fixed for the entire season.  In an international football 
hange over time,  the actual probabilities of obtaining the end of season outcome will c
return of significance as being measured by probabilities, though in this case whilst 
betting odds to capture probability of a team winning the championship. Note the 
season  - pre hes use nce at rugby league matc in analysing attenda 1999) ( and Simmons 
Carmichael, Millington,  been won by that team (glory effect) or already relegated.  
measure for relegation and dummy variables to capture whether championship has 
also constructs an analogous  hence in direct competition for the championship.  He 
dummy variable approach, indicating whether both teams are in top 4 positions, and 
who use a    1996) ( Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson  Other measures include: 
n a less arbitrary fashion than by Kuypers. dealt with i
tournament.  The issue of how to deal with points above the ‘winning’ threshold is 
of significance from championship winning to qualification for end of season 
easure of significance.  They ignore the issue of games left but expand the measure  m
place are measured as negative) as the 
th qualifying place (points above 4
th the 4
in super 12 rugby union attendance, use points behind  2004)  ( Owen and Weatherston
analysis of Spanish league football. 
in their  2002) ( Garcia and Rodriguez  nce is used by  second measure of significa
except that absolute minimum match significance is measured by a score of 0.  The 
indicate higher significance and maximum significance is given by a score of 1), 
that significance is decreasing in this measure (smaller numbers  Kuyper’s measures is
championship the measure is 0.  A curious (but uncommented on) artefact of all of 
the points behind is set to 1 and if a team cannot mathematically win the 
here PB = points behind leader and GL = games left.  Where a team is the leader  W
(3.4)
) NO . 2 + 8 NO ( . ) F ) NO . 3 ( . ( . 3
NO . . . 2
NO . P
5 ) FNO . ( . 1
76Borland doubling the weighting of latter season games and Kuypers offering three 
element with Cairns arbitrarily choosing only second half of the season games, 
o common means of including this time  season.  However, notice that there is n
measure of significance, with larger weights given to games near the end of the 
achieve the objective.  The time element is commonly used to weight the other 
onditional on the team still being able to mathematically  season draws closer, c
increasing significance as the end of  – element is the inclusion of a time component 
in the probability of achieving that end of season outcome.   A further common 
able that distance from the target (as measured) is the key component  total).  It is argu
points plus expected points from remaining games or an assumed known winning 
leaders or distance from expected final points total required (based on current leader 
ance from the desired outcome, whether measured by distance from current  dist
Jennett attempts.  Firstly a team’s  - are common elements within many of the post
measuring seasonal outcome significance is still largely unresolved.  However there 
The multitude of measures used indicate that, unlike match uncertainty, the issue of 
. challenging position (either promoted or within two spaces)
captured by a dummy variable indicating whether the team finished in a promotion 
as being  romotional significance  ance data on rugby league teams define p attend
using season averaged  1992) ( Cameron  Burkitt and  , games of the top five.  Finally
second measure using only those teams still in contention, defined as within two 
when there is less time left to alter the gap between any two teams.’  Borland tries a 
nificant the closer the end of the season,  uncertainty of outcome becomes more sig
the season.  Double weighting is given to the final observations as ‘a given amount of 
of dispersion of points (between first and last team) in division at four points during 
Australian rules football takes measures  in 1987) ( Borland  In aggregate data studies:
over time.
these results are driven by possibility that winning the FA Cup has become devalued 
more attractive over time.  This is empirically verified though it may be the case that 
ixtures becoming relatively  outcome significance should be reflected in the league f
that since the FA Cup has become less competitive over time, importance of seasonal 
experiment using FA Cup and leagues fixtures between the same two teams.  Arguing 
uses a natural  2001) ( Szymanski  ,  Avoiding a measure of significance altogether
77ailable points for that game. average over half the av
top two teams are due to meet, it is not mathematically possible for them both to 
vary if there are systematic differences in the remaining schedules.  For example if the 
are used, in that a current point deficit may be expected to  occurs where current points 
both the current leaders and teams playing in the next match.  This problem also 
not take in to account the degree of expected difficulty of the remaining schedules of 
ted end of season points are adaptive, not rational, and do  Current measures of expec
is drawing to a close there are likely to be fewer and fewer teams close to the leader.
manner.  Perhaps the time variables indirectly capture this element as when the season 
s significance is also likely affected in some similar  effective competitors and thu
two.  The probability of obtaining a seasonal outcome is decreasing in number of 
situations where there are many teams in contention and when there is only one or 
g. promotion).  Furthermore it is unable to distinguish between  seasonal outcome (e.
This may not suffice when there is more than one team which can achieve the 
leading team, but (at least directly) ignore the distribution of points of other teams.  
so tend to calculate the points, or the expected points of the current  Measures al
arbitrarily decided that teams within the top 4 are challenging for the championship.
who  1996) ( Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson  exception within the literature is 
ine it does not represent something considered important to football fans.  The  imag
outcome.  Furthermore, the term is in such common usage amongst fans, it is hard to 
significance than a game against an opponent not in contention for the same seasonal 
rival team three points.  All other things being equal, such games will carry more 
opportunity to gain three points for a team’s cause, but also the opportunity to deny a 
pointers’ in football as they not only provide an  - games are colloquially known as ‘six
tch is against a team effectively competing for the same seasonal outcome.  Such  ma
of a match for a team, virtually all of the measures systematically ignore whether the 
There are also common omissions amongst measures.  In computing the significance  
for inclusion of time in a significance measure.  
of a clear theoretical rationale  variations.  The variation perhaps indicative of the lack 
78 / GB not, 
zero or  - A simple dummy variable indicating whether this probability is non 2.
 /  , t match 
at  i The probability of obtaining the outcome (promotion in this case) for team  1.
discussion I propose three potential constituent parts: Based on the preceding 
measure may not be collapsible to a single dimension.  
and unlike match uncertainty, the seasonal uncertainty  betting  odds.  However,
via  achieving the end of season outcome and/or the influence a game may have
robability of  a measurement of the p – that match uncertainty has been resolved 
is more akin to Jennet’s original proposal but follows a similar route in the way  which 
ainty/match significance  This research proposes a new measure of seasonal uncert
Theoretical Construct A  3.2.3.1
esign D ompetition C elationship with  and the R
ignificance , Match S ncertainty Seasonal U easure of  M ew  N A  3.2.3
consensus hinders any analysis of the effects of league structure.
ainty prior to Peel and Thomas’s suggestion of using betting odds.  This lack of  uncert
match significance is similar to that which was in the measurement of match 
incorporating the time element.  It is thus arguable that the state of measurement in 
The clearest examples of which are the numerous (and inconsistent) methods of 
ncluded.   number of common elements, there is no consensus on how they should be i
systematically omit others and have a number of objectionable qualities.  Even with a 
not only systematically incorporate a number of common elements, but also 
looking measures, which  single variable.   There are, however, a number of similar 
season outcome match significance, indeed significance may not be captured by a 
In conclusion, there has yet to emerge a clear commonly accepted definition of end of 
79vision and the  the top two highest teams automatically get promoted to the higher di
is one in which  (as of 2010) off design - higher division.  In contrast, the current play
the top three positions at the end of the season were automatically promoted to the 
ch finished in  operated a strictly automatic promotion scheme whereby the teams whi
off systems, the second highest division  - where prior to the introduction of play
season outcome.  This may be illustrated by the example of the English soccer leagues 
- of - obtaining the end they have on the match significance and/or the probability of 
off systems may enter the demand function by the potential impact  - season play - Post
(3.5)
) > loses  (  7  /  
 ) > wins  (  7  /  =  / C
Q
0 =  /  if 0
0 >  /  if 1
R =  / GB
) H | prom ( S # ) H (  / S =  / 
Thus, in terms of our demand variables:
across all teams and invariant to the stage of the season.
that it is constant  s on this latter term indicate , where the lack of subscript ) H | 1TH ( S
being promoted,  m ng in position  and the probability of a team finishi ) H (  / S
,  m finishing in league position  i of two different probabilities: the probability of team 
In order to do this it is useful to consider the probability of promotion as the product 
off design.   - bles and play varia
off designs, in addition one must identify the relationship between these  - play
measurement) of these variables is insufficient to estimate the impact of different 
and indeed the significance of matches increases.  However, identification (and 
r teams  teams drop out of promotion contention then the probabilities rise for the othe
not feature directly but indirectly : one might envisage that over the course of time as 
perfect foresight assumption of the original Jennett measure.  In addition time does 
he  nature of the previous attempts and t ad hoc In principle these measures avoid the 
 / C , relative to a defeat
would make t in the match  i a win for team  of promotion given  probabilities 
nificance variable, in this case defined as the difference in the  And a sig 3.
80: in the automatic promotion scheme it would be i.e.
which is then filtered through to other probability variables,  ) H | prom ( S impact on 
he probability of promotion via its  off design on t - impact of play may isolate the
ague table as possible, then we  teams i.e. teams always try and finish as high up the le
off design does not influence the final league positions of  - If we can assume that play
they simply redistribute it!  
– off designs do not create additional probability - fact will still remain.  Different play
potentially changes, the number of teams being promoted from the division, then this 
off system changes, or  - have a probability of 3/24 = 0.125.  Now unless a play
eams  three teams have a probability of 1 and all others 0, or at the other extreme all t
any time point, is distributed across all teams and sums to 3.  It may be the case that 
And for any team, the maximum is obviously 1.  Thus the probability of promotion, at 
(3.6)
 %  
U
3 V  /  '
. the number of teams that will be promoted , i.e. 3 necessarily 
being promoted is  s individual team ams of the probabilities of the te i across all 
the sum  t at time  variables across matches it is useful to start with a simple fact: 
distribution of the three  off design on the - In order to assess the impact of play
during regular season games.  
off function on the determinants of demand  - season play - potential impact of a post
thus illustrating the  – zero probability  - off system, there would be a non - stated play
regime, this team has a zero probability of obtaining promotion, whereas under the
possibility of obtaining sixth or slightly higher, under the automatic promotion 
team no longer has any reasonable chance of obtaining third position but a distinct 
table  - id thirds played season where a m - those definitions, imagine a hypothetical two
competition in which the winner joins the two automatically promoted teams.   Given 
out  - style knock - following four teams (positions three through six) play in a cup
81(3.9)
 %  
U
 % /
0
WX/Y
 / GB ' '
 %  
U
 % /
0
>
ZY
 / GB ' '
off scheme (as described), then  - achieved under the play
po stands for that  under the automatic promotion scheme and  results achieved 
f auto stands for those  I zero probability.  - creates more games where there is some non
that it  off system i.e. - and stated impact of the play st obvious  This leads to the mo
look at the empirical data.
n, this will become very clear when we  probability of a team finishing in that positio
make to individual games, these conditional probabilities are weighted by the 
second part of the probability equation.  And in terms of the actual difference they 
anges to the probability of promotion via the  off designs make ch - Thus different play
the balancing mechanism is not.   – perhaps uncertain 
o the other positions i.e. 0.75 and even if these amounts are  that is redistributed t
by an amount  ing y the probability of promotion having finished third decreas created b
, fifth or sixth (each increasing by 0.25) have been  fourth promotion having finished 
As can be seen the increased probabilities of  off design on attendance.   - impact of play
dance on regular league matches and can be used to evaluate claims of the  on atten
off systems may have  - identify the potential impact play equation 3.8  and  equation 3.7
circumstances and so further research in this area may be required.  Nevertheless 
ed by results from the second tier of English soccer but may not apply in other  support
equal probabilities of promotion from each of the four qualifying positions is 
off scheme they are estimated with some uncertainty.  The assumption of  - current play
In the automatic scheme these probabilities are known with certainty, whereas in the 
(3.8) Q
otherwise     0
6 , 5 , 4 , 3 = H if 25 . 0
2 , 1 = H if 1
[ = ) H | prom ( S
scheme it would appear to be more like: off  - Whereas in the current play
(3.7) Q
otherwise 0
3 , 2 , 1 = H if 1 \ = ) H | prom ( S
82(3.11) 0 =
 % ]
^
) H (  / S C ' 
3 =
 % ]
^
_ ) H (  / S C 
3 ` ' =  /  C
.  Then  F H a  3 = ) H | prom ( S promotion i.e. 
off system where each team has an equal chance of  - qualifies for an after season play
This is most obviously seen if the league were organised such that every team 
is not.    % ]
^ ] ) H | prom ( S . ) H (  / S C [ 2 constant identities, 
are  0 V  % ]
^ ) H (  / S C 2 and  % ]
^ 3 V ) H | prom ( S 2 lthough  a It should be noted that 
.  / C off design, then so is - is a function of play ) H | prom ( S off design, as 
- nt of the play is assumed independe ) H (  / S C Thus although  off design.   - league/play
which is a function of the  ) H | prom ( S weighted by ) H (  / S C league position 
the difference an individual match may make in the probabilities of achieving a 
ch can make operates through  The difference in the probabilities of promotion a mat
(3.10)
 % ]
^
] ) H | prom ( S . ) H (  / S C [ ' =  / C
i.e.:  /  in an analogous fashion to 
 / C promotional outcomes of the competing teams.  We can analyse this by defining 
vidual matches in determining the  the significance of indi – seasonal uncertainty 
Potentially the answer to this may lie with what happens to the third measure of 
thought to maximise attendance? one that is
ro probability of promotion, not be ze - some non have makes all games between teams 
, a system which  nzp off system which maximises  - conundrum of why then does a play
This leads to the logical  positive driver of demand, it increases attendance.
it creates more games with some significance and since that is thought to be a  – offs 
- of play the result that drives the conventional wisdom regarding the impact  This is 
83they did not have in the original automatic scheme.  Thus the significance involved in 
second relative to third and sixth relative to seventh now have some significance that 
ng  position are the same).  However matches that influence the probability of finishi
assumption that the conditional probabilities of promotion from finishing in that 
matches which influence third or fourth spot only now have no significance (given the 
stem,  off sy - or fourth have quite a lot of significance.  With the current English play
On the other hand, matches which heavily influence the probability of finishing third 
they will have no probability of being promoted.   – seventh only has no significance 
or  .  Similarly, matches which influence the probability of a team finishing sixth case
h a certainty of 1 in each  they will be promoted wit – matches have no significance 
second or third i.e. if a team is guaranteed second or third spot, then any remaining 
ing  awards no significance to matches that only affect the probability of say finish
be partly motivated by the following example.  The automatic promotion scheme 
across games. This is perhaps less intuitive than with promotion probability, but can 
distributed  promotion probability, match significance is a fixed stock which is re
off system can avoid either of these two limiting cases, then as with  - If a play
highly unlikely second condition may still theoretically occur.
ng circumstance is ruled out, though the  automatic promotion scheme the first limiti
positions, then the match significance of every single game is zero.  Under an 
off and/or there is no possibility of any single game ever changing league  - season play
- of - that every single team qualifies for an end Thus under the limiting circumstances 
positions. final league  i.e. there is no possibility of a team changing 
(3.12) H a 0 = ) H (  / S C
this relationship will not hold unless  ) H | prom ( S For any other distribution of 
MLS system in negative terms.
e US  he described th significance.  This is the situation Bruce Arena alludes to when
promotion, then no game which influences final league position will have any 
I.e. if it doesn’t matter where you finish in the league as regards the probability of 
84here exists a betting market for end of season outcomes potentially providing  Though t
regression model if there are measures of these probabilities readily available.   
estimated in a production function off related variables may only be  - The play
ignificance Match S
utcomes and  O eason  S - of - nd E robability of  P Measuring the  3.2.3.2
off structure. - play
an empirical question of which of these counteracting forces dominates given the 
largely s i off system  - Therefore, the impact of a play games featuring smaller clubs.
see a reallocation of demand drivers away from games in which they feature, to 
utcome however larger clubs will  season o of a desirable end probability of obtaining 
zero  - clubs may be attracted to matches in which their team still has a non smaller 
marginal fans of  : off - trade likely  theoretical model has identified a potential  us the Th
system, may potentially reduce attendance.
off  - in a play , particularly from bigger clubs to smaller clubs as is likely significance
and or match  very different sized markets, redistributing promotion probability with 
heterogeneous football clubs either direction). Secondly, the league is played between 
course in  potentially of  redistribution may well cause overall attendance to change (
marginal impact of the demand drivers may not be constant across games and 
linear.  In such circumstances the  - demand/attendance production function may be non
y fail.  Firstly, the  There are two (related) reasons why this logic ma
create more demand?
offs always going to  - redistributes the other two demand drivers, are extended play
significance.  Since it increases the number of one positive demand driver and only 
stock of match  all probability and (unless under extreme circumstances) the over
ing the overall stock of promotion  chang zero probability of promotion without  - non
off systems create more games with a  - So there does appear to be a conundrum; play
sixth and seventh.
hird and  finishing third and fourth has now been redistributed to finishing second and t
85Although these data are not available for this research.
3
games with the factual outcomes when games are played.
In practice I simulated the outcomes of all games 1000 times and replaced simulated 
. m for each  ) H | prom ( S assumed values of  
by the  ) H (  / S by multiplying each  /  n and obtai m for each  ) H (  / S simulate 
probabilistic statements about the likely finishing positions. i.e. for each team we can 
expected final table.  Conducting this simulation exercise a number of times allows 
d them to the fixed real table to produce an  outcome of each remaining game and ad
probabilities of where each team is likely to finish.  That is, I can simulate the 
win) for all 40 remaining games then allow us to draw up some measure of the likely 
ilities of the game outcomes  (home win, draw, away  played who, etc. The probab
team is, how many points they have, how many games they have played, who has 
a 500 match league.  The 460 completed matches give a factual table; where each 
For example, suppose there are 40 matches remaining in  final tables. expectations of
produce  to are then added to factual existing results  on these probabilities 
by dividing the outcome odds by the sum of all possible outcomes.  Simulations based 
up  - averaged across bookmakers and then rescaled to remove the bookmakers’ mark
on each game from several major bookmakers.  Odds of individual games were 
which contained archived data  2003) ( MabelsTables  re obtained from .  Data we odds
ante betting  - based on individual match ex (home team win; draw; away team win) 
ng simulated results  For this research I implement an imperfect measure based on placi
likely to remain a contentious area in research.
the conceptual measures are accepted, estimation of the difference in probabilities is 
her of these odds will be observable.)   Thus even if  remaining equal (potentially neit
betting odds should that match be won or lost all other things  counterfactual 
at the time of the match (which may be observable) as one must include the 
ncluding market betting odds of promotion or winning the championship  than simply i
probabilities of obtaining end of season outcomes.  In practice this is more complex 
remains one element which is not readily available:  how a match may affect 
there  ,
3 zero) - h match (and by definition asserting whether the probability is non eac
a means of obtaining probabilities of end of season outcomes for each team prior to 
86or other teams.
one game, a team does not influence the probabilities in another match involving itself 
t by winning  over effects; tha - game.  In other words I assume that there are no spill
eventual league outcomes other than that made by the allocation of points from that 
Secondly, I assume that the outcome of a particular match has no influence on 
t foresight problem. perfec
chapter very astutely pointed out that to some extent this is reminiscent of the Jennett 
reviewed article based on this  - A referee for the peer measurement error will occur. 
subject to systematic changes, a more likely scenario, then some bias via  odds are
captured in the error term and will not cause any specific problems.  However, if the 
variable.  If odds are subject to random changes over time, then this will simply be 
tch in January, we are likely to have measurement error in a right hand side  ma
time, then by using odds posted in March to estimate the expected significance of a 
required in order to calculate the true final table expectations.  If odds change over 
contemporary betting odds for all matches at each time point during the season are 
available for the odds immediately prior to matches being played.  Ideally, 
measures do have a number of weaknesses.  Firstly data on betting odds are only 
etc.  However, the  , there are league i.e. how many automatic promotion places
the structure of the  and between teams effectively competing for the same places
expectations of the difficulty of the remaining schedules, taking into account matches 
and points and the expected total number of points allowing for the market 
ams actual positions  The proposed measures have the benefit of incorporating all te
outcome as a result of winning the game and losing that game.
that game i.e. the difference in the probability of a team obtaining the end of season 
fore gives a measure of the significance of  there m and summed across all  ) H | prom ( S
probabilities of finishing in a particular league position, multiplied by the relevant 
loses that particular game.  The differences in these two  i that we assume team 
y conducting the same exercise with the exception  , then, secondl i positions for team 
game and simulating the remaining games and recording the probability of finishing 
wins that  i matches by: first taking the fixed existing league table, assuming team 
a measure of the significance of any of the remaining  Furthermore, one can obtain 
87ns from August to May with no winter break.  The season ru teams are tied on points. 
accumulated points, then aggregate goal difference and then total goals scored if 
point is awarded to each team.  League positions are firstly determined by 
and none to a losing team. In the event of a draw, a single  awarded to a winning team 
For each league match, three points are  division season consists of 552 games.  
with each team playing each other twice, once home and once away and so a full 1st 
plays a balanced schedule,  s team of the 24 f a regular season each Over the course o
placed teams gain automatic promotion.
off alternative in the English system is that the top three  - play - position.  The non
division. Currently, in all divisions, relegation is strictly automatic based on league 
s promoted to the higher  single final played on neutral territory where the winner i
finals then meet for a  - final, playing home and away.  The winners of the two semi
- legged semi - placed teams respectively in a two
th and 5
th placed teams meet the 6
th 4
and 
rd out tournament.  The 3 - and the next four teams enter a straight forward knock
Division 1, are that the top two teams are promoted automatically to a higher division 
2000/01 season as  the now known as the Championship, but during , Premier League
e division below the  England for th in the 1986/87 season.  The current system in 
offs were introduced to the English football leagues  - Promotion (and relegation) play
Descriptive Statistics 3.3.1
eague L ootball  of the English F ier  T
nd The 2000/01 2 3.3
priority in this area. 
e a future research  rigorous solution to measuring these probabilities is likely to b
the author as games which are worthy of that description.  Nevertheless a more 
empirical results are appealing in that they identify games as significant which look to 
kely outcomes) and the  (i.e. who plays who and with a probabilistic statement of the li
and a means of incorporating expectations based on an existing schedule  the league
, the structure of  incorporate in a systematic manner the reality of the existing tables
r, the approach does  flawed in a systematic and predictable manner.  Howeve
Thus the measures I use to provide values for the model are potentially flawed, and 
887 0.12% 0.18% 15 19,258 Wolves
21 2.49% 3.38% 11 7,901 Wimbledon
23 6.92% 15.38% 5 17,657 WBA
23 7.36% 25.45% 5 13,941 Watford
3 0.01% 0.04% 19 9,052 Tranmere
2 0.05% 0.04% 20 7,030 Stockport
4 0.11% 0.13% 21 19,268 Wed Sheff 
21 2.76% 3.67% 9 17,211 Sheff United
3 0.08% 0.08% 22 12,013 QPR
23 4.96% 12.33% 6 14,617 Preston NE
7 0.20% 0.15% 15 13,533 Portsmouth
23 5.54% 12.07% 7 20,615 Nottingham 
11 0.09% 0.14% 16 16,525 Norwich
3 0.05% 0.07% 23 12,809 Huddersfield
2 0.03% 0.04% 19 5,646 Grimsby
11 0.20% 0.18% 15 9,281 Gillingham
23 1.72% 97.18% 1 14,990 Fulham
9 0.29% 0.33% 19 17,061 Crystal Palace
5 0.05% 0.09% 18 6,698 Crewe
22 3.37% 5.10% 9 16,234 Burnley
23 10.83% 41.52% 3 16,062 Bolton
23 12.15% 54.54% 4 20,740 Blackburn
23 10.12% 33.49% 4 21,283 Birmingham
15 0.62% 1.18% 13 14,465 Barnsley
probability
zero  - non
Games with 
significance
Match 
Mean
promotion
of 
probability
Mean
position
league
Median
Attendance
Mean  Team
eam T ome H robabilities by P romotion  League Positions and P ttendances,  A : 2000/01  1 - 3 Table 
1. - Table 3
wn in  team variation in the match attendance at their 23 home games as sho - and inter
- division showed sizeable intra
st During the 2000/01 season, the teams within the 1
holidays such as Boxing Day and Easter Saturday and Monday. 
day afternoons and also on bank  or Tuesday.  Fixtures are traditionally played on Satur
typically moved from a Saturday to the preceding Friday, following Sunday, Monday 
the original date as possible, for example games moved to be televised live are 
ranged fixtures will occur as close to  matches or television schedules.  Typically, rear
flexibility with some game dates being rearranged due to weather postponements, cup 
Fixtures are determined prior to the season beginning, but have some degree of 
89design may have on attendance. 
tinkering with league  that variables).  Indeed such data hint at the potential limitations 
specific latent support that is independent of short term success (or other temporary 
Such summary statistics hint at the importance of allowing for individual team 
heffield Wednesday.   to match those of S
almost all of the season in first place.  Despite the league success, crowds failed  t spen
modest historical following, were a team that benefited from a wealthy chairman and 
9,268 attendees.  Conversely Fulham, a team with a rather more  home average of 1
much of the season in the bottom four positions, but still managed an impressive 
resources as a result of overspending in previous seasons. Sheffield Wednesday spent 
Wednesday, a team with a historically large support, had relatively few  Sheffield
clubs tend to be found at the higher end of the league table with a few exceptions:  
teams greater or lesser resources which can aid league performance.  Hence the larger 
ect different potential team specific market sizes and generally afford the  grounds, refl
The teams with larger and smaller average attendances are predictable on historical 
stadium capacities.
had a censoring effect on the data, with only a very few attendances approaching 
also indicate that stadium sizes are not thought to have  indicative of a skew.  The data 
means are systematically closer to the minimum level rather than the maximum is 
being correlated with the square of the mean, indicating heteroscedasticity.  That the 
tended to have the largest variances, with the variance  largest average values also
lubs with the  Although not shown in the table, c attendance at the smaller clubs. 
none of the minimum attendances at the four biggest clubs fall below the maximum 
he smaller clubs Grimsby, Crewe, Stockport and Wimbledon.  Indeed  times that of t
Sheffield Wednesday and Wolverhampton Wanderers having averages three to four 
attendances with larger clubs such as Nottingham Forest, Birmingham, Blackburn, 
The table shows a number of notable features: there is a wide variation in average 
90a game can make.
separating out the effects of probability and the effect of the difference in probabilities 
atistical methods in  constraints imposed by probabilities may limit the ability of the st
obvious outliers.  The limited nature of the observational data and the mathematical 
probabilities being associated with low differences in potential changes, with a few 
with low and high  .  It shows a quadratic relationship between the two  significance
obability of promotion and the match  shows the relationship between the pr 1 - Figure 3
probability difference per game of approximately 10%.
in the range 0.25 to 0.75, they have an average  average probability of promotion
promotion is small (less than 3% for the 15 teams).  However, for those teams with an 
similar to Fulham, the average difference a game may make to the probabilities of 
erage probabilities of promotion of less than 5%) that,  (15 out of 24 teams have av
At the opposite extreme there are a number of teams whose probabilities are so low 
averaging around 1.5% per game.
match would make in altering the probability of promotion for Fulham was small, 
the difference an individual  and  created by the means of generating the probabilities)
many of their matches (though this is probably an overestimate for the earlier games 
the probability of being promoted was close to one at the time of  remaining schedule,
elihood of winning much of the  between themselves and the chasing group and the lik
given a high proportion of games already won, a sizable gap  most of the season and
the final three columns.  Fulham dominated the division, occupying the top spot for 
rior to their next match is shown in  remaining points) facing each team immediately p
probability of promotion (as defined by the actual accrued points and simulated 
position, probabilities of promotion and difference the game can make to the 
off position is 0.25, then the average league  - play of promotion when qualifying for a 
As regards the measure of promotional significance, if we assume that the probability 
Course of the Season
Over the  Promotion Probability and Match Significance 3.3.2
91eams T our  F ime for  T ver  O robability  : Match Significance and Promotion P 2 - 3 Figure 
lity robabi P romotion  P ignificance and  h S c at The Relationship Between M :  1 - 3 Figure 
92Bolton in October and occurred at a time when second placed Watford still had a high 
5% at home against  occurred relatively early in the season:  16.7 significant match
Similarly, Watford’s most  promotion regardless of the results of these games.  
accumulated such a lead over third place that they were virtually certain to achieve 
some difference, Fulham had  season, games which potentially should cause 
By the time Fulham played against Bolton and Blackburn in the second half of the 
lead in the league and were playing against a team likely to challenge for promotion.  
fact Fulham had yet to build an actual  ed’  ‘measur game has highest value reflects the 
off positions), in only the second game of the season.  That this  - through the play
the biggest support in that division and a team likely to challenge for promotion albeit 
played away at Birmingham (the team with  Fulham lose) actually occurred when they 
highest value of 7.25% (93% probability of promotion if Fulham win and 85.75% if 
any potential for changing that probability.  The  single game had that virtually no 
ics, Fulham’s high probability of promotion meant  indicated by the summary statist
is also charted and show an equally interesting pattern.  As  Match significance
off spot. - reflects the gently diminishing probability of Watford obtaining a play
d of season and the more gentle decline from January onwards  positions at the en
the rapidly diminishing probability of Watford achieving one of the top two  showing
pped away from November onwards with the steep slope  months of the season, but sli
rted brightly and shared leading the division with Fulham in the early  Watford sta
but were eventually chased down and overtaken by an improving Blackburn side;  
occupied the second automatic promotion spot from the end of December to March, 
off position and  - of the season;  Bolton had a solid start, always in at least a play
consistently closed the gap to achieve the second automatic promotion spot by the end
table, but in November slowly but  - relatively slow start and by October were mid
season favourite for promotion, had a  - and promotion; Blackburn, another pre
n the division  season often by some difference and always looked highly likely to wi
season favourite for promotion, occupied top spot for much of the  - Fulham, the pre
estimating significance and promotion probability.
lustrate both the good and bad parts of the means of  four teams which are chosen to il
shows the match significance and promotion probabilities over time for  2 - Figure 3
934 Blackburn – The final score was Bolton 1 
4
, etc.   importance of finishing second over third
nd the  a playing against each other, that the third placed team has a game in hand
the distance of the challenging teams, the fact that two of the challenging teams are 
.  The measure has thus incorporated 
4 probability difference to Blackburn of 27.5%)
5% (hence a  difference of the game of 30%) and Blackburn’s would rise to 62.2
Bolton were to lose, their probability would fall to 46.75% (hence a probability 
promotion would increase to 76.75% and Blackburn’s would fall to 34.75%.  If 
en points and the probability of  match, their lead over Blackburn would increase to t
prior to the match were Bolton 58% and Blackburn 50%.  If Bolton were to win the 
played one game less and had fourteen matches left.  The probabilities of promotion 
y in the regular season, Blackburn had  59 points), and had thirteen games left to pla
points against 59, Fulham in first place had 75, Birmingham in fourth place also had 
placed Blackburn.  At the time Bolton were seven points clear of Blackburn (66 
curred when second placed Bolton hosted third  convincing.  The game in question oc
in a season which runs to May but closer inspection of the game involved is fairly 
in February.  Initially one might feel that this would be too early  measure took place 
the most significant game, which according to the  captured by the identification of 
value intuitive positive properties.  This is probably best  - have a number of face
Nevertheless despite the apparent problems with Fulham, the measure does appear to 
formed in the early part of the season. 
n expectations  evidence accumulated over the whole of the season to date rather tha
ante odds would have partly been based on the confirmed  - these ex – the season 
overestimation is due to the high odds of a win for Fulham in games occurring later in 
the early months.  The  certain promotion is probably overstated, at least in 
- off to a blistering start that never really relented, the measured probability of near
season favourites and got  - the approach adopted.  Although Fulham were strong pre
e best example of the weakness of  The transition of Fulham over time is probably th
effective competitors.
probability of promotion and were playing against a team which were considered 
94off  - time, with only a maximum of nine points available, if it were not for the play
s Forest were ten points adrift of third place at the  a mpared to some games,  modest co
lost).  Although the probability of promotion and difference in probability is relatively 
promotion probability difference of 11.75% (14% if Forest won and 2.25% if they 
off position and faced a probable  - st were two points adrift of the last play Fore
away to Wimbledon in their third last game of the season, where seventh placed 
valued as quite as significant.  The clearest example appears to be Nottingham Forest 
off places at the bottom end of the qualifying places (i.e. positions 5 and 6) are  - lay p
chase for second place.  None of the games that look like being major influences on 
Bolton or Blackburn, mostly in the later half in the season and mostly reflecting the 
Of the remaining games, all of the significances over 15% feature either Birmingham, 
14.5% 16.75% 4 2 Bolton Watford 24/10
17.25% 1.5% 2 1 Bolton Fulham 04/03
3.5% 18% 10 3 Burnley Blackburn 01/04
19.5% 0% 2 18 Blackburn Grimsby 24/04
0% 21% 21 2 Portsmouth Blackburn 29/04
23.25% 0% 2 4 Blackburn Preston 02/05
24.75% 23.25% 4 3 Blackburn Birmingham 14/03
24.75% 23.25% 4 3 Blackburn Birmingham 14/03
27.5% 30% 3 2 Blackburn Bolton 23/02
27.5% 30% 3 2 Blackburn Bolton 23/02
significance
AT match  
significance
HT match 
position
league 
AT 
position
league 
HT  Away team ome team H Date
cheme S ff  O - Play Matches Under the ignificant  S ost  M : Top 10  2 - 3 Table 
of third placed Birmingham on goal difference and three points ahead of Blackburn.
second placed team which was still Bolton; ahead  expected points total of the current 
slightly smaller difference in probability reflecting that this match did not affect the 
approximately 59%, the difference to Blackburn of the game was 24.75%. The 
. With both teams having a probability of promotion of  Birmingham City
had a similarly significant match two games later when they played away at  they
This peak is clearly seen in Bolton’s graph and is less so in Blackburn’s only because 
95game in hand and with the remaining fixtures were favourite to finish second or third.  
although Blackburn were behind third placed Birmingham by 3 points they had a
significant for Blackburn in fourth place.  Closer inspection of the data reveals that 
curious to know why the Birmingham versus Blackburn game was not quite so 
ant reader may be  second position games as opposed to six as before.  The observ
position games featuring in the top ten as opposed to one as before and only three 
emphasis on who finished third and fourth and indeed there are now three fourth 
kburn game which had a greater  significant than the Birmingham versus Blac
game which heavily influenced who finished second and third is now deemed less 
ordering.  For example, the Bolton versus Blackburn  - placings, but there is a subtle re
lacing also tend to influence third and fourth  which influence second and third p
regime still largely feature as significant in the automatic promotion scheme as games 
off  - scheme were in place.  Naturally the games that were significant under the play
t significant matches as if an automatic promotion  3 shows the top ten mos - Table 3
promoted to the top division.  
structure with the teams finishing in the top three league positions being automatically 
1987 league  - significances for this season as if it had operated under the traditional pre
es and match  the league design, then it is possible to estimate the probabiliti
probabilities and game significance and assuming that match results are unaffected by 
off systems and promotion  - iven an understanding of the relationship between play G
tic Promotion Scheme Under an Automa
Counterfactual Promotion Probability and Match Significance  3.3.3
a powerful motivation for persisting with imperfect measures.
and expected performance over the remaining season.  Arguably such benefits provide 
competing teams), actual position  (i.e. games where points could be denied to other 
pointers  - significant in the context of the season and clearly incorporate notions of six
The proposed measure of significance has identified games which appear intuitively  
y of promotion would be 0%. probabilit
regime, the probability of promotion and the difference that match could make to the 
96higher amount.
off scheme has a  - off scheme such that positive differences mean that the play - play
automatic promotion scheme.  The last three columns show the differences with the 
t each team would have as a home team under an  zero probability games tha - non
shows the recalculated promotion probabilities, match significances and  4 - Table 3
of the redistribution of significance across more games. indicative 
nowing that the stock of significance is fixed, this is  : k cheme it is 247% automatic s
221.25% whereas over the  off scheme leads to a figure of - significances in the play
match significance in the automatic promotion scheme.  Summing the top ten 
ordering of games, but the concentration of  - further feature to note is not just the re A 
18% 22% 5 3 Birmingham Bolton 13/04
0% 22% 23 3 QPR Birmingham 23/12
0% 23% 18 4 Sheff Wed Birmingham 24/03
23% 0% 2 7 Bolton Forest 17/03
0% 24% 15 2 Gillingham Bolton 10/03
25% 4% 4 6 Blackburn Watford 20/02
25% 6% 4 8 Birmingham Preston 20/02
28% 26% 3 2 Blackburn Bolton 23/02
28% % 26 3 2 Blackburn Bolton 23/02
% 17 29% 4 3 Blackburn Birmingham 14/03
significance
AT match  
significance
HT match 
position
league 
AT 
position
league 
HT  Away team Home team Date
Scheme romotion P utomatic  nder A U hes as if  atc M ignificant  S ost  M Top 10  :  3 - 3 Table 
significance for Birmingham than Blackburn under automatic promotion conditions.  
red on whether they would finish second or third, hence the game had more  occur
increased significantly whereas for Blackburn the bigger impact on probabilities 
So if Birmingham had lost, the probability of finishing fourth relative to third 
97very little chance of promotion.  However, the incremental difference columns show 
As can be seen in the first three columns, there are a number of teams which have 
5 0.05% - 0.05% 2 0.17% 0.13% Wolves
11 1.49% 2.34% 10 1.00% 1.04% Wimbledon
1 0.53% 7.21% 22 6.39% 8.17% WBA
6 0.77% - 1.18% 17 8.13% 24.26% Watford
3 0.01% 0.04% 0 0.00% 0.00% Tranmere
2 0.05% 0.04% 0 0.00% 0.00% Stockport
4 0.11% 0.13% 0 0.00% 0.00% Shef Wed
7 1.72% 2.11% 14 1.04% 1.57% Shef United
3 0.08% 0.08% 0 0.00% 0.00% QPR
5 1.26% 7.76% 18 3.70% 4.57% Preston NE
6 0.11% 0.11% 1 0.09% 0.04% Portsmouth
5 0.11% - 3.67% 18 5.65% 8.39% N Forest
11 0.04% - 0.14% 0 0.13% 0.00% Norwich
3 0.05% 0.07% 0 0.00% 0.00% Huddersfield
2 0.03% 0.04% 0 0.00% 0.00% Grimsby
11 0.20% 0.18% 0 0.00% 0.00% Gillingham
0 0.59% 0.95% - 23 1.13% 98.13% Fulham
6 0.21% 0.15% 3 0.09% 0.17% Palace C 
2 0.08% - 0.04% - 3 0.13% 0.13% Crewe
9 1.28% 2.14% 13 2.09% 2.96% Burnley
0 3.09% - 17.83% - 23 13.91% 59.35% Bolton
0 0.20% - 9.72% - 23 12.35% 64.26% Blackburn
2 5.53% - 2.64% - 21 15.65% 36.13% Birmingham
10 0.18% 0.53% 5 0.43% 0.65% Barnsley
games
zero  - Non Mean Sig
Prob
Mean 
games
zero  - Non Mean Sig
Prob
Mean 
scheme makes
off  - e play increas Incremental  Automatic Promotion Scheme Team
ffs O - lay P elative to  R Scheme romotion  P utomatic  A an nder U ariables  V : Promotion  4 - 3 Table 
98r Birmingham,  finishing third, lose only a small amount of promotion probability.  Fo
and third place for much of the season.  Fulham, who only had a small probability of 
10% the teams who were effectively competing for second  - extent Blackburn with 
game and to a lesser  18% per  - This is most obvious for Bolton with  probability.  
a higher probability of finishing third than fourth, fifth or sixth loose promotion 
promotion probability from third place to fourth, fifth and sixth meant that teams with 
ribution of conditional  promotion (with the exception of Watford).  The redist
In general and as anticipated, they lost probability of  a completely different pattern.
The five teams whose average probability was above 20% under both regimes showed 
of finishing third or higher. WBA in sixth and fifth positions and had little probability
i.e. Preston and  off positions - play lower spent much of the season in and around the 
The teams that showed the highest benefit were those that  0.11% to 2%. - range of 
ies i.e. increases are in the  quite on the scale of the increases of promotion probabilit
increased relative to those teams with little or no probabilities of promotion, but not 
less (range plus 1 to plus 11 games).  Match significance differences are again 
ose probabilities were 1% or  zero games is broadly similar to that wh - increased non
The number of  probability tend to be quite a bit larger (range 2% to 8% increases).
however the incremental benefits of increased promotion  - than 1% but less than 10% 
who had a probability of greater  Indeed the pattern is repeated for those five clubs 
zero probability.) - redistribution meant even they had more games with a non
Crewe lost a tiny amount of both probability and significance (though the 
bability of promotion of between 0 and 1%, although  had a mean pro those teams who
ern emerges for  A similar patt games, in which there is still a possibility of promotion.
Gillingham enjoying an extra 11 home games, effectively half the season’s home 
ve probability of promotion, with teams like Norwich and  there is some positi
However, there are more noticeable increases in the number of home games in which 
scheme marginally increased the significance, again with no gain greater than 0.2%.  
off  - with zero match significance (largely the same teams), the play matches had 
Similarly the teams which  off scheme, the increase was never larger than 0.2% - play
although all of them enjoyed an increased average probability of promotion due to the 
, averaged a zero probability of promotion in the automatic promotion scheme that 
teams  e to most teams.  Of the eight off scheme makes a modest differenc - that the play
99sizable proportion. – the season 
probability of promotion, an additional 114 home games, or put another way, 21% of 
zero  - increased number of games for which there is a non The table also shows the 
215 323 zero games - Sum AT non
.029 0 0.030 Mean AT match significance
.123 0 4 .12 0 Mean AT prom probability
216 330 zero games - Sum HT non
.030 0 .029 0 Mean HT match significance
.129 0 128 0. Mean HT prom probability
tem Sys
Automatic Promotion
System
Off - Current Play
Significance
Promotion Probability and Match  on  Average Impact of Promotion Schemes  :  5 - 3 Table 
teams which is not inconsistent with the mathematics).  
d away  as expected, unchanged (there is a slight redistribution between home teams an
shows that the average probability of promotion per game and match significance is, 
which  5 - Table 3 Finally, two tables which illustrate the redistribution affects.  Firstly, 
. redistribution may filter up the league as well as down
consequences of finishing third.  Thus, unlike promotion probability, the 
offs actually increased match significance very slightly as it increased the 
- a slight probability of finishing third, the play not finishing in the top three and only 
fourth, their significance loss was lower.  For Fulham, with no measured chance of 
games which influenced the probability of finishing second or third as well as third or 
t some match significance though as they had  outcome.  Bolton and Blackburn also los
off positions, a largely irrelevant  - determine where they would finish in the play
the biggest losers with little chance of finishing second or higher, matches tended to 
In terms of match significance, Birmingham were  off spot. - almost guaranteed play
guaranteeing promotion slightly outweighed the gain of having a 25% chance with an 
the team destined to finish fourth, the loss of a small probability of finishing third and 
100unbiased and  this case the limitations of such transformation methods are revealed as ‘
easured in its natural metric i.e. attendances.  In  incremental effect of the system m
conduct a hypothesis test on the statistical significance but rather identify the  to only
However the objective of this research is not  .   analysis is to conduct hypothesis tests
roach is acceptable if the objective of the  .  Such an app errors for valid inference
and computation of robust standard  attendance , the natural logarithm of  J  @/ b L log as
log functional form i.e. defining the dependent variable  - log or log - solved via a semi
.  This tends to be  and heteroscedasticity the positively skewed dependent variable
the most commonly addressed data problem is that of  , Within the economic literature
ata D eteroscedastic  H egative  N - Skewed, Non 3.4.1.1
may be highly correlated causing issues of multicollinearity.  /  and   /  C as
within heterogeneous teams.  Finally conceptually different important variables such 
negative, heteroscedastic and often skewed.  In addition, attendances are clustered 
- relevant parameter values of the demand model exist:  attendance data is non of the 
As indicated by the descriptive analysis a number of statistical issues in the estimation 
Attendance
in the Measurement of the Determinants of  Statistical Issues 3.4.1
Season Match Attendance  
Offs on Regular  - Estimation of the Impact of the Play 3.4
0.553 0.354 zero prob games - Non
0.728 0.662 Match significance
0.806 0.768 Probability of promotion
Automatic Gini off Gini - Play
ariables V romotion  the Distribution of P f easures o M oefficient  Gini C : 6 - 3 Table 
off scheme as would be expected. - under the play
In all circumstances the distribution of the limited promotion variables is more even 
zero probability games as captured by a Gini coefficient.   - and the creation of new non
nce  shows the impact on the redistribution of probability and match significa 6 - Table 3
101indicated that there may exist unobserved heterogeneity between teams, principally in 
the observations are independent of each other.  However the descriptive analysis has 
tandard GLM framework assumes that  Like the simple linear regression models, the s
eterogeneity H
Unobserved  eams and  T ithin  Attendance W Clustering of 3.4.1.2
with a log link function and gamma distribution is specified.
zero nature of the attendance data, a GLM model  - ewed, heteroscedastic and non sk
off system relative to an automatic promotion scheme, given the  - the English play
Thus in order to produce unbiased estimates of the incremental effect on attendance of 
. . log specification - in a log 2004) ( Schmidt, and Brook 
Berri,  vation is provided by  a similar moti - off related covariates across teams 
- covariates, thus allowing some scope in modelling a heterogeneous response to play
clustering, with a log link function this team specific effect interacts with other 
team specific effects to account for  section I discuss the addition of individual 
log link function creates an multiplicative effect between covariates. In the next 
The other modelling choice is thus to choose an appropriate link function.  A  data.
ero, skewed and heteroscedastic attendance  z - appropriate choice to model the non
this case, given the summary data, the gamma distribution appears to be an 
In  negative attendance data. - some scope in handling the skewed heteroscedastic non
odel, logit, probit and poisson count models) which provides  the familiar linear m
Generalized Linear Model framework (GLM) represents a class of models (including 
assumptions and thus circumnavigate the retransformation problem altogether. The 
ernative then is to look for models which can accommodate different data  The alt
. 2001) , (Manning and Mullahy
s  the smearing procedure performs poorly in the presence of heteroscedastic error term
Duan also identified a means of correcting this bias, smearing, it has been found that 
. Although  1983) ( ’ Duan he untransformed scale unbiased or consistent quantities on t
consistent quantities on the transformed scale usually do not retransform into 
102explanatory variables. Predictably those variables associated with the probability of 
the  A potential estimation problem occurs through the collinear nature of several of
Multicollinearity 3.4.1.3
live on the (Sky) satellite subscription channels and ticket prices.
effect. Other potential endogenous variables include whether the match is broadcast 
dom  values of the away team variables will be uncorrelated with the home team ran
to be exogenous as by the nature of the random nature of fixture determination the 
variables associated with away teams (such as away team league position) are likely 
l.  However  means are to be included for these variables in the regression mode
related variables for home teams are all likely to be endogenous and so team clustered 
off  - identification of potentially endogenous variables.  For example, the three play
ations guide the  the random effect and covariate of interest.  Theoretical consider
regression model.  The inclusion of the cluster mean breaks the correlation between 
as an additional covariate in the  / . A if one simply includes the cluster mean  model 
in a random effects  ay be estimated without bias  m  / A impact of a correlated covariate
the  :  effects model.  This is not the case as a rather simple and elegant solution exists
is situation automatically rules out a random effects model in favour of a fixed  that th
endogenous and identify that many analysts (particularly economists) falsely believe 
describe these correlated observed covariates as  2004) ( Hesketh  - Skrondal and Rabe
estimates of the impact of the correlated covariates.
that we may obtain biased  consequences of ignoring this potential correlation are
resources and hence have higher expected probabilities of promotion etc.  The 
we may expect the teams with larger underlying markets to have access to larger 
is case this assumption appears suspect as  with the included observed variables.  In th
random effects model is that the random effect is assumed to have a zero correlation 
made to allow for away team random effects.  However, a key assumption of the 
and further extensions could be    c + / : d
/ B + @ : d
@/ A +   : d
 / A =  @/ e linear component i.e. 
Conceptually the random term is easily incorporated in the GLM framework in the 
.   c may be captured by a random intercept or random effect consistent across time,
level setting  - h in a classical multi this case different underlying market sizes, whic
103linearity is unavoidable, and to examine the sensitivity of the results and  multicol
be more prudent to accept the limitations of the data, concede that the presence of 
but does not permit estimation of the separate effects.   In such circumstances it may 
f related variables to a single factor may resolve the issue of collinearity  of - three play
there exists no analytical solution to multicollinearity.   For example collapsing the 
and it is likely that  (Kennedy 2004; Maddala 2001) implemented but also criticised 
alytical solutions such as ridge regression or factor analysis are often  Other an
obtaining that outcome are subject to large swings as a result of one game.  
obtaining an end of season outcome and where low (or high) probabilities of 
imagine leagues where league position is not highly correlated with the probability of 
rd to  the same restricting correlations is a situation more plausible than not: it is ha
the margin, reduce parameter estimate variance.  That additional data would contain 
will contain little additional information, though the increased sample sizes would, at 
a  the extra dat – across other possible datasets, then this solution will be of limited use 
years or more divisions.  However, if the relationship between these variables holds 
An obvious solution may be to incorporate more data by expanding the data to more 
problem.
variables of interest.  It is thus worthwhile exploring the potential solutions to the 
imental design whereby we can produce orthogonal relationships between  an exper
we are unable to construct an active data collection via  – nature of the data collection 
.  Unfortunately to some extent we are constrained by the passive  Verbeek 2004)
(Greene 2003;  es are sensitive to inclusion (or exclusion) of a few data points estimat
estimates having incorrect signs or implausible magnitudes and that parameter 
unbiased) standard errors, however further consequences may include parameter 
individual effects of variables and that hypothesis tests may have large (but still 
out the  The consequence of such collinearity is that we may be unable separate
illustration.
few for which we would expect no correlation e.g. holidays and league position for 
ions between selected variables, including a  shows pairwise correlat 7 - Table 3 0.69.
- is  and the significance of the game to a team between a home team’s league position
promotion are all highly and significantly correlated.  For example the correlation 
104.
ZY
 @/ e f a linear predictor  o ) . (  , =
, is a function 
ZY
 @/ f ),  po off system ( - under the play t at a league match indexed by  j
against away team  i  i.e. the conditional expectation of attendance between home team 
(3.13) J
ZY
 @/ e L  , = = J
ZY
 @/ e g b L  V
ZY
 @/ f
Generalised Linear Model.
expressed as a  3.13 of the form given in equation  models are thus All final 
Econometric Framework 3.4.2
1.00 0.05 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.13 - 0.01 - Sky
1.00 0.30 0.20 0.38 0.35 - 0.06 theil
1.00 0.48 0.57 0.66 - 0.02 - Pd   (away)
1.00 0.44 0.67 - 0.04 P     (away)
1.00 0.70 - 0.02 - Nzp (away)
1.00 0.05 - Pos (away)
1.00 hol
sky theil Pd (away) P (away) Nzp (away) Pos (away) hol
1.00 0.05 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.11 - 0.01 - Sky
1.00 0.40 - 0.70 - 0.39 - 0.61 0.06 theil
1.00 0.54 0.55 0.67 - 0.04 - Pd   (home)
1.00 0.44 0.69 - 0.02 - P     (home)
1.00 0.69 - 0.06 - Nzp (home)
1.00 0.02 Pos (home)
1.00 hol
sky theil Pd (home) P (home) Nzp (home) Pos (home) hol
ariables V xplanatory  E elected  Correlations Between S :  7 - 3 Table 
model specification, then the consequences of multicollinearity are diminished.
h different assumptions.  If we find predictions are largely invariant to  models wit
The intuition behind this approach is that it gives us the range of responses from 
variously dropped and the sensitivity of the results to each specification examined.  
nce or magnitude is considered a potential artefact of multicollinearity are  significa
- particular case, I do this by presenting a range of models where variables whose non
policy implications to the problems/uncertainty caused by multicollinearity.  In this 
105. @/ T and  / T is captured by league positions for both home and away teams: 
.  Team quality  @/ C and  @/  GB , @/  and a set of analogous variables for the away team 
for the home team   / C and   / GB ,  /  off related variables:  - the three play d are nclude I
are available.
explanatory variables which are chosen on the basis of theory and what data  included 
.  Here I outline the  3.4.1 section  random effect for the home team has been justified in
The GLM statistical model with a log link and gamma distribution estimated with a 
Choice of explanatory variables  3.4.3
(3.16)  , h 8
 @/ f = J  @/ e |  @/ b L 1 ij
is given by:
the expectation, a gamma distribution is assumed and hence the conditional variation 
The data indicate that the variance of the dependent variable is related to the square of 
characteristic.
t represent an impact of any observable match  random component and does no
accounts for the underlying heterogeneity of each team split into a fixed and    c
+ 6kl :
ZY
/ . A vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated.  Note that the component 
are  6kl : and  m : , @ : ,   : ally endogenous  and of those variables which are potenti
is a vector of team averages 
ZY
/  A , n ) 8
  o , 0 (  ~   c p specific time invariant random effect
is a team    c off design. - characteristics indicating they are considered invariant to play
superscript for the match specific  off  - .  The lack of a play t at match  team and match 
are vectors of match characteristics relating to the home team, away  / B and
ZY
@/ A ,
ZY
 / A
(3.15)   c + 6kl :
ZY
/ . A + m : / B + @ :
ZY
@/ A +   :
ZY
 / A =
ZY
 @/ e
and 
(3.14) ) . ( exp = ) . (  , =
Where
106holidays.  However, many fixtures are played midweek.  It is perceived that, relative 
Football is traditionally played on a Saturday afternoon and on certain public 
. 2003) ( Statmail  attendance provided by 
and data on  2003) ( MabelsTables  fixtures, results and game dates, was provided by 
draw was 0.29; and away win was 0.34).  Data on betting odds, as with data on 
7; a  to 1.09 (Crystal Palace versus QPR, where probability of a home win was 0.3
win was 0.73; a draw was 0.18; and away win was 0.09)  home purged probability of a
up  - ranges from 0.75 (Fulham versus Tranmere, where the bookmakers average mark
in uncertainty and  The measure is increasing  . / 3q r > on the match betting odds, 
outcome.  In this chapter I measure the outcome uncertainty as a Theil measure based 
with fans expected to shy away from games which have a certain  – a driver of demand 
nd is thought to be  Match uncertainty has been the focus of several empirical studies a
thus no variable for the away team is included.
attract the marginal fan.  The same arrangements are not made for away teams and 
team at home since last (until next) season is expected to  last) chance to see your 
The additional party atmosphere of a home team’s first or last game and the first (or 
lap of honour to say thank you for the fans’ support throughout the season.   match - post
rrange additional entertainment and teams may complete a  for that team.  Clubs often a
home team only, to capture whether it was the first or last home game of the season 
are constructed for the  ,  / qj> and  / s1> distance.  Two further dummy variables,
a lack of interest in seeing a team from some  marginal home fans may be deterred by 
as travelling away fans may be deterred by the additional travel costs and  distance
as attendance is expected to be diminishing in between teams distance e measures th
,   / Hq3 matches and any other derby games. city derby - between these two intra
, to capture the difference  / 3ssC r  United, a further dummy variable is constructed, 
derby games: due to the intense rivalry between Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield 
city Sheffield  - his construction rule is the intra is set to one.  The one exception to t
home) team featuring in that match is the nearest club to that particular team, where it 
constructed on the basis of nearest neighbour and are set to zero unless the away (or 
) are  @/ C31tb and  / C31tb ms ( derby games for both home teams and away tea
Matches against local rivals are also anticipated to generate interest.  Variables for 
107midweek dummy is also considered potentially endogenous.  
Sky.  In addition since televised games are often moved to midweek, then the 
the Theil measure of match uncertainty and whether the match is televised live on 
the home team’s league position,  are considered endogenous as are:  team  the home 
off related variables for  - month dummies and first and last game variables.  The play
team are assumed exogenous as are holiday fixtures, derby variables, miles measure, 
ose variables associated with the away  are included in the model specification.  All th
exogenous.  For those variables that are considered endogenous, team season means 
made between those variables that are regarded as endogenous and those that are 
e random effects model, a distinction must be  given the requirements of th , Finally
effect.
teams across a season then the effect of ticket price will be subsumed in the random 
form model rather than structural. Though if ticket prices remain constant within 
ns the model must be regarded as a reduced  omission of this endogenous variable mea
price adult or season ticket holders being able to bring a friend for £5.  The  - by a full
price reductions such as children under 16 being admitted for £1 when accompanied 
pect a low crowd they may offer a variety of  captured.  For example where teams ex
change precisely due to expected demand for a match may not be sufficiently 
may omitted variables however variables such as ticket price which for some teams 
e team random effect is sufficient to pick up time invariant  unobservable.  The hom
However a number of desirable variables are omitted on the grounds that they are 
the game is played with January being the omitted category. 
capture the month in which  / jb and / u1 , / j1 , / v3t , / "3w , / Ti , / xw> , / 3 , / uy=
on the main subscription satellite TV providers, Sky.  Dummy variables
dummy is included, capturing whether the game was televised live  / zb fixtures. A 
oliday Monday, are classed as holiday fixtures and not midweek  H ank  B a  such as
category is a Friday or weekend fixture.)  Games played on a weekday bank holiday, 
are included, capturing when the game was played (the omitted baseline  / Tq r and
/ HCI33z reas games played midweek deter attendance.  Thus dummy variables  whe
to the traditional Saturday fixture, games played on public holidays attract attendance 
108in  Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004) - commands (Rabe suite of commands gllamm
ll regressions are estimated using the  A theoretical framework and empirical results.
offs given the  - e intended to show hypothetical maximum impacts of the play 5 ar
light and would be expected to show decreases in attendance.  Thus models 3 through 
offs in their worse  - applying the same logic as before, these models present the play
lower clubs with a smaller capacity to turn demand variables into attendance, then 
significance and if it is the case that the redistribution occurs from bigger clubs to 
As models 4 and 5 feature redistributions of fixed stocks of probability and 
zero probability games. - system has is to create more non
off  - hat the only impact the play modelling expected attendances, effectively assume t
zero probability games but furthermore, when  - estimate the impact of the non - over
offs in their most positive light as we will not only  - potentially represents the play
ity or match significance. This then  is no redistribution of promotion probabil
zero probability games and there  - offs only create more non - model 3 implies that play
variables.  Now thinking about the subsequent modelling of expected attendances, 
will overestimate the magnitude of the included  it  – know the direction of the bias 
all positively correlated and ‘know’ that they are all positive demand drivers, we 
promotion probability and match significance.  And since we know these variables are 
variable bias by partially including the impact of  therefore be subject to omitted
zero probability games are included, the estimated coefficient will  - only the non
.  For example, in model 3  only one of the three mechanisms scheme is felt through
off  - lay fore represent extreme cases where the impact of the p Models 3, 4 and 5 there
probability and significance respectively.  
zero probability dummy, promotion  - off variable included in each case: non - play
off related variables included whereas models 3, 4 and 5 have a single  - has all the play
positions.  Model 2  explanatory variables included; model 2 through 5 omits league 
off related variables, five models are estimated.  Model 1 has all  - positions and play
In order to test the sensitivity of the analysis to issues of collinearity between league 
esults ression R Reg 3.4.4
1095002 - 5046 - 5038 - 5048 - 4968 - log likelihood
0.002 0.045 0.01 0.195 0.004 - 0.099 0.012 0.225 0.001 0.033 effect) var (rand 
0.241 0.295 - 0.678 15.012 - 0.276 2.435 1.142 11.052 0.818 14.595 - av_theil
0.135 1.581 - 0.159 0.6 - 0.175 6.368 - 0.16 2.592 - 0.141 0.556 - av_real_mid wk
0.129 0.684 0.146 0.947 - 0.192 6.717 0.144 1.382 0.129 1.092 av_sky
0.401 0.391 0.048 0.351 0.422 1.419 av_dp (home)
0.174 4.968 - 0.507 3.217 0.176 2.504 - av_p (home)
0.038 0.015 - 0.232 1.261 0.073 0.361 av_nzp (home)
0.006 0.034 av_pos (home)
0.053 0.086 0.058 0.014 0.056 0.016 0.06 0.075 0.05 0.075 May
0.03 0.088 0.033 0.078 0.032 0.08 0.034 0.101 0.028 0.092 April
0.031 0.087 0.034 0.099 0.032 0.089 0.034 0.116 0.029 0.107 March
0.031 0.084 0.035 0.1 0.033 0.087 0.035 0.098 0.029 0.09 February
0.029 0.04 0.033 0.05 0.031 0.03 0.033 0.062 0.028 0.051 December
0.032 0.006 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.011 0.036 0.021 0.03 0.007 November
0.03 0.005 - 0.034 0.01 0.032 0.026 - 0.034 0.001 0.028 0.004 - October
0.031 0.04 - 0.034 0.027 - 0.033 0.078 - 0.035 0.033 - 0.03 0.049 - September
0.038 0.05 - 0.042 0.035 - 0.042 0.093 - 0.045 0.054 - 0.037 0.061 - August
0.103 0.475 0.114 0.574 0.108 0.538 0.115 0.537 0.095 0.507 sheffd
0 0.001 - 0 0.001 - 0 0.001 - 0 0.001 - 0 0.001 - miles
0.154 0.288 0.16 0.318 0.165 0.211 0.19 0.382 0.165 0.529 theil
0.023 0.029 - 0.026 0.061 - 0.024 0.028 - 0.027 0.063 - 0.023 0.067 - sky
0.037 0.04 0.041 0.051 0.039 0.083 0.042 0.022 0.035 0.05 derby (away)
0.038 0.067 0.042 0.047 0.04 0.058 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.06 derby (home)
0.017 0.062 - 0.019 0.061 - 0.018 0.057 - 0.019 0.064 - 0.016 0.067 - midweek
0.039 0.094 0.044 0.137 0.042 0.137 0.045 0.118 0.037 0.108 last
0.042 0.114 0.047 0.119 0.044 0.117 0.047 0.118 0.039 0.112 first
0.021 0.053 0.023 0.063 0.022 0.06 0.024 0.057 0.02 0.052 hol
0.167 0.181 0.221 0.22 - 0.191 0.247 - (away) pd 
0.03 0.141 0.034 0.167 0.034 0.194 p (away)
0.016 0.037 0.02 0.01 - 0.019 0.003 nzp (away)
0.331 0.775 0.405 0.422 0.336 0.359 pd (home)
0.107 0.405 0.119 0.353 0.101 0.302 p (home)
0.025 0.064 0.026 0.06 0.022 0.058 nzp (home)
0.002 0.002 pos (away)
0.002 0.004 - pos (home)
0.205 9.929 0.713 25.483 0.244 7.106 1.219 2.981 - 0.855 23.51 Constant
Std err coeff Std err coeff Std err coeff Std err coeff Std err coeff
Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 Var
esults R Regression  Attendance  :  8 - 3 Table 
home teams.
function and a gamma distribution.  There are 552 observations clustered within 24 
and use a random effects specification with a log link  aCorp. 2003) (Stat Stata SE 8
110the positive and significant coefficients associated with the averaged Sky variable 
contribute to a fixed component of a team’s unobserved heterogeneity.  For example 
These variables do not estimate the impact of the associated variable but  signs. 
The averaged endogenous variables are generally significant and with the expected 
this bias.
month dummies may be an indication of this and indeed a crude means of correcting 
the trend observed in the  – eason may be more prone to measurement error  of the s
basis of betting odds fixed some months later, thus these variables in the earlier part 
significances calculated using a disproportionate amount of matches simulated on the 
ificances.  Matches earlier in the season have promotion probabilities and  sign
be an artefact of the means of calculating the promotion probabilities and match 
omitted variable which is correlated with the time of the season.  Potentially this may 
have had positive coefficients.  Thus the month dummies may be picking up some 
to  conditions, then one would have expected the months of August and September
the month dummies were picking up a negative influence of adverse weather 
positive coefficients whereas months prior to January having negative coefficients.  If 
ter January having  The month dummies show a distinctive time trend with months af
is naturally correlated with the derby dummies.
dummies (nearest geographical team) and/or the inclusion of the miles variable which 
ng.  This may be due to the crude means of constructing the  which is mildly surprisi
impact on demand.  The derby dummies are of the correct sign but not significant 
measure of uncertainty supports the notion that increased uncertainty has a positive 
positive and mostly significant variables estimated for the Theil  economic theory, the 
coefficients estimated which are mostly statistically significant.  In accordance with 
variable, increasing distance between teams and a midweek setting all have negative 
have a negative impact on attendance such as the live broadcast  anticipated to 
games of the season and derby games are all positive and mostly significant; variables 
drivers of attendance such as games being played on bank holidays, first and last 
logous away team counterparts;  variables anticipated as being positive  their ana
most cases statistically significant; parameters associated with the home team exceed 
off related variables are all positive and in  - conform to prior expectations: the play
contains the regression results which show that the results in all models  8 - Table 3
111(3.17) J   c + 6kl :
ZY
/ . A + m : / B + @ : WX/Y
@/ A +   : WX/Y
 / A L 3A = WX/Y
 @/ f
. ) H (  / S has no impact on ) H | prom ( S assumption that 
. As previously stated this requires the  equation 3.17 counterfactuals, as shown in
d  off variable values with the estimate - implemented by replacing the observed play
off system not been  - rred had the play attendances for each match that would have occu
between these variables and attendance, it is possible to predict the expected 
variables under an automatic promotion regime and estimates of the relationship 
off related  - re of the expected values of the play Given a theoretical model, a measu
ttendances A
eague  L egular  R ff system on  O - lay P mpact of the  The I 3.4.5
off related variable and even then only when it is applied to the home team.
- play d is of the expected sign but only significant when it is the only include variable
off related variable is included.  The probability difference or significance  - other play
significant for the home team, though only significant for the away team when no 
zero probability dummy is also always positive and  - e and away teams.  The non hom
The promotion probability variable is positive and significant in all models for both 
increases as correlated variables are omitted.
off variables  - omitted.  Notably the magnitude and significance of the remaining play
hange as correlated variables are  off related variables do c - associated with play
off variables are omitted.  As expected the coefficients  - the models as various play
off variables produce estimates generally consistent across  - uncorrelated with the play
is also as expected.  Those variables  The variation in results across models 
variance of the random effect being significantly different from zero.
In all cases the random effects specification appears justified with the estimated 
, indicating a negative impact on attendance.  f live broadcast o estimate of the impact
negative and significant coefficient estimated for the Sky dummy is the unbiased 
live broadcast rather than a positive impact of broadcasting on attendance.  The 
he tendency for games with expected high attendances to be chosen for  demonstrates t
11216 24 illingham G Grimsby 09/09/2000 4,624 552
17 21 QPR Grimsby 17/10/2000 4,634 551
3 22 olton B Grimsby 12/09/2000 4,657 550
12 19 ortsmouth P Grimsby 27/01/2001 4,737 549
5 19 rom West B Grimsby 29/10/2000 4,770 548
11 21 orest Nottingham F Grimsby 23/09/2000 5,093 547
10 20 imbledon W Grimsby 13/03/2001 5,098 546
24 19 rewe C Grimsby 13/01/2001 5,131 545
18 21 alace Crystal P Grimsby 02/12/2000 5,217 544
22 23 uddersfield H Grimsby 14/10/2000 5,298 543
18 6 rimsby G Birmingham 28/04/2001 24,820 10
17 4 rewe C Birmingham 10/03/2001 25,164 9
13 4 olves W Birmingham 01/04/2001 25,335 8
1 2 ulham F Blackburn 11/04/2001 25,485 7
21 2 uddersfield H Blackburn 16/04/2001 25,803 6
4 3 lackburn B Birmingham 14/03/2001 25,815 5
10 3 urnley B Blackburn 01/04/2001 26,042 4
4 6 rom West B Birmingham 17/02/2001 26,594 3
19 10 ed Sheff W td U heff  S 16/12/2000 30,091 2
9 17 td Sheff U ed W heff  S 01/04/2001 33,018 1
AT pos HT pos Away Home Date E(Attend) Rank
cheme S ff  O - lay P nder  U ttendances  Bottom 10 A op and  elled T : Mod 9 - 3 Table 
regression parameters in a meaningful metric.
linear  - offs as estimated and highlight the importance of viewing the non - play
tches it clearly shows the rather marginal incremental impact of the  small subset of ma
model 1 parameters and match data.  Although this exploratory section looks at a 
show the modelled top and bottom ten attendances using  10  - Table 3 and  9 - Table 3
remain constant across designs.  
erent hypothetical settings and so should  heterogeneity is assumed to apply in diff
off variables.  The underlying  - heterogeneity rather than the impact of the play
) capture a component of a home team’s time invariant  6kl : combination with
(in 
ZY
/ . A .  This is because the original values of  WX/Y
/ . A rather than a new set
ZY
/ . A
Of particular note within this equation is the retention of the original values of 
1133,500 paying customers.  On the other hand, the third biggest modelled attendance 
of approximately  off induced loss  - automatic scheme with 29,321 attendees a play
off scheme with 25,815 attendees to third in an  - modelled attendance under the play
an automatic promotion scheme and so it jumps from having the fifth biggest 
) would have more significance in 
th vs. 4
rd The Birmingham versus Blackburn game (3
3 22 olton B rimsby G 12/09/2000 4,592 552
16 24 illingham G rimsby G 09/09/2000 4,616 551
17 21 QPR rimsby G 17/10/2000 4,634 550
12 19 ortsmouth P rimsby G 27/01/2001 4,722 549
5 19 rom West B rimsby G 29/10/2000 4,745 548
11 21 orest Nottingham F rimsby G 23/09/2000 5,071 547
10 20 imbledon W rimsby G 13/03/2001 5,090 546
16 17 ed Sheff W rimsby G 26/08/2000 5,108 545
24 19 rewe C msby Gri 13/01/2001 5,131 544
18 21 alace Crystal P rimsby G 02/12/2000 5,201 543
13 4 olves W irmingham B 01/04/2001 25,679 10
12 12 ulham F irmingham B 18/08/2000 25,692 9
18 4 ed W heff  S irmingham B 24/03/2001 25,841 8
21 2 uddersfield H lackburn B 16/04/2001 26,111 7
10 3 urnley B lackburn B 01/04/2001 26,260 6
4 6 rom West B irmingham B 17/02/2001 26,585 5
17 4 rewe C irmingham B 10/03/2001 26,748 4
4 3 lackburn B irmingham B 14/03/2001 29,321 3
19 10 ed W heff  S td Sheff U 16/12/2000 29,776 2
9 17 td Sheff U ed Sheff W 01/04/2001 33,056 1
AT pos HT pos Away Home Date E(Attend) Rank
cheme S romotion  P utomatic A nder  U ttendances  A ottom 10  Top and B : Modelled  10 - 3 Table 
any scheme. under
re the biggest  scheme design does nothing to change that and these two matches a
and the draw that is the Sheffield derby.  Unsurprisingly a switch of promotion 
result of two big teams (as estimated by their team specific fixed and random effects) 
y a  matches were particularly significant due to promotional reasons and were entirel
two biggest attendances.  As can be seen from the league positions, neither of these 
Sheffield derby is estimated as the matches likely to attract the  - In both cases the inter
114probability of promotion for these two teams contesting second and third positions.  
21,343) losing the most over the season, reflecting the reduction in  - Blackburn (
,797) and  28 - Again the reduction is not felt evenly across teams with Bolton (
0.24% attendance is estimated or a reduction of 35 fans per game.   - a reduction of 
offs occurs through the redistribution of promotion probabilities.  In this case  - the play
the impact of  offs in their worst possible light, whereby - Model 4 represents the play
being reasonably big attendance producing clubs.
off place) and  - probability games (both clubs had slim chances of obtaining a play
zero  - gain more substantially by having far more non Sheffield United (+10,783)
through the impact on the away teams, whereas teams such as Norwich (+13,690) and 
such as Fulham (+1,940), Bolton (+2,206) have increased aggregate home attendances 
ttendees per game.  The increase is not even across teams; teams  of an additional 277 a
an additional 153,024 attendees over the full regular season of 552 games, an average 
model, no team is worse off than under the automatic regime and the overall impact is 
ental increase of aggregate attendance of only 1.97%  In this  suggests an increm
offs in a biased best light.  However even then it  - match significance, presents the play
As discussed, model 3 which omits the redistribution of promotion probability and 
0.24%.   - dest ranging from an increase of 1.97% to a decrease of  mo
In all 5 models, the incremental difference is rather  aggregated over the entire season.
shows the estimated incremental differences in home attendance  11  - Table 3
very few if any notable differences between promotion schemes.
modelled attendances with  bottom ten  its very negative random effect, dominates the 
At the bottom end of the table, Grimsby, a small club to be in this high division with 
of games with smaller gains.
a few games which are relatively big losers and a larger number  – ficance  match signi
repeating the pattern observed in the redistribution of promotion probability and 
off system.  This is  - grand difference of only 9 individuals in favour of the play
a  – automatic promotion scheme with a modelled expectation of 26,585 attendees 
n  ) with a modelled expectation of 26,594 attendees would be fifth in a
th vs. 4
th off scheme, Birmingham versus West Bromwich Albion (6 - game in the current play
1150.18% - 0.24% - 1.97% 0.69% 0.96% As a % of modelled auto attendance
14,065 - 19,291 - 153,028 54,595 75,079 Total
840 1,892 - 8,631 710 1,130 olves W
2,180 2,278 6,579 8,126 7,060 imbledon W
1,514 10,615 5,515 12,170 12,318 rom West B
2,384 - 1,341 7,319 5,003 5,371 Watford
63 - 190 2,931 1,762 2,057 ranmere T
97 171 - 2,761 144 771 tockport S
427 264 - 7,631 3,162 4,010 ed Sheff W
5,311 3,269 10,783 10,950 13,013 td Sheff U
148 5 - 3,629 1,806 2,104 PR Q
4,143 10,626 8,189 14,237 13,086 reston P
301 179 - 9,380 3,602 4,421 Portsmouth
1,427 - 6,209 9,303 9,943 10,689 orest Nottingham F
44 - 646 13,690 10,617 10,746 Norwich
137 967 3,492 2,862 3,580 Huddersfield
177 45 - 2,297 9 505 Grimsby
304 307 8,534 6,322 6,172 Gillingham
2,081 463 - 1,940 572 - 150 Fulham
354 947 - 7,948 4,395 5,186 alace P rystal  C
364 206 - 3,022 616 - 48 - rewe C
3,335 4,094 11,133 15,389 16,448 urnley B
10,168 - 28,797 - 2,206 30,950 - 24,742 - Bolton
1,479 - 21,343 - 2,425 17,307 - 13,962 - Blackburn
20,981 - 4,955 - 4,626 15,736 - 11,916 - Birmingham
768 568 - 9,062 8,570 6,931 arnsley B
model 5 model 4 model 3 model 2 model 1 Team
cheme Off S - Due to Play ttendance  ntal Season A : Increme 11 - 3 Table 
off positions fifth and sixth. - play
teams which spent much of the season in the lower  – Preston North End (+10,626) 
t if this were the correct model are West Bromwich Albion (+10,615) and  the mos
is thus only marginally affected.  The teams that gained 
rd probabilities of finishing 3
463) who only had relatively small  - such compensating attendance.  Fulham (
loss, but for Blackburn, the team which eventually finished second, there would be no 
off games themselves may compensate this  - season play - Attendance during the post
116off games themselves), whereas all other teams gain smaller  - attendance from the play
13,793) being the major losers (though two of the three will gain  - Birmingham (
15,635) and  - 27,846), Blackburn ( - Bolton ( , on average,  on away teams), with impact 
Blackburn, Crewe and Fulham (in model 2 only) lose attendance (Crewe via the 
rather modest.  Across teams, both models predict that Bolton, Birmingham 
larger to smaller clubs, at least in the season 2000/01.  However the overall effect is 
from the  contention) outweighs the redistribution of probability and significance
zero probability games (keeping teams theoretically in  - production of more non
of between 71,569 to 54,595 or 130 to 99 attendees per game.  This indicates the 
% and 0.69%, an increase  se in attendance of between 0.96 off regime to be an increa
- off related variables.  They estimate the net impact of the play - the counteracting play
off related variables and so allow for a net effect of  - Models 1 and 2 include all play
the biggest gainers. Sheffield United (+5,311) and Preston (+4,143) are
10,168) are the other big losers whereas  - reversed the overall picture. Bolton (
greater efficiency of Birmingham in turning significance into attendance may have 
aller club Fulham had (and vice versa), the  larger club Birmingham had the season sm
of the significance in Birmingham matches.  Had the positions been reversed and 
had removed the difference between finishing third and fourth, it thus removed much 
off system  - the season in fourth place) as the play of finishing third (they spent most of
20,981) who had a good chance  - significance.  The opposite is true for Birmingham (
the shift of significance ‘up’ the table that more games had greater overall 
, as they had a very low probability of finishing fourth,  second and third.  For Fulham
there is a significant difference between finishing third and forth and not between 
off  - and little between third and fourth, whereas with an automatic promotion play
a significant difference between finishing second and third  off system there is - play
anticipated effect is illustrated by the expected impact on Fulham (+2,081).  With a 
of the  The mechanism 0.18% or 26 attendees per game.   - is actually a reduction of 
estimate  modelled  he  tch significance up as well as down.  Thus t redistribute some ma
off systems always redistribute probability down the league table, they  - play
as the model which looks at the shift of promotion probability.  This is because whilst 
significance confirms the expectation that it would not be as negative  redistribution of 
off is assumed to be a  - The outcome of model 5 where the only consequence of play
117off spot  - dance as each additional play always predicts additional increases in atten
off spots.  In addition and as expected, as model 3 assumes no redistribution effect, it 
- four play - roughly the same expected aggregate attendance for the current situation 
istics: firstly, all the models show  has a number of expected character 3 - Figure 3
shows the modelled results. 3 - Figure 3 for this purely exploratory analysis. 
, it is a simplifying assumption that I will use 
rd as a team finishing 3 out competition 
has the same probability of winning a knock  place
th assume that a team finishing in 18
off spots.  Though it is probably unreasonable to  - the total number of play are   e  wher

1 = ) H | prom ( S off scheme and, in addition, I will assume that - the current play
for the comparison of automatic promotion and  I make the same assumptions required 
teams. N size 
off scheme of  - out play - +2 positions enter a knock N automatically and the following 
In all cases I assume the top two teams are promoted  off begins. - implies the trade
spots simply to see where the model  off - model results for up to 20 promotion play
and should only really be applied to marginal increases.  That said, I will produce 
this section should be taken as a logical but tentative extension of the model results 
t which is supported by the data.  Thus  assess situations which may be well beyond tha
I should point out immediately that this will involve extrapolation of the model to 
zero probability games. - more non
promotion probability and match significance outweighs the effect of the creation of 
ion of  attendance?  Essentially, this hinges on the point at which the redistribut
off size would maximise  - question that may be addressed by the model is what play
off scheme, a further interesting  - what it would have been under an automatic play
attendance above  off system has indeed (modestly) raised aggregate - English play
Being reasonably convinced by the evidence of models 1 and 2 that the current 
ize S ff O - lay P aximising  M Attendance  3.4.6
clubs.
suffered by the bigger  losses on aggregate, sufficient to overcome the  attendances, but
118izes S ff O - lay P ifferent  D redictions of  P ttendance  A : Aggregate  3 - 3 Figure 
redistribution of match significance to relatively large teams.
in this case there is a  – off scheme  - would have benefited from a 10 team play
arge attendance generating Sheffield teams having particularly poor seasons and  l
spots; this is purely a function of the way the 2000/01 season was realised with the 
off  - on match attendance.  Match significance has an interesting bump at 9 and 10 play
minor impact promotion probability and match significance are estimated as having 
y  promotion scheme. However both curves are very shallow indicating the relativel
down to teams lower in the division and hence attendance maximise at an automatic 
Models 4 and 5 show the negative aspects caused by redistributing demand drivers 
fectly flat. off spots, the curve is almost per - and by 15 play
off spots diminishing marginal returns have set in  - promotion.  Though after 10 play
negative probability of  - creates some further games where a competing team has a non
119measurement error that is largest during the early part of the season (where the time 
hand side variable  - ill probably introduce an element of right positions.  This w
ante betting data in constructing the expectations of final league  - measures using ex
parameters in this analysis.  Lack of ideal data has required construction of imperfect 
off related  - identified the practical means of measuring the play 3.2.3.2 Section
uncertainty.
path which has largely led to a broader consensus in the measurement of match 
using betting data as a measure of probability and/or expectations, follows the same 
et of measures which, in  therefore defines a new s 3.2.3 were intended to answer).  
unsuitable for this research question (and very possibly the research questions they 
them  that their inconsistent, contradictory and counterintuitive properties render 
identifies the current measures of seasonal uncertainty/match significance and argues 
3.2.2 designs could influence regular season match attendance.  However, section 
off  - n play thought is identified as being the theoretical means by which end of seaso
Within an attendance production framework, the ‘uncertainty of outcome’ line of 
offs an empirical matter. - and thus makes the impact of play
ted variables may act against each other  off rela - theoretical model identifies that play
off related variable values created by a different promotion regime.  The  - play
predication of attendances that would be observed given the different values of the 
and the effect on attendance; and finally, a  estimate of these parameter values
zero probability; significance of match); a statistical  - (promotion probability; non
off relevant parameters  - construction of a simple theoretical model identifying play
English league football and conducted in three steps:  applied to a single season of 
off systems influenced attendance at regular league matches.  The analysis was 
- season play - The original research question aimed to analyse the extent to which post
Conclusions 3.5
only have a small positive impact.
it will  offs will not reduce attendance, although - that increasing the size of the play
The tentative conclusion from this exploratory section is that current model suggests 
120highly correlated variables are omitted from the specification.  
the correct sign but not significant unless the  match may make to the probability is of
of a game and the probability of promotion at the time of the game.  The difference a 
zero probability  - elements of match significance are consistently significant: the non
o this issue.  The estimation finds that two  robust t generally  overall results are 
promotion probability and significance, sensitivity analysis show the substantive 
limited in the extent it can separate out the individual effects of the elements of 
an issue with multicollinearity and the data may be  Though there does appear to be 
zero and heteroscedastic nature of dependent variable.    - despite the skewed, non
and the choice of a Gamma distribution allows for unbiased estimates and predictions 
s to have heterogeneous responses to determinants of demand  different market size
log link function, allows clubs with  a correction for endogeneity.  Within the model
a  and do not permit.  The GLM framework is supplemented with random effects
act on attendance, something the more common log transformation solutions  the imp
GLM framework is appropriate to allow for the production of unbiased predictions on 
and conclude that a  3.4.1 are discussed in  of which between teams.  The implications 
attendance data clustered within teams as a result of unobserved heterogeneity 
zero, skewed and heteroscedastic - strictly non – identifies the data issues involved 
results may be expected to replicated over other seasons.  This descriptive section 
exceptional with the larger teams finishing towards the top of the division and so the 
y  undul contributed to issues of multicollinearity.  However, the season does not look 
means that inference may be limited to that season alone and, in addition, may have 
.  The use of a single season  3.3 division season which is described in section 
st 1
lish  The empirical content of the paper is provided by analysis of the 2000/2001 Eng
how they will impact on the final table.  
reasonable expected probability of how the remaining fixtures will be resolved and 
, remaining fixtures and some  , league structure ns incorporate current league positio
which the flawed measure identify as significant feel intrinsically correct and 
target this issue and produce more refined measurements, inspection of matches 
of the simulation). Whilst it is expected further research may  are a greater function 
difference between actual and ideal variable measurement is largest and expectations 
121eam for each of the three promotion variables. per home t
Bolton) and estimate a random coefficient  . Blackburn vs . g . random effect per game (e
reapplied to more data, indeed much more data, then I would be inclined to specify a 
e this for further research.  In the event that this model is reapplied and  to leav
However given the limitations imposed by using just the one season of data lead me 
specific random effects surrounding the three promotion variables themselves.   
possibly club  – this is perhaps insufficient and a further sophistication is required 
variables) the results of models 4 and 5 and the flatness of the curves lead me to think
heterogeneity across clubs (bigger clubs have bigger reactions to changes in demand 
exponential link function, has generated a model in which there is a degree of 
the  and, in particular, the interaction of probability with a club random effect via
linear model  - from bigger clubs to smaller clubs.  Although I have argued that the non
zero probability games outweighing the impact of the redistribution of probability  - non
ew  increase regular season attendance.  This is principally a result of the creation of n
offs will  - Finally an exploratory analysis indicates that increasing the size of the play
only eclipsed by the combined gain of all other teams. 
dividual team gain, and  in other amounts of attendance which are not matched by any
place losing 
nd ) and 2
th and 4
rd off qualification positions (3 - occupying the higher play
positive, the redistribution effect reduces the overall gain, with the bigger teams 
hough the net impact is  other attendance generating policies may have.  Secondly alt
%.  Such results may indicate the limitations  7 9 ted positive impact of just 1. a limi
a model which assumes no impact of the redistribution of probability still estimates  –
ce ‘production’ function  variables do not have a great practical impact on the attendan
off related  - reasons stand out for this, firstly although statistically significant, the play
additional attendance, but by an amount that may be smaller than anticipated.  Two 
ystem has created  , supporting the notion that the English s during the regular season
estimated impact is a rather modest increase of between 0.91% and 0.69% attendees
offs to have increased overall attendance.  In total the overall  - is sufficient for play
of season outcome  games where teams are theoretically still in contention for an end
relationship between game characteristics and attendance, the impact of creating more 
offs to reduce aggregate attendance.  However given the estimated  - potential for play
clubs leading to a  reallocated probability and significance from bigger to smaller 
off system has  - The data also permits a detailed description of how the play
122inequality.
funding may not be sufficient alone to make a major impact on educational outcome 
also improve efficiency.  However, the models also suggest that simply redirecting 
quality but  schools with currently below average outcomes may not only reduce ine
responsiveness to funding.  Rather surprisingly the models suggest that targeting 
mix and  - substantial heterogeneity across schools in underlying pupil case
dom coefficient models suggest  achieving Key Stage Levels is clearly inelastic.   Ran
estimates by up to 66%, the marginal impact in terms of proportions of pupils 
although endogenous models increase parameter  – generally supports this finding 
production function within an English LEA   modest.  The econometric estimation of a
significant findings, the practical impact of substantial rises in funding are still rather 
for such findings and sophisticated corrections seem to systematically find statistically 
exogenous may be partly to blame  deemed flawed.  Although mistreating funding as
data that leads to situation where some 40 years of empirical research is largely 
significant estimates or at least conflicting assessments of common  - proportion of non
a significant  – exists a seeming paradox  The literature review finds that there 
pupil funding. - implications of education production functions with respect to per
the empirical estimation and policy  – substantive component of the research 
urth) generation requirements before concentrating on the  suggestion for the next (fo
education production functions.  A small theoretical diversion identifies my 
explicit link between the funding ‘generation’ definitions and the underlying theory of 
th the rationale and nomenclature for funding before drawing an  England.  It begins wi
This chapter looks at the economic theory underpinning education formula funding in 
Introduction 4.1
England with an LEA level application
The Economics of Formula Funding of Education in  4
123d. This can reduce perverse  providers in proportion to the services offere
adjusted capitation formulae allow finance to flow to  - Well designed needs 
given a relatively high level of emphasis in the UK in deriving funding formula. 
ciency and equity. The equity consideration has been  defined in terms of both effi
benefit in terms of the desirable outcome measures. These outcomes are often 
It permits resources to be directed to where they are expected to secure the most  
optimal formula design, which may evolve over time.
bate about the  Explicit presentation of the criteria for funding permits informed de
manner, the recipients of the funds are more likely to accept their allocation. 
manner and if it can be shown to have been derived in a fair and reasonable 
formula treats all in the same  partisan. A  - of funds to be seen as fair and non
It provides a transparent means of allocating resources that allows the distributor  
): 2003) ( Smith  (adapted from
resources are often defined in terms of equity, efficiency and political considerations 
uting  Potential advantages of formula funding relative to the other means of distrib
The Rationale for Formula Funding 4.2.1
Reform Act.
predominant means of distributing resources in education since the 1988 Education 
K to some extent, formula funding has become the  mechanisms can be found in the U
discretion or political patronage; and historical precedent and whilst all of these 
schools. Other common forms of allocating resources exist, such as bidding; 
o local government and then from local government to individual  from national t
competing for those resources. In the case of education in England this is in two steps: 
limited pool of resources amongst devolved decision entities which are effectively 
g is defined as a mechanistic formula or criteria for distributing a  Formula fundin
The Rationale and Nomenclature for Formula Funding 4.2
124te it crea
managing the relationship between outputs and the inputs used to  – Efficiency  2.
incremental amount it costs to teach that type of pupil.
in the education funding formula, should bare a strong relationship to the actual 
to, for example, special needs  expected for that student. Thus the ‘unit value’ attached 
formula reflect the costs of the resources required to provide the quality of education 
In an educational context this requires that the amounts allocated per student by the 
nd objectives are met  the extent to which aims a – Effectiveness  1.
: 2005) ( et al Atkinson  added from
), with a further criterion  1998) ( %& Leva Ross and  assessing a formula (adapted from
allocations of resources. The following eight criteria have been suggested for 
optimal  - sub Badly designed formula funding can lead to perverse incentives and 
A Criteria for Formula Assessment 4.2.2
efficiency.
a major feature of the 1988 Education Reform Act, is thus argued to reward 
market, which was  - ts of gaining custom. The creation of this quasi financial benefi
market, schools will face the financial consequences of losing custom and the 
capitation payment for their child will follow that child. Thus, like in a normal 
have some choice of where they send their children for education then the 
rents  market by separating purchaser and provider. In education, if pa - of a quasi
And perhaps less obviously, formula funding based on capitation, aids the creation  
only.
, whereby schools attempt to select low cost pupils  skimming - cream incentive for 
ome of the  special educational needs pupils, a formula approach may remove s
sufficient resources to compensate for the extra resources required to provide for 
playing by the devolved entities. For example, by providing  - incentives and game
125thought to promote participation in decision making about the formula and ensures 
he resource receiving entities. This positive feature is  making community and t
- The formula should be transparent in that it can be readily understood by the policy
formula
the ease of understanding the  – Accountability, simplicity and transparency  6.
is thought to contribute to low administrative costs.
ments  budget calculations. The statistical property of parsimony in the use of measure
The formula should be easy to construct, maintain over time and to utilise in making 
costs etc.
the cost of implementing the formula, data collection  – Administrative cost  5.
decide how to count needy pupils. 
receiving entities. This could occur if, for example, local authorities were free to 
The objective is that the formula should be free from unfair manipulation by resource 
entities
llocation to manipulation by receiving  the robustness of the a – Integrity  4.
those who shape policy.
important that the equity implications of a particular funding formula are clear to 
decision making process is a matter of sensitive political judgment. However, it is 
implications into their  The extent to which policy makers wish to incorporate equity
consideration of the distribution of the outputs across the population – Equity  3.
about rewarding performance.
ilarly diverting resources to schools with low achievement sends perverse signals  Sim
historical precedent provides schools with no incentive to reduce energy costs. 
pursuing inefficient behaviour. For example, the funding of energy costs according to 
Careful attention should be paid to whether the formula sets any incentives for 
126achieve the same educational standards leading to weighted per capita funding.  This 
pupils have greater educational needs than others and require greater resources to 
eity of pupils, that some  Second generation funding formulae recognise the heterogen
same educational needs and thus cost the same to educate to a given standard. 
capita funding, implicitly assuming that all pupils at a particular grade level have the 
le and transparent basic per  First generation funding formulae provided a very simp
taxonomy describing formula in terms of generations:
provide a  1998) ( %& Leva Ross and  In terms of describing types of funding formula, 
of Formula Generations Taxonomy A  4.2.3
expected levels of funding.  to
future. Resources may be required to provide an insurance buffer for random shocks 
formula is derived may affect a school’s or local authority’s ability to plan for the 
Uncertainty regarding future pupil numbers and/or the manner in which the allocating 
minimising the impact of uncertainty or variations in funding. – Stability  9.
allow for variations in input prices.
to  The formula should be capable of adjusting to local supply and cost conditions
allowing for differing costs of provision – Sensitivity to local conditions  8.
one used to allocate resources to schools within the local authority.
ssarily be the same as the  used to allocate funds to the local authority should not nece
opportunities for local democratic decision making. Thus, for example, the formula 
Where delivery of education is decentralised, the formula should allow for 
rtunities for local decision making oppo – Local democracy  7.
stakeholders.
higher levels of accountability of the providing agency and schools to their 
127and estimation of the education production function, fourth generation will require the 
specification  welfare function.  That is, just as third generation formula will require
offs between efficiency and equity via a social  - Specifically it will formalize trade
realized, it is still possible to suggest what a fourth generation formula may involve.  
her than  even though third generation formulae are perhaps still theoretical rat
development of third generation formula as a necessary but insufficient step.  Thus 
additional treatment of any equity considerations and ultimately this tends to make the 
e is no such  understanding of the education production function.)  However, ther
the concept of heterogeneity in economic theory (as I will argue, it requires an 
equation new concepts of heterogeneity and equity whereas the latter simply grounds 
ference brings into the  greater than that between second and third.  The first dif
Arguably the difference between first and second generation funding formulae is 
funding formulae.
UK has evolved over time and is progressing towards what they term third generation 
ucation in the  %&
	


	

 formula objectives.  Ross and Leva
offs to be made between  - considerations indicating that there may well be trade
third generation formulae has sacrificed simplicity for effectiveness and equity 
at the move from first to  consistent with agreed national education policies. Notice th
constructed in a manner that encourages schools or areas to behave in ways which are 
generation formulae is that the formulae should be incentive consistent, i.e. 
ts. A further property of third  formulae should be comprehensive and include all cos
a given standard according to the pupils’ needs and the cost of the resources. The 
an estimate of the actual costs faced by the school or area in educating their pupils to 
is, the formula is derived from  Third generation funding formulae are cost based, that 
that area.
areas received did not necessarily reflect the extra costs required to teach pupils in 
with relatively high levels of economic disadvantage, but the additional amounts these 
schools/areas  standard. Thus, second generation formulae reallocated resources to
not based on estimates of the amount required to get pupils to a certain educational 
historically highly correlated with need and thought a good proxy measure), but were 
rivation (which is  weighting component was typically based on some measure of dep
128itional  s may enter the production function, thus schools with pupils with add e teach
of pupils that the school  mix - case and a single input, funding. Other inputs such as the 
different production functions. Firstly, the relationship discussed is between output 
have  educational outcomes.  There are broadly two reasons why the schools may 
formula is that schools have different abilities to turn the funding input into 
A complicating factor that motivates the use of formula beyond first generation 
accessible manner.
ry  approach is initially adopted as it illustrates the concepts and implications in a ve
beyond the scope of a national formula.  In addition, for this section, a graphical 
government or LEAs to schools, since allocation of funding to individual pupils is 
rom  probably more appropriate for discussion of optimal funding formula f
approach I will use for the remainder of this chapter.  This level of aggregation is 
individual pupil level, it may also be applied at the school level, and this is the 
ly applied at the  Although the educational production function theory is usual
characteristics including latent ability, family background and parental input.
is a vector of individual pupil related  P inputs such as funding, class size, etc. and 
is a vector of educational  R is a vector of a student’s educational outcomes,  x Where 
(4.1) ) . ,  ( s = x
equation 4.1. the relationship is given by 
outcomes is provided by the education production function, where the general form of 
etical link between inputs and educational  produce a given outcome.  The theor
allocation of funding on the basis of the actual costs or resource use required to 
As argued, the distinguishing feature of third generation funding formula is the 
The Education Production Function 4.3.1
ry of Funding Formula The Underlying Economic Theo 4.3
obtain the optimal allocation formula.
additional estimation of the welfare function and the final combination of the two to 
129(equal) funding to both schools A and B, we  { v of output. For example, if we gave 
for the same level of funding for each school we would expect to see a different level 
iven level of inputs for all levels. That is,  having a higher output than school B for a g
The diagram shows two schools with different production functions, with school A 
if a school had 100 per cent success with its pupils.)  
y could not improve their outcome (an obvious mathematical case would be  school the
uld allocate to a  no matter how much extra money you co – to additional funding 
As the curves flatten out and become perfectly straight, there are no additional returns 
linear nature of the curves.  - crease in output. This is represented by the non marginal in
returns, that is, as more and more funding is allocated to a school the smaller the 
ishing  of dimin hypothetical they are drawn to show a typical or expected relationship
ey stage levels at all possible levels of funding. Although the curves are  hieving k ac
represent the schools’ separate abilities to turn funding into proportions of their pupils 
for schools A and B and  production functions The lines labelled P(A) and P(B) are the 
various key stages (KS).
pupils reaching the appropriate levels at  influence, for example, the proportion of 
can be any outcome, or combination of outcomes, that society wishes schools to 
and educational attainment (output) for  two hypothetical schools, A and B. Output 
relationship between all possible levels of funding  shows a hypothesized  1 - Figure 4
I  illustrate next and discuss the consequences. off  - trade
nd it is this  off between efficiency and equity a - allocate, there is a potential trade
t production functions is accepted, then, given a limited set of funds to  differen
aside the issue of why schools differ in their production functions, if the notion of 
risk of partially allocating funding towards inefficient providers. However, putting 
g funding to tackle additional needs on the basis of outcomes alone runs the  directin
important for decision makers to distinguish between the two determining cases as 
mixes and how much is due to inefficiencies and it may be  - due to different case
ivariate relationship it is not possible to determine how much of the differential is  un
their inputs into an output given the same mix of other inputs. From a simple 
other reason for a differential is that some schools may be more efficient at turning 
needs may require more funding per pupil to achieve the same level of output. The 
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quadrants (labelled P(A) and P(B)  bottom right and  top left shown in the 
uced and are  each school. Thus the production functions of the two schools are reprod
split into a separate graph for  1 - Figure 4 outcomes. Two of the graphs are actually 
consists of four graphs which are linked together to show combined  2 - Figure 4
Possibility Frontier Production The 4.3.2
Production Functions Educational  Hypothetical Heterogeneous  :  1 - 4 Figure 
. | v and  } v require different allocations of funding to each school, 
, this would  { x ome for their pupils,  wished for both schools to achieve the same outc
funding without any structural change would not be sufficient. Conversely if we 
shift of the curve via say an  improvement in curriculum, but simply allocating further 
so that it were possible i.e. an upward  change the production function of school B 
One could attempt to  . } x current production function of B, we could never reach level 
Notice that, no matter what level of funding we allocated to school B, given the 
. | x and school B a proportion  } x ortion  would expect school A to achieve a prop
131shows the outcome of  6~ x best instrument, funding. The point  - amenable second
represents the possible outcomes policy makers may choose from given their policy 
on functions of the schools, is infeasible. Thus the PPF  given the current producti
combination of outputs outside the shape, given the limited funding available and 
contained within or on the boundaries of the three sided shape are possible. Any 
s and the current production functions. Any combination of outputs  the school
curve. The PPF shows all possible efficient outcome possibilities given the inputs of 
(PPF) represented by the downward sloping  production possibility frontier up with the 
plot the combined school outcomes in the top right quadrant, we will end  schools and
for all possible combinations of funding allocations which give all the funds to 
line permits us to see the expected outputs OA(ef) and OB(ef). If we do this exercise 
ring to the axes showing outputs, we can see that the extension of the dotted  By refer
P(B).
extending the dotted lines till they reach the relevant production functions P(A) and 
It is then possible to observe the expected outputs from this distribution of funding by 
to where it crosses the relevant funding axis.  6~ v m the point  horizontal dotted line fro
the graph we can see how much funding each school gets by drawing a vertical and 
which represents a 50/50 split of funding to each school. Using  6~ v Consider the point 
where the funding is not totally allocated to schools.
ts  allocations. Points within the triangle, but not on the 45 degree line, represent poin
towards the axis origin (forming an upside down right angle triangle) are feasible 
funding is allocated to school B. All points along this line and within the line and 
e  axis, it represents the point where all th | v school A and where the line crosses the
axis, this represents an allocation whereby all the available funds go to  } v reaches the 
right shows all possible allocations of funding to the schools. Where the line  left to 
available to allocate to the two schools. The diagonal 45 degree line which falls from 
quadrant, labelled ‘funding’, shows the total amount of funds  bottom left The 
, output of school B. | x for funding to B; and  | v for output of school A; 
} x for funding to A;  } v level of resource/funding to that school. The axes are labelled 
respectively). As before, they show the expected educational outcomes for a given 
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there is also an opportunity cost in terms of outcomes and this is where the 
one school, it cannot be used elsewhere. As funding is converted into outcomes, then 
opportunity cost of allocating funds where funds are limited. If a pound is allocated to 
the  school A receives a smaller share than it did under equal funding. This is 
, notice how this requires that school B receives a greater share of funding and that  6Y v
derive the implied levels of funding required to achieve this outcome. In this case,
to  on the PPF.  The PPF may be used 6Y x outcomes, this is represented by point 
given the funding and the respective abilities of the schools to turn funding into 
Consider a situation where we wished to achieve equal outputs from the schools then, 
Function The Social Welfare  4.3.3
for Educational Outcomes rontier F ossibility  Production P The  :  2 - 4 Figure 
possible, it does not, by itself, show what is optimal.
schools. However, although the PPF shows what is  allocating equal funds to the 
133economics, states that interpersonal comparisons of welfare or utility are not possible.
practical.  Firstly, the welfarist doctrine that usually underpins the philosophy of 
and the other  However, incorporating equity has two main problems, one conceptual 
offs between the two outcomes of efficiency and equity.   - preferences are for trade
we need to know what society’s  - component to the existing conceptual model 
dd an additional theoretical  In order to answer this question it is necessary to a
represents an improvement?  
represents a reduction in total or average output, is it possible that such a distribution 
return school to the lower return school.  But even though this redistribution 
- gh moving to more equitable outcomes involves taking funding away from the hi
is generally more ‘efficient’ at turning funding into educational outcomes and so 
This is not an entirely surprising result as the production functions show that school A 
vement.   redistribution does not even represent a potential Pareto impro
point alone, such a  - compensation principal and therefore from an efficiency stand
redistribution of funding not represent a Pareto improvement it also fails the 
function, not only does such a  ).  Thus, given the current production x  > xu 
school B’s output is insufficient to compensate for the loss in school A’s output (i.e
product of funding were zero in one school’s case) but notice that the increase in 
(it could only be so if the marginal  funding does not represent a Pareto improvement 
o a redistribution of  ) s x  and school B rise (by an amount  ) xu  t  (by an amoun
away from school A to school B it is not surprising to see the output of school A fall 
that a redistribution of funds takes  frontier and recalculating the new outputs.  Given
The cost may be shown by a movement along the production possibility  ? 6Y x point
then is the cost of setting funding such that the two schools have equal output, i.e. 
outcomes for the two schools.  What  production possibility frontier and hence unequal 
on the  6~ x Suppose the status quo position was equal funding and leads to point 
in more detail. 2 - Figure 4 in  PPF 
hich shows the  3 w - Figure 4 off occurs, this is illustrated in  - quity/efficiency trade e
1342 SWC
1 SWC
OB
OA
OB
OA
O*
eo O
ef O
of outcomes, they are equivalent, even though the aggregate level of output is 
is not regarded as an inferior distribution  6Y x to  6~ x ), then a move from  1 curve (SWC
lie on the same social welfare  6Y x and 6~ x e can see that as both  I have outlined, w
.  With the hypothetical scenario  1 combinations of outcomes that are preferred to SWC
then it represents  1 is further from the origin than SWC 2 concave and as SWC
overlapping and  - .  As with indifference curves they are assumed non 2 and SWC 1 SWC
and are labelled  3 - Figure 4 Two hypothetical social welfare curves are plotted in 
efficiency and equity.
individual utility the curves represent the marginal rate of substitution between 
the society that funds it.  However instead of representing  which yield equal utility to 
society level indifference curves, mapping combinations of output amongst schools 
off may be captured by social welfare curves, effectively  - equal.  The societal trade
re equitable allocation of resources all other things being  that society prefers a mo
societal rather than individual perspective is adopted and the argument can be made 
welfarist approach resolves this issue.  In this approach a  - However adopting an extra
and the Social Welfare Curve Off - ficiency and Equity Trade Ef The  :  3 - 4 Figure 
135societal decision maker has such a natural comprehensive feeling for society’s 
o argue that a  it less justifiable t , of their own preferences (i.e. indifference curves)
whilst it may be reasonable to assume that an individual is inherently aware  , Secondly
production function creates uncertainty about the production possibility frontier.   
dge of the  instrument and the uncertainty created by a less than perfect knowle
constraint and a production constraint.  Funding thus becomes a second best 
Firstly, the allocation of outcomes is subject to not one, but two constraints: a budget 
tional complications.   with a budget constraint.  However, there are a number of addi
maximising utility  – formula designers is essentially a standard economic problem 
the problem facing the  knowledge of the PPF and the social welfare curves where 
of the PPF and fourth requires  Thus, third generation formula require knowledge
. # x outcomes at point 
hat obtains  the distribution of outcomes amongst society and leads to an allocation t
only a recognition of the education production function but also the preferences for 
cludes not  then a fourth generation type may be identified and defined as one which in
problem by incorporating society’s preferences via a social welfare curve.  Perhaps 
of location is somewhat arbitrary.  However, as it is conceptually simple to rectify this 
choice  consideration of society’s preferences between efficiency and equity, then the 
s there no  A specific point on the PPF and allocating resources to achieve that point.  
is based on the concept of the PPF and may be viewed as decision makers choosing a 
ormula  ).  Third generation f 6Y x to any point (thus potentially even to a point beyond 
increased funding is not based on any awareness of the PPF, then the move could be 
, however, as the  6Y x towards 6~ x ction possibility frontier from  move along the produ
pupil funding.  Second generation formula implies some clockwise  - with equal per
represents the outcomes that would be achieved under first generation formula,  6~ x
%&
'
"


 Leva We can place this concept in the context of the Ross and 
. 3 - e 4 Figur in # x
welfare curve with the production possibility frontier, in this case represented by point 
distribution of outputs may be achieved by the intersection of the most distant social 
with maximising utility subject to a budget constraint, an optimal  reduced.  As 
136For a two school problem, this leads to a solution given by 
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the educational budget constraint.   

 Wher
(4.5) 0  @  
 

@ v 
@ x 
@ x 

ndition is order co
.  The first  ) @ . mix of pupils (given by - their output for reasons other than the case
allows schools to differ in    s and thus a solution is possible. The school subscript on 
is convex  ) . ( s concave and - is quasi ) . (  solution is possible i.e. that  that an interior
order conditions such  - welfare and output functions have the necessary desirable first
during the period for which the allocated resources are used.  It is assumed that the 
which are assumed time invariant   pupil characteristics of school  are the  @ . Where 
(4.4) J @ . , @ v L   s = @ x
: production constraint is given by
The  .  is the population in school @  and   pupil funding allocated to school
- is the per @ v , represents the total resource budget for the decision maker  Where
(4.3)
 % @

@  @ v '  
: constraint is represented by
The budget  .  and x is increasing in   t  school populations.  It is assumed tha
is a vector of   is a vector of educational outcomes from each school and x Where
(4.2) )  , x (  = 
may be defined as:
offs in public services) the welfare function of concern to the formula designers  - trade
who look at such  1987) ( Behrman and Craig  Formally (and following notation in 
education production function and the social welfare curves.
derivation of both the  – preferences.  This creates two clear research requirements 
137optimal.
fairness and equity, then a simpler mechanism would indeed be  to offset the gain in 
improve transparency may well be secondary, if the loss of transparency is too large 
whilst a drive to  – conclusions need not be seen as being at odds with each other 
The two  ence based, but satisfied political requirements better’. was less evid
‘rejected in favour of a simpler mechanism that  Boards was, after public consultation, 
that a technically intricate and fair formula for the funding of Scottish Health  reports
2003) ( Smith  However,  transparency should be a secondary concern’. improve 
the drive to  and that ‘ fairness and equity are more important than simplicity’ that ‘
Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee (1999) which concluded 
report the conclusion from the House of Commons  2001) ( Hill  - Rice, and Carr
, Smith off between transparency and fairness,  - of education and in terms of the trade
off where conflicts between objectives arise. As an example outside  - have been traded
generation formula it is instructive to observe how objectives  - In the absence of fourth
England
The Development of Formula Funding in Education in  4.4
offs between objectives. - production functions and societal trade
transparency) and clearly states a requirement for knowledge of both the relevant 
of formula (e.g.  This result stands when extended to the plethora of objectives
production function.
substitution in the welfare function equals the marginal rate of substitution in the 
occurs when the marginal rate of  optimal allocation in the other and that the 
oduction  that the cost of allocating more limited resources to one school is a loss in pr
hand side gives the slope of the production function.  This equation shows intuitively 
The left hand side of the equation gives the slope of the welfare function and the right 
(4.6)
F 8 v  8 x  8 
F  v   x   
=
F 8 x  
F  x  
138Though there were both a reduction in direct grants and an increase in costs.
5
schools and despite the 11.6% increase in  government and then local government to
step nature of funding in the UK from national to local  - However, given the two
could receive an increase (or ceiling) of more than seven per cent per pupil funding. 
t per pupil funding. The flipside was that no LEA  increase (or floor) of 3.2 per cen
the concept of floors and ceilings such that LEAs would be guaranteed a minimum 
Damping muted the redistributive element of the new funding process by introducing 
off than in previous years with the process of ‘damping’.    no LEA was worse 
off LEAs, the government took steps to ensure that  - potential rebellion by the worse
would expect to receive less funding than previously.  In order to head off a  ) LEAs (
Local Education Authorities meant that several
5 overnment ed by G rovid funding p
variation from the previous formula that even an 11.6% increase in nominal overall 
based and with 80% of allocation based on pupil numbers, it showed sufficient 
Although the EFSG report led to a formula, which was still broadly second generation 
(EFSG 2002a). revisions to the funding formula and produced a final report in 2002, 
churches, was charged with providing background analysis and making suggested 
unions, schools, governors’ organisations, the Audit Commission, OfSTED and 
entatives from  not only central and local government representatives, but also repres
the Education Funding Strategy Group (EFSG). The EFSG, which was comprised of, 
engaged in the process of updating its second generation funding formula by creating 
hen the UK Government  arose from the 2002 reforms, set in motion in 2000, w
he more obvious occasion arose during the ‘2003 funding crisis’ which  Possibly t
risis The 2003 Funding C 4.4.1
apparently arbitrary basis.
each decision is left open to criticism of being made on a hidden and  whole, as such 
that on each occasion the decision was optimal and for the benefit of the society as a 
occasion, without reference to an underlying social welfare function it is not obvious 
n made.  And whilst it appears clear what the decision was on each  has had to have bee
off  - and Wales since 1988 reveal two potential occasions when a decision on a trade
In terms of education, the development of formula funding in education in England 
139Assistant director
’ far as I can see, without a rationale for the transfer of those resources.
nimum funding guarantee and, as  are on the formula to those that are on mi
has effectively meant a net transfer of resources from those that  [The MFG] ‘
Primary headteacher
. ’ not so well off and the local authorities that are well off
guarantee is maintaining the differential between the  The minimum funding  ‘
Secondary governor
’ losing.
, then someone else is  funded according to the formula] - are relatively over
[LEAs and schools which  The pot is only a certain size. If you protect them  ‘
icised, as the following quotes illustrate: heavily crit
The opportunity cost of implementing floors and ceilings is well recognised and 
3.76%
chool floor and ceilings were 5% and 6.8% and for the LEA they were 3% and  s
In 2004/05 the  o that school. quired to provide at least that amount of funding t re
guaranteed funding level calculated (which incorporates falling rolls) and LEAs are 
in pretty much the same way that damping works for the LEAs: each school has a 
on to individual schools. This guarantee worked  passported guaranteed to LEAs was 
ra money  the 2004/05 financial year at 4%, was intended to ensure that the ext
this was named the minimum funding guarantee (MFG).  The MFG, introduced for 
process of damping to from LEAs to individual schools, though in the schools’ case 
tend the floor part of the  The main response of the Government was to simply ex
had made much political capital of the overall increase in funding, to respond.
formula losers was successful in stirring an embarrassed Government, who  - the new
3. A high profile and vocal campaign from  less real funding per pupil than in 2002/0
to LEAs to distribute funds to schools meant that many schools unexpectedly received 
total funding, unexpected sharp rises in supply costs and the (limited) freedom given 
140study also showed that these costs were broadly consistent across school types.
£1,280 per AEN pupil per year (£980 met needs and £300 opportunity costs). The 
ss both primary and secondary blocks were  estimated that the unit costs for AEN, acro
year were estimated at £70, the highest cost was reported at £20,680.  The PwC study 
staff school resources per  - school staff cost of £26,000. Similarly, whilst the mean non
was estimated at £1,500, with a highest  the mean school staff cost per pupil per year 
,  (HCPs) cost pupils - variation across schools. For example, before filtering out high
pupils. The survey (based on returns from 1035 schools) showed considerable 
oom teacher time) of providing education for AEN  such as head teacher or classr
from schools on the costs (including the opportunity costs, such as diverted resources 
The additional unit costs of teaching a pupil with AEN was based on survey results 
. AEN pupils
he actual costs of providing education for  the AEN index but also with measuring t
(PwC) study was commissioned by the EFSG  tasked with not only refining  (2002)
in the area of funding AEN. Specifically, an independent PricewaterhouseCoopers
and concerted effort to enact a third generation approach  generation, there was a clear 
Meals.) And although most of the 2002 reforms were still distinctly second 
on population characteristics (e.g. proportion of pupils qualifying for Free School 
storically determined pot of money allocated by an AEN index based  manner i.e. an hi
generation  - 2003 the means of addressing AEN was conducted in the usual second
.  Prior to  (West, Pennell, and West 2000) educational outcomes across the population 
stration, has had an emphasis on addressing the inequitable distribution of  admini
Educational policy in England and Wales, especially since the 1997 Labour 
Addressing Additional Educational Needs (AEN) 4.4.2
addressing effectiveness and equity issues. 
The ‘missing’ rationale is clearly the promotion of stability but at the expense of 
2005) ( et al Atkinson 
141in.
ssing AEN rather than the route it takes, I leave it  interested in describing the total allocation to addre
direct grants and some reports exclude this figure from the AEN in the formula calculation.  As I am 
This figure may differ from those reported elsewhere as 25% of this sum was to be allocated through 
6
2002b) ( EFSG 
’ least deprived authorities who have argued for a minimum AEN unit cost.
funded, and the  authorities, who would like to see all the unmet needs being 
Compromise between the opposing views of the most deprived  [A]  ‘
The DfES admitted that the final figure was : 
, some 66% of the PwC estimate  
6 AEN pupils (excluding HCP) per year was £1,530
r  capped, unit cost fo - capped) estimate of unmet need by 0.5. Thus the final, double
The Government compromised by somewhat arbitrarily weighting the (already 
least to gain) argued against devolving funds according to unmet needs. 
gnising that they had the  reports that the relatively least deprived LEAs (possibly reco
2004) ( Johnson  The concept of ‘unmet’ needs was not accepted across the board. 
AEN was £1,780 per pupil per year.
pped unit cost for providing the extra resources required to teach pupils with  the ca
uncapped mean was some £1,020 per pupil per year). This led to the conclusion that 
Thus, the ‘unmet’ need was estimated at £500 per pupil per year (although the 
influenced means.   - recorded at a lower maximum value, presumably to avoid skew
alues are  £26,890). The PwC analysis reports ‘capped’ estimates where high v
unmet costs was diverse with some very high additional costs (the maximum was 
support they considered necessary. As with elements of met needs, the distribution of 
identify what additional  whether they felt pupils’ needs were fully met and if not to
providing the agreed acceptable level of service. They thus asked schools to identify 
represented the costs of current provision and may not represent the unit cost for 
hey based their figures on  However, the PwC study also recognised that the data t
142outcomes.
outcomes as well as the underlying production function which will turn funding into 
ernment to be cognisant of a social welfare function for educational  for the Gov
I.e. in order to resolve these almost unavoidable conflicts in priorities, there is a need 
’ policy aims and defending the outcomes so produced.
and depth of dissatisfaction, but by relating the formulae explicitly to social 
minimise the spread  An equitable settlement is not produced by seeking to  ‘
- argues  2003) ( Johnson  welfare function.  And as  - reference to an explicit social
off) and not with any  - losing entities (who criticise on the basis that they are worse
g and minimizing criticism from  tradin - appears largely determined by political horse
off between equity considerations and other requirements (notably stability)  - trade
perpetuated the inequitable distribution that drove the formula to be changed, the 
nd ceilings which has to some extent,  And, as with the imposition of floors a
however it should be made clear that this is the underlying reason for the weighting.  
generation perspective, the weighting of the PwC figure may well be warranted 
possibility curve to equal outcomes.  From a fourth  movement along the production 
i.e. the Government is unwilling to endorse a  nwilling to meet the full costs  u
arbitrary weighting is to say that the Government did accept the unit cost but were 
he estimated figure, another way of interpreting the seemingly  66% weighting to t
Though it appears the Government partially rejected the PwC valuation by applying a 
unit cost value.
Government commissioned a third generation orientated means of obtaining the true 
s the means by which AEN enters the formula where the  exception to this rule i
patterns rather than an analysis of how much is required per pupil. The notable 
by which the formula allocates amounts is still broadly based on historical spending 
, many of the original criticisms remained. For example, the means  2003 formula - pre
Though the new formula was intended to address several of the criticisms aimed at the 
ummary The New 2003 English Education Formula S 4.4.3
143welfare functions have two critical components: an aversion to inequality and an 
arguing that that such  1987) ( Behrman and Craig  probably the more complicated with
functions are  Of the two, welfare  for both the production and welfare functions.  
Empirical solution requires an explicit functional form to be specified and estimated 
Empirical Estimation of Educational Welfare Functions. 4.5.1
resolved the issues involved. 
had completely  however, be optimistic to argue that the more sophisticated models 
early literature (predominately the endogenous nature of funding).   It would, 
more sophisticated methods aimed at addressing the theoretical shortcomings of the 
chool inputs and output to  systematic and practically strong relationship between s
econometric specifications which have failed to demonstrate a convincing picture of a 
literature has developed over time progressing from simple, arguably naïve, 
educational production function. This  component of the literature regarding the 
I thus start with estimation of the welfare function before going on to the substantial 
not been reached.
directed towards uncovering the educational production function, a consensus has still 
scientific enquiry  Indeed it is arguable that after some 40 years of serious empirical
problems that have occurred in the estimation of educational production functions. 
production function crops up before the welfare function) and the substantial 
f funding formula (i.e. the  existent).  This is possibly due to the natural development o
- scarce compared to educational production functions (indeed they are almost non
As can be seen, empirical estimations of educational welfare functions are relatively 
cal evidence in both areas. published empiri
and education social welfare function.  This next section therefore summarises the 
constructed with explicit reference to an underlying education production function 
The preceding sections have argued that modern funding formula need to be 
Education Production and Welfare Functions
Empirical Estimation of  Literature Review of the 4.5
144Pollak welfare function specification of the form - 1990.  They adopt a Kohm
sectional datasets collected in 1980 and  - schooling outcomes in Mexico on two cross
off of  - equity trade - estimate the efficiency 1) 200 ( Gershberg and Schuermann 
effectively a greater aversion to inequality at the lower end of the attainment scale.
symmetric curve where there is  - The third scenario gives an example of a non
with varying degrees of curvature within these two bounds.   scenarios captured
cases represent the extreme limits of a rational welfare curve, with all rational 
line.  These two 
o curves would be ‘L’ shapes emanating from the origin along a 45
d case represents an example of extreme inequality and the social welfare  The secon
lines sloping downwards from left to right.  
straight 
o social welfare curves that were 45 distribution of outcomes, this would imply 
The maximizing output principle implies that there is no particular concern about the 
exceed.
schools meet or  Provide a minimum education output threshold that all 3.
Equalise education outcomes across schools 2.
To maximize educational attainment. 1.
following three plausible objectives, given a fixed level of educational resources:
shape of the welfare function for the  As an example consider the implications for the
line emanating from the origin.  
o around a 45
this would be represented by an asymmetry of the social welfare curve  – top end 
ing inequality at the lower end of the achievement scale than reducing it at the  reduc
types of inequality.  For example the Government may be more concerned about 
the other hand, unequal concern reflects different weights a society may attach to 
between equity and productivity, is reflected in the curvature of welfare surface.  On 
off  - unequal concern component.  The aversion to inequality, effectively the trade
145methods a la Gershberg and Schuermann.) 
echniques (as opposed to revealed preference  market valuation t - stated preference/non
patterns, this identifies a further research area and one which applies methods such as 
pending  tical analysis of previous s immediately apparent nor recoverable from statis
y it serves.  Since these values may not be  reflect the values/preferences of the societ
policy its preferences for addressing inequality and one may anticipate that it would 
according to an explicit and transparent formula would also be willing to commit to 
ent that is willing to allocate resources  case in the UK and it is feasible that a Governm
Of course this need not necessarily be the  rational or effective allocation patterns.’
the Mexican allocation pattern does not obviously incorporate  indeed they state that ‘
nt in official policy statements,  Mexican Government does not reveal its standpoi
uncover the values of the welfare parameters through input and output variables as the 
poor.  However, Gershberg and Schuermann note that they  - concern, mainly pro
. They also found limited evidence of unequal  presented yielded positive results)
years and a little sensitive to differing model specifications (two of the eight models 
not particularly large (and generally not statistically significant) nor consistent across 
However, they conclude that aversion is  . 0 <  demonstrates inequality aversion i.e.
They find that in both years they estimate that the Mexican National Government 
(4.8) )   ,   (  3
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For a two school problem this implies a social welfare curve between the schools 
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146consensus is a  plus years of continued research into this area without achieving such a 
. The 40  relationship that, thus far, do not appear to be converging on a consensus’
achievement  - quality - the impetus for hundreds of empirical studies of the school ‘
been argued to be  school resources on student outcomes.  This puzzling finding has 
sample size found what were regarded at the time as surprisingly small effects of 
, a large scale observational US study that, despite the  1966) ( et al Coleman  found in 
equivocal research are  The origins of the  the research evidence for this is equivocal.’
expenditure is causally and positively related to student outcomes,  professionals that
despite the strong belief among parents and educational  the authors state that ‘
where  2002)  ( Vignoles  and %& Leva literature since the 1960’s.  It is summarised by 
informative to describe the seemingly unresolved paradox that has plagued the 
Before embarking on a detailed review of the production function literature, it is 
f Education Production Functions Empirical Estimation o 4.5.2
distribution neutral.
welfare function for England and Wales would display similar preferences and not be 
.  One would therefore anticipate that an educational  @ h 4   h unequal concern, i.e.
and  0 <  ates both inequality aversion i.e the health welfare function demonstr
.’  Thus Williams et al find evidence that  inequalities defined by sex or smoking status
reduce inequalities defined by social class than they are to reduce identical 
‘people are much keener to  ’  It also seemed that  lth. and hence to sacrifice overall hea
willingness to sacrifice health benefits to target those with the worst health prospects, 
‘there is a general  conclude that  2005) ( Williams, Dolan, and Tsuchiya  research 
achieved sample of 833 people. In summarising this  postal questionnaire of an
face interviews with a sample of 130 York residents and a  - to - survey consisted of face
off of the population. This  - equity trade - survey looking at the health maximization
ic and Social Research Council (ESRC) have sponsored a major  function, the Econom
public.  More recently, and more relevant for derivation of an education welfare 
Off (TTO) exercises conducted with the general  - score was completed via Time Trade
5D instrument to a single health related quality of life  - health state EQ dimensional 
- uncommon in health in the UK.  For example, the means of reducing the multi
Although no such surveys appear to currently exist in education, they are not so 
147here appears no strong or systematic  t quoted conclusion that ‘ - famous and oft
that would occur if there were no impact of funding on attainment.  This led to the 
a sampling result, he argues,  – reporting direction) [Table 8]  negative; and 17% not 
75% finding no significant impact either way (of which 38% were positive; 20% were 
significant positive impact, 5% find a negative and statistically significant impact with 
educational outcomes, found that only 20% of studies find a  expenditure on
where a review of 65 US estimates analysing the impact of per pupil  2003b), (
Todd and Wolpin  ) and  1986 ( Hanushek  in a synthesis of the US evidence provided by
continuing debate between a number of prominent academics.  The debate originates 
funding educational production function estimates and is dominated by a rather heated
pupil  - The United States provides by far the biggest source of single country per
tudies S bservational  O ountry  C Single  4.5.2.1
data.
experimental  - al issues which arise in the non designed to address the methodologic
experimental designs; and finally a more sophisticated econometric approach which is 
country observational studies (including Europe and developing countries);  - cross
from the United States);  mostly bservational studies ( subsections: single country o
pupil funding may be divided into a number of distinct  - The literature on per
STAR class size experiment being a case in point.
heated debate between Hanushek and Krueger over the analysis of the Tenenesse 
g points; the rather  such that the same evidence is used to argue the two most opposin
significant as they are often argued to be.   The divide in the academic literature is 
- endogeneity); and a third argument that states that the results are not as non
dological issues (mostly  of relying on observational data which is beset by metho
significant results are a feature  - returns have set in);  those that argue the generally non
countries are operating on the flat part of the production functions (i.e. diminishing 
ndicate that western  significant findings i - those that argue that the persistent non
Three distinct counter arguments sum up the current state of knowledge: there are 
function.
clear indication of the difficulties involved in estimating the education production 
148[of no impact of  determine if the data are consistent with the null hypothesis ‘
analysis approach, and that is to  - imply an unusual objective of their meta Greenwald
Hedges, Laine, and  d all estimates.  However,  median pooled result rather than include
independence as a concern they produce an alternative ‘conservative’ analysis with a 
identify statistical  Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald education, etc.).  Where 
anushek i.e. class size, per pupil expenditure, teacher  across all inputs considered by H
example they state that one study alone yielded 12 estimates (though these are spread 
same paper and/or the same data, raising issues of statistical independence.  For 
of the analyses counted by Hanushek originate from the  raise the issue that many 
assumption they are all negative and find no substantive differences.)  Finally, they 
running the analysis under the  - (they later test the sensitivity of this omission by re
h provided no information on the direction of the effect  they omit the 11 studies whic
errors and thus likely to be unable reject a null hypothesis that is untrue.   Secondly 
II  - counting technique employed is prone to Type - They note that the vote failed.’  
tely) a null hypothesis after attempts to reject it have  accepting (at least approxima
essentially one of  Firstly, they argued that Hanushek’s methodological standpoint is ‘
counting’ approach adopted by Hanushek) and arrived at an opposite conclusion.   
analysis technique as compared to the ‘vote  - echnique (a meta evidence synthesis t
Hanushek analysed, applied both a different selection criteria and more sophisticated 
took the same studies that  Educational Researcher  in the  1994a) ( Greenwald 
Hedges, Laine, and  n emphasis on the meaning of ‘strong’ and ‘systematic’, Placing a
convergence in opinions.  
have spanned the literature for the following 20 years and with only the limited 
These controversial conclusions have led to a series of responses and rejoinders which 
original research.
en referred to in place of the  which is oft 1989) ( Hanushek  a summary article by 
s repeated in  This message wa results overstate the true effect of added expenditure.’
even these  impact of funding tended to be of the lowest quality and thus believes that ‘
more likely to find a positive  quality of the studies, he finds that those that were
.’ Furthermore when considering the  expenditures are considered in the aggregate
when expenditures are decomposed into underlying determinants and when 
nditures and student performance.  This is the case  relationship between school expe
149statistical testing and suggests that the estimated impact of expenditure has failed to 
sided  - Hanushek also draws attention to the unjustified two single substantive results.
that showed the omission failed to change the  Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald by 
null hypothesis.  He fails however to acknowledge the sensitivity analysis conducted 
nt studies is bound to bias the sample in favour of rejecting the stated  significa - non
He also criticises the more stringent selection criteria, pointing out that, deselecting 
of course may bias his own results even with the simpler technique.
the estimates are not (statistically) independent of each other, though this element  of 
correct evidence synthesis procedure, especially in light of the possibility that many 
analysis procedure is in fact a more  - questions whether the more sophisticated meta
’ interpretation of his original conclusion.  He thus  absurd uninteresting and an ‘ rather
finding that the null hypothesis is false in some of the studies is both fundamentally 
identifies that the stated main objective of HLR of  Furthermore Hanushek studies.)
the estimated relationships are statistically insignificant for the majority of  that 
and student performance give no real confidence that there is any relationship (i.e. 
in which the vast majority of studies on the relationship between specific resources 
to summarize a situation  nical statistical sense, but in a practical sense i.e. ‘ in the tech
clarifying that his initial famous statement of strong and systematic is not to be taken 
responds by  (1994) Hanushek Educational Researcher, In the following issue of the 
’  practical importance.
mean coefficient was sufficiently large to be of  significant factor and that the 
expenditure per pupil to be a robustly  They thus conclude that ‘ student outcome.’
the national average) would be associated with a 0.7 standard deviation increase in 
an increase of PPE by $500 (approximately 10% of  s that ‘ of the PPE variable indicate
effect on educational outcomes.  Furthermore, a comparison of the median effect sizes 
in the positive direction) the null hypothesis that per pupil expenditure (PPE) has no 
able to reject (in all model specifications and always  With their methodology they are 
. ) 0  : : T
and  0 M : : T ( sided tests  - tailed test, the authors conduct two one - single two
’   And in a second unusual step, instead of conducting a  least some of the studies.
ggest that the null hypothesis is false in at  in all studies or if the data su expenditure]
150estimates negative and significant.
significant; and just 3% of the  - not significant; 24% of the estimates negative and not
positive and statistically significant studies, 44%; 29% of the estimates positive but 
h a far greater percentage of  different to those of studies previously analysed: wit
and 27 in the effect magnitude estimation.  The summary statistics are notably 
pupil expenditure analysis, 27 in the combined significance test  - contributed to the per
parate estimated coefficients that  magnitude analysis.  In total there were 34 se
their previous studies, they conducted a combined significance test and an effect 
over two thirds of the estimates used by Hanushek in 1986 were discarded.  As with 
ically independent of each other) meant that  and, crucially, that the data are stochast
economic factors and/or longitudinal  - inclusion (which included controlling for socio
’  Notably the applied decision rules for  of studies than we examined previously.
a more comprehensive collection  techniques to ‘ analysis - reapply their meta ) a 1996 (
Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine  . Review of Educational Research this time in the 
Two years later and the same arguments are replayed between the same protagonists, 
despite substantial increases in real PPE.
to materialise  that their predictions of educational improvement have singularly failed 
sided tests and make absolutely no response to the critique  - tests rather than one two
sided statistical  - in any depth to the questions regarding the rationale of using two one
respond  dependence may cause similar issues in Hanushek’s original work but fail to 
objectives they themselves originally specified.  They do point out that statistical 
analysis, the origins of the original misunderstanding are arguably found in the  - meta
ctive of  number of studies.  Whilst this argument does indeed describe the key obje
stating it is an entirely appropriate methodology for synthesising the evidence from a 
analysis,  - Hanushek of failing to understand the rationale underpinning the meta
, accuse 1994b) ( Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald  In the same issue, a rejoinder by 
currently rate below the national average.’
performance over the past quarter century had been realized, Albert Einstein would 
deviation improvement in student  - standard - predictor of a seven their implied 
If  ‘ - materialise in the real world where there has been substantial increases in PPE 
151’s treatment of allocating equal weight to each study. et al criticism of Greenwald 
s into perspective Hanushek’s  given the same weight in the synthesis.  This put
’s, each  ( whereas in Hanushek’s treatment of data a single study may provide several
i argue that each study or data source provides one  et al independence.  Greenwald 
ue of statistical  Such a formulisation is also useful to demonstrate the iss
negative values.’ - that the distribution is composed of non
the combined significance tests demonstrate  general distribution.  For example, that ‘
that their intention is too say something about the  state  et al them) whereas Greenwald 
’s are significant (or at least more than 2.5% of      e  want to know whether any of th
et al . Hanushek states that Greenwald      , , each study will produce an estimate   
d  an    ,   x .  Using the observed values of    r  and the local paramete    , expenditure
pupil  - , the per    s, , will be a function of the school characteristic   x y,  that stud
The outcomes observed for     , labelled 
( impact will be a function of a local draw o
, the local  I to  1 =  indexed by  expenditure, however for any study or application, 
, represents the true underling impact of  
( parameter - A global or hyper - ’  parameters
distribution of underlying [resource effect]  be a ‘ Hanushek in that there may
ent in further detail.  They agree with  in a rejoinder, outline their argum ) (1996b
Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine  of failing to state their principal aim.   et al Greenwald 
incorrect technique, asks a fundamentally uninteresting question and accuses 
analysis is both an  - with the argument that meta responds, persisting 1996)  ( Hanushek 
show strong and consistent relations with achievement.’
Global resource variables such as PPE  and significant effects.)  They conclude that ‘
on of studies which patently demonstrate a higher propensity finding positive  selecti
’  They note that this estimate is lower than in their previous work (despite a  deviation.
be associated with an increase in achievement of nearly one sixth of one standard 
would  94]  - [10% of the national average of PPE in 93 increase in PPE of $500  an that ‘
no negative effect is never rejected.  Their revised estimate of the effect magnitude is 
model specifications (dropping studies prior to 1979; etc.) and the null hypothesis of 
under a variety of  t for no positive impact of PPE is always rejected  es sided t - The one
152the outcome of which would be reflected by higher rates of  – states than within states 
analyses.  Hanushek’s point is that such omitted bias is more likely to occur across 
regression  perhaps have additional educational policies which are omitted in simple
higher amounts of funding per pupil are also more likely to prioritise education and 
multiple state samples.  Hanushek argues that states which systematically allocate 
ies and 74 were  the 163 estimates considered, 89 were single sample state stud
find positive significant effects of expenditure are subject to omitted variable bias.  Of 
In addition to the 1986 summary, Hanushek argues that many of the studies which 
s remain unchanged.   and more positive.  As expected his conclusion
brackets, the distribution of outcomes are broadly similar though slightly more diffuse 
coefficient.  As can be seen by comparison with the 1986 figures, shown in square 
id not report the sign of the estimated  13% [17%] were not significant and d
were positive but not significant, 19% [20%] were negative but not significant and 
positive and significant, 7% [5% in 1986] were significant and negative, 34% [38%] 
evidence, he finds 27% of estimates [20% in 1986] are  and the means of synthesising 
outcomes. Subject to the same criticisms of identifying separate parameter estimates 
leading to a sample of 163 estimates of per pupil expenditure on educational 
updates his previous summary with an additional set of studies  1997) ( anushek  H
contention that the relationship is not particularly strong.
a less bleak picture than Hanushek stated in 1986, though not necessarily refuting the 
literature mostly shows a positive impact of expenditure on outcomes, thus portraying 
gly argued that the  appear to have convincin et al  equally.  In conclusion, Greenwald 
study seems less likely to seriously mislead the analysis than counting all estimates 
same studies and not throw the additional data away, however a single observation per 
ervations from the  even more rigorous approach would have been to nest multiple obs
Hanushek’s sample is the elimination of multiple estimates per study.  Perhaps an 
clear that the largest single reason for the difference between their sample and 
teria very clearly and it is  state their selection cri et al  However Greenwald  effects.’
all studies but 34% of those with positive and statistically significant estimated 
pupil expenditure, they retain only 17% of  - for per ‘ – random selection of studies  - non
adopt a  et al Greenwald  selection of studies.  Hanushek argues that - subsequent non
by Hanushek, the  et al This leads to the final major critique levelled at Greenwald 
153adopted and the possible bias caused by omission of other relevant factors, Krueger 
ures  Recognising the limitations of the estimating proced average NAEP score.’
per student is associated with an increase of about .11 standard deviation in the 
significant association with average test scores.  A $2,000 increase in expenditures 
statistically  has a positive and  units.  Krueger finds that expenditure per student ‘
is the average score on the NAEP exam measured in standard deviation  Y Where
(4.9) CyHH3 j=3 + CyHH3 yt3w> + D
>yC3G>
3GCG=
E t + j = ;
f the form: performs a simple OLS regression o
deviations per decade.  To establish a relationship with school resources, Krueger 
to the extent that median test score are rising by .06 standard  dip in the early 1970s’ 
modest upward time trend after an initial  ated a ‘ adjusted results have demonstr - age
trends for Krueger to analyse, he concludes that the  - subjects give a possible nine time
and seventeen years in selected years up to 1996. Three age groups measured on three 
were administered to pupils aged nine, thirteen  collection started in 1970 and exams
selective) to assess progress in basic mathematics, reading and science.  Data 
representative sample of US school children (as opposed to SATs, which are 
sources on an aggregate level.  The NAEP exams are conducted on a  and school re
Progress (NAEP) to assess the relationship between average test score performance 
uses time trend data from the National Assessment of Educational  1998) ( Krueger 
leads to serious questions about the interpretation of the results.’
ttern that  conclude that added resources improve student performance … it is this pa
Simply put, analyses at higher levels of aggregation are noticeably more likely to  ‘
finding a positive and significant relationship.  Leading Hanushek to conclude that 
ated estimates  expenditure positive and significant and only 17% of school aggreg
level of aggregation with 28% of district aggregated estimates finding per pupil 
statistically significant relationship. A similar story appears when one considers the 
% find a positive and  aggregated to state level and omit within state variation, some 64
state estimates have a rate of 35%.  Furthermore, of those estimates which are  - multi
single state estimates have a rate of 20% positive and significant studies, whereas the 
ed the case, the  state analyses finding positive significant results.  This is inde - multi
154that despite the positive spin the RAND press releases put on the findings, the results 
sample size used (Hanushek assumes 44 data points and not 271) but does point out 
ponds with a strongly worded critique that incorrectly attacks the  res 2001) ( Hanushek 
’  advantaged students. - higher numbers of minority and less
particularly for states with disproportionately  allocation affect student performance, ‘
difference between coefficient values.  They concluded that levels of expenditure and 
ic  effect, though a Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis of no systemat
funding variable and the random  - potential issues with a correlation between the per
pupil funding doubles as the model switches from random to fixed effects, indicating 
- ate for per pupil expenditures.  However the parameter estim - that have higher per
effect models, they concluded that NAEP scores are systematically higher in states 
on 271 scores from 44 states at 2 year intervals.  Using both random effects and fixed 
e contained data  living differences.  The sampl - of - expenditure adjusted for state cost
achievement scores in maths and reading from 1990 to 1996 as a function of per pupil 
level NAEP  - in a RAND corporation study, examine state 2000) ( et al Grissmer 
spending per pupil.
real  improvements in basic maths and reading despite significant increases in 
conclusions with science scores significantly lower than in 1970 and very marginal 
levels (with the exception of writing which was abandoned in 1996) with no change in 
P data to 1999  updates the NAE 2003a) ( Hanushek  standard deviations since 1984. 
1969 to 1996 and in writing (introduced in 1984) where there was also a fall of 0.2 
a fall of 0.2 standard deviations in science from  - with 17 year olds occur in science 
ificant time trends  the gently increasing time trend disappears.  Indeed the only sign
metres race. By focussing on the 17 year olds’ responses alone, Hanushek notes that 
Hanushek likens this approach to valuing placings at 50 metres and 75 metres in a 100 
all age groups and  third.  Furthermore, Krueger’s analysis gives equal weight to
Krueger offers as his exemplar would lead to an increase in spending of more than a 
notes that the $2,000 dollar increase in expenditure per pupil  1998) ( Hanushek 
e linked to school resources.’ may b
evidence that student achievement  prima facie aggregate data is that they provide 
my reading of the  concludes that, in opposition to Hanushek’s 1996 conclusion, ‘
155her divide it on the basis of the outcome variable and  exogenous factor and then furt
factors,  instead it appears to separate individuals into five groups determined by an 
insufficient to truly separate the source of variation into acceptable and unacceptable 
tenberg and Vandenberghe’s circumstance measure is  It is arguable that Wal
unacceptable factors whilst leaving acceptable factors uncompensated.
pupil should be targeted towards overcoming the  - instrument such as funding per
Roemer’s argument is that a policy amenable  .   (mother’s education) and effort
ance  p75).   This defines 15 complete and exhaustive groups defined by circumst
and this permits a further subclassification of individuals into quantiles (p25, p50 and 
‘Acceptable’ factors, such as effort caused variation in outcomes within each type, 
mother.   circumstances, in this case the highest educational attainment of the pupil’s 
collections of individuals with similar  - Unacceptable factors where defined as ‘types’ 
‘unacceptable’ factors which caused an uneven distribution of outcomes.   
‘acceptable’ and  partitioning the overall population into groups defined by 
outcomes (and conclude that it is not possible).    Heterogeneity was incorporated via
which allocation of existing funding would be required to equalise educational 
t of funding but also estimate  literature by not only estimating a heterogeneous impac
study Brazilian data and add value to the  2007) ( Waltenberg and Vandenberghe 
reduce attainment.
effect model, they found that the decrease in funding did not significantly  - fixed
to 1998, and using a  spending.  Set in Finland during a period of recession over 1990
occurs over a period of declining rather than increasing per pupil educational 
provide an interesting study that is most notable as it  2003) ( Kirjavainen, and Uusitalo 
Hakkinen,  and of these  US single country studies are far rarer in the literature - Non
to a 0.33 standard deviation gain amongst disadvantaged students.
$700 per pupil can lead  - increase per pupil funding in that ‘modest’ increases of $500
attention to the heterogeneous impact of  ek’s sample size error and draw Hanush
correct 2001) ( Grissmer and Gri  a trivial impact’. ‘ – ons  0.05 standard deviati
annual increase nationally but would yield an improvement of just 2 percentile points, 
imply that an additional $1,000 per student increase would lead to a $50 billion 
lar to those previously reported.  Hanushek notes that the results  are not too dissimi
156pupil funding. - addition to redistributions of per
red at least in  monetary policies are requi - add to the general conclusion that non
to that seen elsewhere and Waltenberg and Vandenberghe conclude that their results 
of individuals into acceptable and unacceptable groups, the results are broadly similar 
g the partitioning  Although the paper makes some questionable assumptions regardin
for, though the implication is that the loss is rather small given the coefficient results.
clear what proportion of outcomes are lost once unacceptable factors are compensated 
s not entirely  but types 4 and 5 maintain some increase.  Given the data in the paper it i
quantile distributions are equalised across the lowest 3 types  - within – original funding 
receive no funding; types 1, 2 and 3 receive 6.8, 2.05 and 0.144 multiples of their 
4 and 5  negativity constraint leads to a solution whereby types  - Imposing a non
7 times what they currently receive.   - what they currently receive and type 5 pupils 
ype 1 pupils would have to receive 11 times  .  T quantile scores across types - within
qualise expected  note that there would need to be negative resource allocations to e
With these regression results and given a fixed budget, Waltenberg and Vandenberghe 
approach.  
to funding is not stated and perhaps is indicative of the weakness of the classification 
on  why the ‘low effort’ group would have the highest reacti – have higher coefficients 
which are largely ignored: for example the lowest quartile groups generally appear to 
production functions.  However there are some observable patterns within the results 
5  variable is positively significant, with statistical significance achieved in 13 of the 1
pupil funding.  In general they find that the funding  - mothers also have the highest per
pupil increases across types such that the pupils with the most educated  - g per fundin
type/effort group with log test score as the dependent variable.  It should be noted that 
Waltenberg and Vandenberghe estimate 15 different production functions, one per 
pupil funding,  - Using teacher salary divided by class size as the measure of per
ditional perspective to the rest of the literature. interesting approach which offers an ad
other unobserved ‘unacceptable’ circumstances.  Nevertheless the paper is an 
assumes that this is all down to effort, whereas it could of course be a function of 
157internationally standardised mathematics and science test scores, such that the world 
parents had not completed secondary education.)  Outcomes were classroom average 
oom level (this included family background variables i.e. % of students whose  classr
Individual pupil level data are aggregated to  returns to expenditure per pupil.
should therefore be more likely to show positive and significant  , production function
where countries are less likely to be operating on the flat part of the  , world
ng velopi function.  A review of the de operating on the flat part of the production
pupil expenditure i.e. the US is  - we are observing severe decreasing returns to per
expenditure over the last century in the developed world (mainly US) have meant that 
r pupil  for a genuine lack of return on input based policies is that large increases in pe
that one reason  use TIMSS data to examine the argument  2003) ( Hanushek and Luque 
articles looking to establish a link between school resources and outcomes.
ber of research  more than 260,000 students has been a common data source for a num
country analysis at the student level.  This international database of  - allowed cross
approximately 40 countries (ranging from the USA to Singapore to Iran) and has 
n 150 selected schools in  olds; 13 year olds and 17 year olds) in selected classes i
on student attainment and background on three different targeted populations (9 year 
The 1995 Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) collected data 
Studies Country Observational  - Cross 4.5.2.2
one might expect in the private education sector.
problematic where the dependent variable is often close to a natural boundary i.e. 1 as 
specification for the proportion outcome variable.  This may be particularly 
gression model used an appropriate  is not clear that a linear fixed effect re
significant) impact on the proportion of pupils achieving grades A to C.  However, it 
impact on the proportion of pupils achieving A grades and positive (but not 
rithm of capital spending has small but significant  Stevens find that the natural loga
gives access to data which shows greater variation in resource inputs and Graddy and 
olds in UK private schools.  Using the private sector  - educational outcomes of 18 year
pupil capital spending on  - ook at the impact of per l 2005) ( Graddy and Stevens 
pupil funding.    - review identified only one UK specific study which looked at per
country analysis and the literature  - UK evidence is usually included in the cross
158red at the classroom level) are statistically significantly  smaller class sizes (measu
higher educational expenditure per student (measured at the country level) and 
In fact,  positively significant relationship between school resources and outcome but ‘
els with, and without, robust standard errors found not only no  regression mod
structure, rules governing hiring and remuneration of teachers, etc.)  OLS and WLS 
expenditure per pupil) and institutional arrangements (e.g central examination 
of  the student’s background, school resources (including both class size and 
n  used individual pupil level data to estimate test scores as a functio 2003) ( Wößmann
. 2005) ( Wößmann  production in Europe, 
and a second focussing on education  2003), ( Wößmann  international evidence, 
o separate analyses using TIMSS: the first assessing the  Wößmann conducts tw
.’ policies can be expected to have a significant effect on student outcomes
the evidence is not conclusive that pure resource  even here, Hanushek concludes that ‘
indicative of a stronger relationship between outcomes and resources but  Certainly
expenditure, 0% a significant negative relationship and 50% statistically insignificant.  
pupil  - identified, 50% show a positive and statistically significant return to per
studies  international  f the 12  found that o and  the same argument  examines 2003b) (
Hanushek  by  TIMSS study  - diminishing returns have yet to set in.)  A further non
may be expected to operating on a part of the education production function at which 
necessarily the case that the relationship was stronger in poorer countries (which  not
resources and attainment was stronger than previous US studies, but noted that it was 
concluded that this international evidence for a positive relationship between school 
ment and only two significant relationships in the wrong direction.  The authors  attain
a statistically significant positive relationship between smaller class sizes and class 
13 population, the picture was reversed, with 17 of the 33 included countries showing 
and 3 suggested that smaller sized classes reduced attainment.  For the age  direction 
only 1 was found to have a statistically significant coefficient in the hypothesised 
of the 17 countries that provided sufficient data on class size for the 9 year old cohort, 
ts.  Adopting a 10% significance level, Hanushek and Luque found that  year old cohor
specific education production functions for the 9 year old and 13  - to estimate country
characteristics and class size) and student background characteristics.  OLS was used 
; the primary input variables of interest were school inputs (teacher  mean was 50
159rates. - same school caused by variations in birth
this instance is the variation in average class size between two adjacent years in the 
tion’ that Wößmann exploits in  drop before creeping up again.  The ‘natural fluctua
class sizes will tend to creep up until a new class is created whereby the average will 
which trigger creation of new classes when a class reached the permitted number, thus 
size rules  - ment maximum class induced discontinuations occur when countries imple
- induced discontinuations and natural fluctuations.  Rule - impact on attainment: rule
Wößmann exploits two exogenous sources of variation in class sizes to identify the 
rticular, and in the absence of RCTs,  that adopted in the international analysis.  In pa
production functions in Europe with a more sophisticated econometric approach than 
uses TIMSS to focus on the role of class size in educational  2005) ( Wößmann
student performance.’
iciently and to improve  involved are provided with incentives to use resources eff
one of more resources but one of creating an institutional system where all the people 
improve student performance … the crucial question for education policy may not be 
entives does not promise to  institutional system which does not set suitable inc
Spending more money within an  ‘dubious’ impact of resource on outcomes that ‘
related to improved outcomes.  Thus Wößmann concludes that given the weak and 
erest in teaching matters, etc. being positively  encouragement of parents to take int
appropriate teaching methods, competition from privately managed schools, 
and personnel decisions; individual teachers having incentives and powers to select 
and curriculum control mechanisms, school autonomy in process  centralised budget 
attainment found statistically significant results with: central examinations, 
Estimates of the impact of family background inputs and institutional settings on 
due to endogeneity issues.  
of resources may still be prone to some bias  however, that his estimates of the impact
average class size in a 2SLS estimation did not change the results.  He concludes 
national level (in the case of expenditure) and instrumenting  actual class size by the 
gues it should not be biasing results at the  students with additional needs, but ar
considers the potential impact of endogenous allocation of greater resources to 
Wößmann  related to inferior student performance in mathematics and science.’
160increased funding could be spent.
attainment, appears the most relevant as reduced class size is one such way in which 
ct of class sizes and teaching assistants on  experiment, which looked at the impa
Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR)  Tennessee search. The large scale 
RCTs estimating the impact of funding on outcomes uncovered in the literature 
scarce in education, to the extent that there were no examples of  generally RCTs are
Experimental Data 4.5.2.3
more than just increases in expenditure on primary education.’
educational indicators are weak and that the achievement of the MDG will require 
between resources and  the link  Development Goals (MDG).   He concludes that ‘
educational performance across developing countries aiming to meet the Millennium 
extent to which differences in resources allocated to education explain differences in 
regression model to explore the  linear  - section log - uses a cross 2006) ( Samarrai  - Al
where precise and consistent results could be obtained.’
performance at the lower secondary level in those 12 West European school systems 
size reductions are a promising strategy to boost student  - class on whether
, the results cast strong doubt  All in all Naturally enough, Wößmann concludes that ‘
and two counterintuitive significant positive estimates, Germany and Switzerland.   
Wößmann finds not one significant negative estimate  easing class sizes, indeed incr
discontinuation approach fares no better in identifying a negative impact of  - The rule
). endogeneity related 
- effect specification (indicating possible peer - coefficient does not survive the peer
relationship in the Netherlands, though this significant  intuitive positive statistically
- Iceland.  Furthermore Wößmann found a counter – student performance in maths 
identified only one statistically significant negative causal effect of class size on 
fication in the sense that the natural fluctuations approach  robust to model speci
mean performance of a student’s class peers (Peer Effects).  Results were generally 
IV) and a specification which contained the  - Effects Instrumental Variables (SFE
Instrumental Variables (IV), School Fixed Effects (SFE), School Fixed  models:
With the natural fluctuation approach, Wößmann specifies a number of econometric 
161treat specification (i.e. individuals  - to - over, Krueger uses an intention - random cross
- data.  For example, in addressing pupil attrition and non models with the original
attempts to refute these issues using individual pupil level panel data econometric 
issues; Hanushek identifies several issues and likely consequences and Krueger 
in separate publications address these  1999) ( Krueger  and  1999) ( hek  Hanus Both 
students at each year.
outs were replaced each year, leading to 2,314, 1,791 and 1,389 new  - study drop
original sample completing the full four years.  In order to maintain the power of the 
ts and significant attrition over years with 48% of the  issues or parental complain
sizes due to behavioural  - approximately 10% of students switched between class
from the trial protocol which may have compromised the findings.  For example, 
random deviations  - iment was also subject to a number of potentially non The exper
kindergarten. 
standard deviations in small classes, with almost no additional improvement beyond 
statistically significant, they were modest with test scores for students rising by 0.22 
.  However, even though the results were  1990) et al ord  (W time teaching aides 
- were no significant differences between regular sized classes with and without full
improved performance in small classes relative to regular sized classes but that there 
variance at class level, indicated that pupils tended to show  groups and analysis of
The initial research findings, based on comparison of means between assignment 
randomised to classes.  
longitudinal.  A notable feature of the study was that teachers were also to be 
were identifiable over time and so the data were  their educational attainment 
schools. Pupil outcomes were measured at end of year tests and individual pupils and 
were to have at least one of each class type and randomisation occurred within 
time teacher aide.  Each school  - dents per teacher) with a full 25 stu - sized classes (22
25 students per teacher) and regular  - students per teacher), regular sized classes (22
17 - 11,600 students from 80 schools who were randomised to small classes (13
985 to 1989.  Over the full four year period, the study involved some  the period 1
The STAR study was a large scale RCT conducted in US kindergarten schools over 
162of uncorrelated estimates of the impact  it would appear that a majority  - relationship 
Hanushek may have successfully challenged the notion that there is no systematic 
multiple countries.  To some extent the net impact of the research directed against 
analysis of primary data across single and  - systematic reviews, analysis and re
research interest in this area. This has involved systematic reviews, reviews of 
has generated substantial  output strong relationship between school inputs and
stated belief that there is no systematic or  - Hanushek’s oft The Coleman report and
iterature L ummary of the Early S 4.5.2.4
broadly consistent with that from the observational studies.
being suggested in practice and thus the very limited evidence from the STAR RCT is 
e far in excess of those class size reductions that are  size reductions implemented wer
- demonstrated (which he disputes) they hold little practical significance as the class
Finally, Hanushek points out that even if statistical significance has been 
a degree of doubt that the trial results are not compromised. therefore there remains 
incumbent upon the trial administers to demonstrate that allocation was random, 
random, it is  - there is no obvious evidence that teacher allocation to classes was non
om effects, but did not include such an analysis).  Thus although  specific rand - teacher
is these factors that influence pupil outcomes (Krueger could have tested for this with 
random allocation occurred on unobservable teacher characteristics and it  - that a non
impact on pupil outcomes.  The possibility therefore remains  characteristics had little
relationships, however, as Krueger later identifies himself, such observable teacher 
characteristics (race, experience and education) and finds no statistically significant 
r class assignment was independent of observable teacher  Krueger assess whethe
However there is no data on whether teachers took their randomly assigned class.  
work in the direction of producing a more favourable estimate for smaller class sizes.  
the smaller class size.  Thus not all of the potential biases  underestimate the impact of
treat approach will  - to - smaller classes is to improve performance, then an intentions
likely to switch from larger classes to smaller classes, and the incremental impact of 
if lower ability pupils are more  – the original findings  demonstrate the robustness of 
have their original class allocation specified in their regression variables) to 
163functional form (i.e. not linear) 
aggregation bias – level of analysis  
omitted variable bias 
between school resources and student outcomes. An endogenous relationship  
as:
.  These are identified  2000) ( et al Vignoles  es which plague the literature’  difficulti
a number of conceptual and methodological  ‘ estimated effects are an artefact of 
at deserves some attention is that the lack of strong  An alternative explanation th
simple production of aggregate output.
pupil expenditure is genuinely unlikely to yield increases in the  - increasing the per
.’  In either case, simply  schools’ monopoly power within a geographical area
f inefficiency caused by  indicative o allocation and pupils’ academic outcomes is ‘
Secondly, they argue that a lack of evidence of a strong response between resource 
in the econometric specification is the wrong one from the school’s perspective).   
ependent variable typically used  target equity issues rather than efficiency (thus the d
may have differing utility functions and may be efficiently allocating resources to 
offer two potential suggestions: firstly, schools  2002) ( and Vignoles  %& Leva this idea, 
ed this issue.  Reinforcing  factors may shift the production function) have exasperat
production function and failing to consider the incentive mechanisms (i.e. what 
that the focus on simply providing additional resources, making movements along the 
unction.  Indeed Hanushek suggests  US is operating on the flat part of the production f
pupil funding is the possibility that (principally) the  - significant practical impact of per
Hanushek has suggested that the most plausible explanation for the lack of a 
across the educational literature,  During the course of the running argument contested 
outcomes.  
pupil funding and educational  - relationship between the marginal increases in per
strengthened Hanushek’s hand in terms of contesting that there is no strong 
f small positive effects may have  indeed if anything, the combined effect o
still far from clear that a practically significant relationship has been established, 
pupil funding are more likely to uncover a positive relationship.  However it is  - of per
164reases in measured school inputs are likely offset by the  from even very large inc
expenditure, the benefits of small improvements in student performance resulting   
the evidence implies that student achievement will increase measurably by such an 
year) will not dramatically improve student achievement.  Although  the school day (or
teacher ratios, increasing starting salaries of teachers, or lengthening  - lowering pupil
simply  statistical significance to considering practical significance, Figlio finds that ‘
es than usually reported.  However even then, moving beyond  higher teacher salari
teacher ratios and  - pupil inputs, he finds higher positive estimates for lower pupil - per
flexible translog production functions and although he does not look at expenditure 
Douglas and  - es the issue of functional form and estimates Cobb address 1999) ( Figlio 
issues.
greater emphasis on adopting more sophisticated methods designed to address these 
The data issues identified by Vignoles have led to a number of studies which have a 
odels M More Sophisticated Econometric  4.5.2.5
ng the same problem. describi
is likely that the omitted variable issue and the endogeneity issue are actually 
’  Furthermore, given the nature of the funding formula it  than any particular theory.
cational inputs used in empirical work tend to reflect data availability, rather  edu ‘
finding  at al The other issues have received more limited attention with Vignoles 
such, much of the recent developments have focussed on this issue.  
’ and, as  s in this field number of theoretical and empirical critiques of the finding
the root of a  the endogeneity problem is at find that ‘ et al .  However, Vignoles  (2003)
Hanushek  ’  point in time just to the current resources is likely to be very misleading
contemporaneous measures of inputs’ and ‘relating the level of performance at any 
onal with only  secti - cumulative process, but a majority of analyses are purely cross
Education  is a  significant findings ‘ - comings may be responsible for some non
- significant findings and Hanushek himself accepts that methodological short - non
largely responsible for the  contend that these severe data issues are et al  Vignoles 
identifying the appropriate dependent variables – criteria  
165t  ), not leas X does not directly appear in the determination of  O for that year (i.e. 
as actual academic outcomes in a year do not partly determine the resource allocation 
Note that this formulation is not quite the textbook version of the simultaneous model 
. 0 = )   , Y  ( cov and  ) 8
 o , 0 (  ~ Y  , ) 8
Y o , 0 (  ~ Y  Where
(4.10)
  +   h +  h = 9
Y  +  8 : + 9  : +  : = x
, we get: equation 4.1 erms and expand  error t
If I therefore assume a simple linear function with standard  . ignored in this text.)
this issue is largely  – is a function of previous school attainment  R suggest that 
(the example of parent choice maybe also  R ool resources are also a function of  sch
.  The endogeneity issue described above implies that  R and pupil level resources, 
X , as a function of school resources,  O describes educational attainment,  Equation 4.1
formula. 
pupil funding as determined by the funding  - s, despite relatively low per school
manage to allocate their advantaged pupils to schools which are high achieving 
example by buying houses within the catchment area of successful schools) may 
, parents with sufficient resources to exercise choice (for  In addition . attainment
cational  with lower expected edu pupils from socially deprived backgrounds
formulae generally allocate more funding to schools with higher concentrations of 
funding  The endogeneity problem implies an element of reverse causality i.e. 
. ed coefficients as on estimat downward bi
theoretically predictable  creating a allocates resources to tackling equity issues and 
the literature, possibly due to its intuitively likely presence in a system which partly 
eity issue however that has received substantially more attention in  It is the endogen
Hanushek’s findings.
improved functional form, arrives at a conclusion that he acknowledges is close to 
Thus Figlio, even with an  enormous costs of bringing about such a change.’
166RCTs in education capable of addressing these issues, the majority of the empirical 
process in which the problem does not occur.  However given the limited number of 
ing  increased use of Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) i.e. creating a data generat
A number of solutions to this endogeneity issue have been suggested, such as 
data on relevant inputs and endowments are missing.’
observed; but, it does pose a problem when  inputs as well as child endowments were
problem in estimating a production function for achievement if data on all relevant 
The fact that inputs are chosen purposefully would not necessarily pose a  ‘ 2003a) (
Todd and Wolpin  .  This argument is summarised in   : f  causing a biased estimate o
hence violating a key  OLS assumption and   c and  Y c via the relationship between  X
, this will be correlated with  ) Y  + Y c ( composite error term in the outcomes equation, 
.  If we consider the  0 4 )  c , Y c ( cov educational resources equations respectively and
are the omitted variables in the educational outcomes and   c and  Y c Where 
(4.11)
  +  c +   h +  h = 9
Y  + Y c +  8 : + 9  : +  : = x
4.11
equation  is illustrated in  occur if there is a common omitted variable, this situation 
between the two equations is closed.   However, even in a recursive system, bias will 
equation does not necessarily lead to the biases associated when the feedback loop 
regression  O iables in the  var X and the inclusion of the endogenous but predetermined 
Thus the endogenous relationship described is recursive rather than truly simultaneous 
characteristics. R possible to observable 
and Welsh funding system attempts to tie funding as explicitly as  current English
terms which cause the bias inherent in simultaneous equation models.  Indeed the 
and it is the cross contamination and resultant correlation of error  Y  the error term 
i.e. the equation purged of  X  entering the determination of   8 : + 9  : +  : = ) x ( 
educational outcomes that drive funding allocation, however this would mean
outcome at the end of the year.  One could argue that it is the expectations of 
because of the time lag between allocating resources over a year and observing a test 
167estimate of the impact of funding increase the already significant estimate threefold 
ander reports that the 2SLS  significant than the OLS estimate.  For the eight grade, S
0.0022 to 0.0034) but due to increases in the standard error is further from being 
case of the third grade regression, the 2SLS estimate increases the coefficient (from 
in the latter case).  In the  test scores for both third and eighth grades (significantly so 
Illinois.  Initial OLS regressions find expenditure per pupil to have a positive effect on 
estimate the impact of funding on third and eighth grade test scores in mathematics in 
instrument to  Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to construct an - uses Two 1999) ( Sander 
resources are, in general, underestimated by OLS.
from OLS.  Ludwig and Bassi conclude that estimates of the impact of school 
e impact of funding up to five times larger than those obtained  found estimates of th
positive impacts of funding on achievement, two relatively weak effects, but only one 
limitations and finance reforms as instruments). All three funding studies found 
pact of increased spending (using physical disability students, tax  three look at the im
review seven IV studies (1 Israeli and 6 US), though only  1999) ( Ludwig and Bassi 
resource allocation but not output, and studies remain relatively scarce.
circumstances to provide good instruments, a set of variables which influences 
However IV solutions require a happy coincidence of  quality research.’  
provides perhaps the most fruitful prospect for good  conclude that the IV method ‘
to  (2002)  %&
 
 )	
 experiments in instrumental variables and led Leva
riation from ‘natural’  approaches in the funding literature is to exploit exogenous va
obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficient of interest. The underlying theme of IV 
outcome equation to  the potential instruments.  Valid instruments may then be used in
as it rules out many  latter criteria perhaps does not receive the attention it deserves
this  – , in the outcomes equation  Y c ,  must not be correlated with the omitted variables
variables, but do not have a direct causal impact on outcomes.  In addition, the IV 
r other observed  even after controlling fo X, are correlated with the resource variables, 
, which  Z IV solutions require identification of a further variable or set of variables, 
estimation techniques.
most common econometric tool used is that of Instrumental Variable (IV)  the 
studies have sought to use econometric methods to overcome these data issues, and 
168endogeneity issue.
on test scores and is liable to be underestimated by studies which ignore the 
and that spending per pupil has a significant and positive impact  marginal products’
pothesis that school inputs have positive  favourable than earlier reviews to the hy
‘is more  an increase of 137%  As a result, the authors find that their summary  – model 
of 0.030 of log per pupil funding in the most egregious model to 0.071 in the IV 
show an increase from an estimated coefficient  measured in log form and the results 
capita income.  All variables (including the outcome average SAT scores) are 
the endogeneity of funding to ignoring parental education and including real per 
% elderly etc.  Misspecification models ranged from ignoring  level variables such as 
- The instrumental variable for funding was constructed in a 2SLS method using state
results is measured by comparison of three incorrect models and a correct IV model.  
ed data where the extent to which misspecification may bias the  pool - using the state
The primary analysis examining the impact of per pupil spending was conducted 
significant at the 95% level.  
13 estimates producing positive estimates of expenditure per pupil and 4 of these 
sis of their specification, with 11 out of  studies which were labelled as good on the ba
indicate a more positive picture than that found by Hanushek, especially in those 
includes 28 of the papers surveyed by Hanushek and a further 18 new studies.  Results 
analysis  - 1992.  The meta - r the period 1987 pooled data ove - from 1960 and state
with primary estimation of production functions from the TALENT student level data 
analysis  - negatively correlated with formal school inputs.  The paper combines meta
ous mechanisms where parental inputs are thought to be  category of endogen
omitted impact of parental contributions to the production function.  This falls into the 
implement an IV approach to account for the  1999) ( Dewey, Husted, and Kenny 
score by more than one standard deviation. 
n double to increase test  eighth grade, expenditure per pupil would have to more tha
figure as a misprint, Sander acknowledges that even with the highest estimates in 
whereas the discussion implies the coefficient is positive.   Even accepting the table 
0.0070  - 2SLS estimate to be  the 10% level.)  However the table of results shows the
(although the standard error increase fourfold and the estimate is only significant at 
169between resource allocation and outcomes. Indeed those IV studies which included 
ationship  shown mixed results at best, usually failing to find any significant rel
have  2002) ( and Vignoles  %& Leva The review of the UK literature contained in 
squared explained variation. - R
t exams; ability to choose own textbooks) accounting for 25% of the final  externally se
settings account for more variation, with institutional settings (e.g. school autonomy, 
characteristics and (perhaps more importantly from a policy perspective) institutional 
ot warrant the costs.  By contrast, they find that student specific  benefits do n
And conclude that the small  effect in math also gets statistically insignificant.’
countries with particularly low spending levels are excluded from the sample, the 
relationship between expenditure and performance in reading.  Once the four 
t  1,000$ of additional annual spending.  There is no statistically significan
size of the effect is small, though, at 10.7 AP in math and 7.7 AP in science for each 
statistically significantly related to better performance in math and science …  the 
level is  Educational expenditure per student at the country  pupil.  They find that ‘
- instrument for actual class size.  There is no corresponding instrument for finance per
teacher ratio at the school level as an  - 2SLS approach is adopted which uses student
urces, a  regressions (CRLR) and to allow for the potential endogeneity of school reso
robust linear  - use clustering Wößmann units within the PISA sample) Fuchs and 
To allow for the clustered nature of pupil level results (schools were the sampling 
sources may make. school re - look at the contribution that non
availability of computers at home; number of books; etc. which permits the analysis to 
occupation and educational status of parents;  – the student’s family background 
data is that the data contain information on  A further unique selling point of the PISA
ts. points and an international standard deviation of 100 poin
permitted comparison.  Test scores were standardised to an international mean of 500 
countries.    Ability was measured with tests specific to the programme and thus 
ng in 32 developed and emerging  year old students in maths, science and readi
PISA dataset is an internationally comparable dataset of the education ability of 15 
Assessment (PISA) to estimate international educational production functions.  The 
e OECD Programme for International Student  use th 2004) ( Wößmann Fuchs and 
170appear more likely to produce stronger estimates of  implement IV approaches
biased estimates of said resources does indeed hold some merit.  Papers which 
failure to incorporate the endogenous nature of school resources has led to downward 
literature is still developing, it appears as if the argument that a  Although the IV
Conclusions Review  Literature  4.5.3
pass rates.
increasing funding being especially productive on schools that had traditionally low 
Of additional note is that Papke found a heterogeneous impact on schools, with 
n one and two percentage points.   increases the mathematics pupil pass rate by betwee
includes the IV approach.  Papke estimates that a 10% increase in real spending 
significant impact of funding on attainment which increases when the specification 
specification Papke finds a statistically  instrument.  Using a fixed effects panel data 
period 1992 through 1998, using the 1994 Michigan education reform as a natural 
uses data on standardised test scores from Michigan schools over the  2005b) ( Papke 
.’ ek’s sceptical view on the education system Hanush
suggest that resources seem to matter which  contradict  outputs of the IV research ‘
author to rather optimistically conclude that in accounting for endogeneity, the 
hough, the results are more positive on other inputs such as class size and lead the  t
es.’ In general  grade test scor
th grade test scores but show no effect on 8
th improved 4
estimates suggest that increased spending  even then the results were rather modest  ‘
pupil spending.  However  - Reform Act of 1993 to isolate exogenous variation in per
linearity in state aid formulas of the Massachusetts Education  - discontinuities and non
.  This study used  2001) ( Guryan  pupil spending, - estimates the effect of per
reviews the new wave of IV papers but finds only one study which   ) 2005 ( Webbink 
cant. neither occasion was it signifi
methodologically strong only two included expenditure per pupil as an input and on 
’  Of the four studies deemed  determining educational attainment at school.
nce of prior attainment/ability and family background variables in  importa
confirm the overwhelming  … and most econometrically sophisticated studies
the most recent  and are ‘ additional pupil level (such as home background variables)
171the English education  damping and minimum funding guarantees, introduced to 
n doing so it may be possible to determine whether the  I simplicity and stability.  
incorporating just efficiency and equity to include other formula criteria such as 
the analysis beyond the simple case  in this area.   Indeed one may generalise 
represent the suite of microeconometric research techniques that are more appropriate 
techniques, such as stated preference techniques e.g. discrete choice experiments, may 
market evaluation  - approach, other non ce uncovered was of a revealed preferen
education production function.  Although the only paper of note this review 
concern as the perceived inability of the production function research to uncover the 
of research in this area should therefore be as much as a  society they serve.  The lack 
in danger of implicitly imposing a preference which is not representative of the 
makers in education are  - The implication from similar research in health is that policy
y and hence the derivation of the social welfare curve.    between equity and efficienc
offs  - the social preferences for the marginal rate of substitution or trade – formula 
perhaps drawn attention away from the second requirement for an optimal funding 
ng struggle to estimate an educational production function has  In addition, the continui
between them.
should address issues of school efficiency rather than just the allocation of resources 
formula as a means of tackling equity issues may be misguided and that policy makers 
This suggests that the sole use of funding  the impact is not particularly strong. 
a systematic positive impact it is still hard to argue against the proposition that  there is
that  resources on outcome.  Whilst there is probably sufficient evidence to suggest
e is no strong and systematic impact of  that ther – from Hanushek’s 1986 position 
functions is that the weight of evidence should lead to a marginal shift of opinion 
Thus the overall conclusion of the empirical literature on the education production 
outputs.
schools that traditionally had lower  generally found a stronger impact of resources in 
papers which looked at a heterogeneous impact of funding across schools, they 
insignificant, particularly in the case of the UK. One further point is of note, of the 
provides estimates which are frequently  be noted that the IV literature too 
estimates against a naïve OLS approach using the same data.  However, it should also 
this is particularly true when the IV papers consider their own  – resource impact 
172targets i.e. at KS1, a pupil should obtain level 2 or higher and at KS2 a pupil should 
be consistently applied across Key Stages and is the focus of stated Government 
cs is measured in levels which may  into reading and writing for KS1) and mathemati
ages 7 (Key Stage 1, KS1) and 11 (Key Stage 2, KS2).  Attainment in English (split 
11 and is formally assessed at  - age 16.  Primary education focuses on the age range 5
begins at the age of 5 and continues to  Compulsory education in England and Wales
Data Description 4.6.1
functions across schools.
ction  empirical investigation into the estimation of heterogeneous education produ
significant homogenous marginal impact of funding. Thus this section represents an 
this may partly be due to a general inability to consistently find a statistically 
though  – tion  covariates), it has not been an element that has received sufficient atten
heterogeneity (the marginal impact of funding will depend on the values of the other 
linear models, and thus automatically incorporated some degree of  - incorporated non
function have  Whilst some current empirical estimates of the educational production 
but also permits estimation of heterogeneous production function across schools.
econometric specification that not only addresses the endogenous nature of the data 
tion is to apply an  three school years 2001/02 to 2003/04.  The objective of the sec
(including infant and junior) schools in Swindon, an English LEA, over the period of 
This section contains the empirical estimation of a production function for primary 
chools S rimary  n LEA P Production Functions in Swindo
Education  eterogeneous  H stimation of  E Empirical  4.6
following sections are restricted to estimating the production function.
element of deriving an optimal resource allocation is beyond this thesis where the 
ility.  However this  fourth generation formula by incorporating preferences for stab
generation formula, as argued by a number of economists, or rather a step forwards to 
formula as a result of the 2003 funding crisis, represent a step backwards to second 
173average of £2,727
For example in 2002/03 Swindon received £2,436 delegated funding per pupil against a national 
7
statements.
statements; and % of pupils considered Special Education Needs, but without 
as belonging to an ethnic minority; % of pupils with Special Education Needs 
cords  uses to address additional need funding, % of pupils who the January census re
this is a key indicator variable which the Government  – Free School Meals (FSM) 
mix indicators: % of pupils eligible for  - across all schools and years for four key case
tribution  shows summary statistics of the dis 1 - Table 4 pupils with additional needs.  
pupil funding for  - In addition to increase in AWPU, there was also an increase in per
4 pupils rose from £1,284.67 to £1,393.93 to £1,575.43 over the three year period.
U for Year  pupil years of 8.5% in 2002/03 and 12.6% in 2003/04.  For example AWP
2003/04 with an average increase across  – pupil funding over the period 2001/02  - per
weighted  - However, like other LEAs, Swindon received significant increases in age
.
7 inancing spectrum pupil funding towards the lower end of the f - receives a per
Due to the resource allocation calculations of the current funding formula, Swindon 
253 pupils (s.d. 87 pupils).
xcluding nursery pupils, school sizes ranged from 44 pupils to 496, with a mean of  e
incorporating KS2 pupils.  According to the January school pupil census and 
of these schools were Infant schools, the remaining 8 were Primary schools 
addition, 13 schools had nursery schools attached, catering for pupils prior to KS 1, 5 
om effect).  In  that may exist due to shared management (i.e. they do not share a rand
not occur, however the specification does ignore any correlation between such schools 
subsidization does  - school receives its own funding allocation and we assume cross
nior School) each  the same first name (e.g. Moredon Infant School and Moredon Ju
pupils at both KS 1 and KS 2.  Although a number of Infant and Junior schools shared 
and 14 were Junior Schools, taking KS 2 pupils only.  Thus 38 schools educated 
g pupils for KS 1 level only,  addition, of these schools, 14 were Infant Schools takin
66 primary schools appear in the dataset in total, though not all appear in all years.  In 
without a correction to allow for the endogenous nature of funding are estimated.
efficient models with and  Random effect and random co achieve level 4 or higher. 
4 17ng over time. the larger increases in per pupil fundi
funding, schools with SEN units not only had higher per pupil funding but also had 
in 2002/03 followed by a 10% rise in 2003/04.  Coupled with the increases in AWPU 
a 3% increase  – so subjected to increases over time  The SEN per place funding was al
regression model.
mix generates some exogenous variation which may be exploited in a  - school case
vary each year.  The lack of responsiveness of funding to year on year variation of 
needs of the pupils within the school may  of needs across time, whereas the actual 
Note though that funding for SEN units is tied to the long term or average expectation 
76.09 54.23 19.05 13.10 9.76 0 15.37 statemented - % SEN non
1.62 6.71 1.63 0.68 0.34 0 1.14 % SEN Statemented
55.55 59.1 10.2 6.6 4.6 0 8.36 % Ethnic Minority
124.89 53.6 14.3 7.27 4.19 0 11.42 % FSM Eligible
ariance V max p75 p50 p25 min mean ariable V
chools S cross  A upils  Mix of P - : Case 1 - 4 Table 
ool had 56 funded places.  primary sch
had 6 funded places (and places with the lower unit allocations) whereas Penhill 
can lead to large variations in overall funding.  For example Pinehurst Infant school 
pe of places contained within that unit and given the variation in unit costs  on the ty
funded at £10,681 per place in 2001/02.  The funding for SEN units therefore depends 
at KS 1 (MLD 1) funded at £3,009 per place in 2001/02 to communication problems 
y vary over time. SEN unit places are defined by type e.g Mild Learning Disorders  ma
remain constant over time whereas the actual number of pupils with SEN statements 
SEN units and are funded per place rather than by per pupil.  SEN unit places tend to 
in the funding of Special Educational Needs (SEN) units.  15 primary schools had 
cted  pupil funding across schools. In Swindon, over this period, this was mostly refle
- need pupils.  This variation in additional needs is the key driver of differences in per
additional needs pupils and a few schools with very high proportions of additional 
no  The distribution is categorised by heavy tails i.e. a number of schools with almost 
175Nursery school pupils are not included.
a more accurate representation of the pupil numbers served over the time period.  
be  estimated pupil numbers that appear in the Section 52 returns as this is assumed to
year pupil census (PLASC) rather than  - The pupil divisor I use is taken from the mid
prices. 1/02 deflated using the RPI to 200
llocated to Nursery schools.  The figures are  demands and  minus any funding that is a
teaching  - share plus direct Government grants minus funding directed towards non
Thus the financial input figure I use in the regression model is the total LEA budget 
etc.  maintenance and repair funds,
ates (NNDR),  Domestic R - purposes, for example, school meals National Non
also be appropriate to remove funding which is not directly related to teaching 
pupil figure that appears, however it may  - pupil funding above the per - increases per
.  The direct Government funding  figures are also available on the Section 52 returns)
thus it will be appropriate to include these figures in the available funding (such 
accorded great freedom in how the direct funding was spent within their schools and 
s schools.  Schools were generally  provided a source of variation in funding acros
funding, etc.  As this funding is also targeted towards addressing SEN issues, it again 
from national Government via targeted school standards grants, maximum class size 
may also have received funding direct  monies received via the LEA budget, schools
may not be the appropriate input variable.  In addition to  4 - Figure 4 and 2 - Table 4
and is shown in  pupil funding figure that appears on the Section 52 returns  - The per
2,132.17 1,967.71 1,918.08 182.82 2,037.54 2003/04
1,843.00 1,719.10 1,654.31 210.31 1,784.67 2002/03
1,789.97 1,682.28 1,609.39 251.22 1,745.66 2001/02
P75 P50 P25 Std dev Mean Year
unding (2001 £) F upil  : Section 52 Per P 2 - 4 Table 
176S52 per-pupil funding (2001 £)
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predictable nature of the direct grants opens the possibility that some schools may 
minimum funding guarantee applies only to the LEA budget share, the less 
4 shows the distribution of this variation across schools and time.  As the  - Table 4
23.7% 15.9% 12.2% 10.2% 17.8% pupil - Net available per
20.7% 18.3% 16.4% 3.4% 18.8% pupil - S52 per
P75 P50 P25 Std dev mean Funding
(% ) ng Increases 2001/02 to 2003/04 : Real Fundi 4 - 4 Table 
2,246.58 2,084.47 1,951.38 252.71 2,134.72 2003/04
2,098.69 1,874.30 1,783.04 228.43 1,938.11 2002/03
1,938.89 1,767.45 1,707.54 207.29 1,829.45 2 /0 1 200
P75 P50 P25 Std dev Mean Year
unding (2001 £) F upil P er P vailable  A Net  :  3 - 4 Table 
. 5 - Figure 4 and 3 - Table 4 shown in 
and is  pupil funding figures - variation over time than that observed in the reported per
n of direct Government grants which vary over time gives greater  The inclusio
(2001 £) Across Schools unding F upil  P er  : Section 52 P 4 - 4 Figure 
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es form a category below that of level 2. function approach I assume that all these categori
tested, no level awarded, disapplied, etc. For the purposes of the education  - all group of not - catch
It is not possible for pupils to record level 1 output at KS2, with results below level 2 falling into a 
8
time. each level over
show the aggregated proportions of pupils achieving  9  - Table 4 through  5  - Table 4
(2001 £) Across Schools unding F upil  P - Per vailable  Net A :  5 - 4 Figure 
ordered category outcome.
ntained in the  means of reflecting output and maintain the full information that is co
by simpler aggregate measures. Thus the approach here is to break with the standard 
therefore the data may contain more differentiation in attainment than is represented 
and 
8 4 at KS1 However it is possible, for example, for pupils to achieve level
the relevant level, or beyond, at the two Key Stages.  
output may therefore be measured by the proportion of the school’s pupils obtaining 
matics over the period 2001/02 to 2003/04.  School  KS 2 English and KS 2 Mathe
Outcomes are recorded on KS 1 Reading, KS 1 Writing and KS 1 Mathematics and 
pupil decrease since 2000/01. - two schools have actually faced a real funding per
e smaller increases than ‘guaranteed’, indeed combined with inflation  actually receiv
1780.08 27.80 46.02 18.66 1.07 0 6.37 Total
0 28.16 47.56 17.23 0.76 0 6.30 2003/04
0 28.31 44.95 18.79 1.60 0 6.34 2002/03
0.26 26.89 45.54 20.00 0.83 0 6.48 2001/02
Six
Level 
Five
Level 
Four
Level 
Three
Level 
Two
Level 
One
Level  Unclassified year
2001/02 to 2003/04 : KS2 Mathematics 8 - 4 Table 
0 0 0 13.23 71.49 10.21 5.06 Total
0 0 0 16.67 65.89 12.93 4.51 2003/04
0 0 0 18.95 65.57 9.98 5.50 2002/03
0 0 0 3.59 83.61 7.64 5.17 2001/02
Six
Level 
Five
Level 
Four
Level 
Three
Level 
Two
Level 
One
Level  Unclassified year
2001/02 to 2003/04 : KS1 Writing 7 - 4 Table 
0 0 0.03 29.90 54.78 11.93 3.36 Total
0 0 0 30.48 54.73 11.30 3.49 2003/04
0 0 0 29.14 56.52 10.93 3.40 2002/03
0 0 0.09 30.09 52.99 13.66 3.17 2001/02
Six
Level 
Five
Level 
Four
Level 
Three
Level 
Two
Level 
One
Level  Unclassified year
2001/02 to 2003/04  : KS1 Reading 6 - 4 Table 
0 0 0.01 32.17 59.16 6.51 2.15 Total
0 0 0 32.20 59.03 6.67 2.11 2003/04
0 0 0 33.73 58.83 5.34 2.10 2002/03
0 0 0.02 30.48 59.66 7.59 2.25 2001/02
Six
Level 
Five
Level 
Four
Level 
Three
Level 
Two
Level 
One
Level  Unclassified year
2001/02 to 2003/04 : KS1 Mathematics 5 - 4 Table 
179levels or above.
skewed with a small number of schools with low numbers of pupils obtaining target 
Fewer schools are meeting KS2 targets than KS1 targets and the distribution is 
100 86.01 79.10 66.67 27.54 75.33 KS2 English
100 85.50 76.60 63.28 31.88 73.90 KS2 Mathematics
100 92.98 87.34 79.49 52.63 84.73 KS1 Writing
100 92.37 87.86 79.45 46.67 84.71 KS1 Reading
100 97.30 93.39 87.87 61.82 91.34 KS1 Mathematics
Max P75 P50 P25 Min Mean Subject
igher H evel or  L elevant  Achieving R upils  P : % of  10 - 4 Table 
KS targets.
portrays the distribution of how schools are meeting Government  10 - Table 4 Finally 
nature.
modal  - single underlying latent scale may therefore not adequately capture this bi
levels. A  modal with a peak at unclassified as well as a peak over the higher  - appear bi
pupil funding.  Secondly, and particularly in the case of KS2 results, the results  - of per
pupil funding.  At face value this would indicate a low or zero impact  - increases in per
Two things stand out:  firstly, there is no obvious improvement over time despite clear 
0 26.07 49.26 16.58 0.81 0 7.28 Total
0 25.27 51.82 15.05 0.64 0 7.23 2003/04
0 25.15 48.93 17.49 1.02 0 7.40 2002/03
0 27.89 46.94 17.20 0.77 0 7.20 2001/02
Six
Level 
Five
Level 
Four
Level 
Three
Level 
Two
Level 
One
Level  Unclassified Year
2001/02 to 2003/04 : KS2 English 9 - 4 Table 
180individual level and school level characteristics to movements along the linear scale, 
values which convert  *
 Thus the regression model must not only estimate the 
(4.13)
#
  b  5  s 4 =   b
5  < #
  b  8  s 3 =   b
8  < #
  b    s 2 =   b
  < #
  b s 1 =   b
categories) then:
categories, grades or levels (the model may of course be extended to further ordered 
example, if there are four ordered  underlying variable crosses certain thresholds.  For 
This latent variable takes on observable values measured in exams or tests when the 
(4.12)    + : d
  A = #
  b
such as funding. i.e.
is a function of the pupil’s individual characteristics and school inputs  pupil which 
for an individual  #
  b Consider an unobserved educational outcome/ability variable
fits in to the education production function approach.  
motivate the ordered outcome models via the latent outcome variable approach which 
it is possible to  additional explanation as follows.  As with the binary outcome models
principles as the binary outcome models, are more sophisticated and are afforded an 
explanation here, the ordered models, though they operate on the same basic 
own and require no further  The properties of the logistic model are well kn
of successful pupils across the higher levels.
categorical model which assess the conditional impact of funding on the distribution 
proportion of a school’s pupils achieving level 2 or higher and secondly a  or 
steps: first a logistic regression which assess the impact of funding on the probability 
modal nature of the data, the impact of funding is measured in two  - Due to the bi
Modal Distribution - Ordered Categorical Outcomes and Bi 4.6.2.1
Model Econometric The 4.6.2
181variable for each subject with variable KS 1 mathematics being the omitted category
g a dummy  All KS subjects are analysed together and are incorporated by definin
thus I choose an ordered logistic model
show the underlying model may be applied to proportion outcomes,  Woolridge (1996) 
Papke and  year’s pupils achieving each key stage.  Nevertheless proportion of a 
individual, whereas the data available are aggregated at school year level, i.e. the 
motivate the model from the perspective of an  Equation 4.12  through equation 4.14 
(4.14)
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  b ( Pr = ) 1 =   b ( Pr
between cumulative distributions i.e.:
fferences  continuous nature of the distribution probabilities are expressed as di
statements about an individual being in a specific state.  Note that given the 
distribution, then the ordered logit model is specified.  This enables probabilistic 
rom an Extreme Value  are assumed iid f    into the same GLM framework.  If
regression model and like the binary logit and probit model, the ordered models fall 
completes the definition of an ordered logistic or probit     unobserved error term 
rrounding the behaviour of the  As with the binary model, the assumption su
used in the binary approach.
points are explicitly estimated, an approach that could be  - constant term and the cut
off point lies at 0.  In ordered models there is no  - implicit assumption that the cut
term and an  (between 0 and 1) is effectively estimated by inclusion of a constant
off point  - In a binary regression model a single cut ). ) 5  ( between levels 3 and 4 
and  ) 8  ( , between levels 2 and 3 )   classifications (i.e. between levels 1 and 2 (
points between the KS  off  - which represent the cut 5  to    but also the values 
182nce educational outcomes. expected to influe
i.e. those observable and available variables which are  from an ethnic minority.
Statemented) and the % of pupils which PLASC recorded as being  - statements (Non
pupils with statemented SEN (Statemented%), the % of SEN pupils without 
% of  additional needs, the % of pupils eligible for Free School Meals (FSM%), the
(Junior School); a selection of common variables which are used to measure 
School); a dummy variable indicating whether the school catered for KS 2 pupils only 
pupils only (Infant  dummy variable indicating whether the school catered for KS 1 
dummy variable capturing whether the school had an associated Nursery School; a 
, a  4.6.1 pupil variable as discussed in  - Explanatory variables include: the funding per
Regression variables 4.6.2.4
funding it received over the time period analysed.
invariant and represents the average amount of  - for each school, this variable is time
over time i.e.  by including a school specific averaged funding variable  2004) ( Hesketh 
- Skrondal and Rabe funding variable I adopt the simple correction identified in
specific random effect and to eliminate the correlation between the random effect and 
- I include a school In order to avoid the biases caused by a common omitted variable 
Endogenous funding variable 4.6.2.3
GLLAMM command in Stata 8 SE. 
for the intercept term and funding term.  The models are estimated using the 
zero elements  - is a matrix of random effects with non y d B where  y d B + : d A =  l  mode
, and in the mixed  : d A =  manner.  In the fixed model the linear predictor is given by
term) and a random coefficient attached to the funding variable in the following 
specific constant  - ividual specification is extended to incorporate a random effect (ind
In order to incorporate heterogeneous production functions, the fixed GLM 
Mixed model specification 4.6.2.2
183functions.
effect model, permits greater heterogeneity in school’s education production 
efficient of funding per pupil.  The random coefficient model, relative to the random 
- ias in the co endogeneity corrected models to examine the extent of the predictable b
The first two theoretically inferior models are included for comparison against the 
correction for endogeneity. 
endogeneity of funding; and finally a random coefficients model with a  for the 
correlation with observed covariates; a random effects model with a correction  - non
which lead to biases in a recursive endogenous system, but violates the assumption of 
invariant) unobserved factors  - model which in principle accounts for all (time effects
outcome variables, but not the endogenous nature of the funding variable; a random 
naïve regression model which takes into account the limited dependent nature of the 
Four models are estimated for each of the binary and ordered categorical parts: a 
Results Regression  4.6.3
Note that the funding per pupil variable enters the model as thousands of £ per pupil.
54.23 0 8.72 15.37 Statemented % - Non
6.71 0 1.27 1.14 Statemented %
59.1 0 7.45 8.36 Ethnic Minority %
53.6 0 11.18 11.42 FSM %
1 0 0.41 0.22 Junior School
1 0 0.41 0.22 Infant School
1 0 0.40 0.20 Nursery School
2,528.09 1,495.52 208.05 1,963.72 funding per pupil (£) School Averaged 
2,711.02 1,305.32 261.70 1,968.70 Funding per pupil (£)
Max Min Std.dev Mean Variable
Variable Descriptive Statistics xplanatory  E s odel M : Regression  11 - 4 Table 
184ects. averaged across KS 2 subj
shows the same analysis  14 - Table 4 averaged across the relevant KS 1 subjects and 
shows the expected differences in proportions from a zero increase  13 - Table 4
pupil increase; and a £1,000 per pupil increase.   - jects for a £500 per and two KS 2 sub
the expected proportion of pupils achieving level 2 or higher in each of the three KS 1 
estimated parameter values, the school characteristics in the final year and calculating 
show this variation by taking the  14 - Table 4 and  13 - Table 4 r.  linea - the model is non
increase in funding will still demonstrate some degree of variation across schools as 
pupil funding, the marginal impact of an  - specific estimates of the effect of per - school
odel produces a single population (or fixed) effect and not  Although a random effect m
proportion of acceptable exam levels achieved. 
measures are generally negative indicating the expected prediction of lower 
again has a better showing than English.)  Increasing levels of pupil additional needs 
gher (where maths  subjects are lower and in all KS 2 subjects the proportions are hi
mathematics, the proportions of pupils obtaining level 2 or higher in the other KS 1 
sign and are largely unaffected by the endogenous correction: Relative to KS1 
erally of the hypothesised  mixes of pupils.   Values for the other covariates are gen
- the propensity for higher funding to be allocated to schools with more difficult case
As expected, the coefficients for the average funding variables are negative indicating 
random effect alone.   the parameter estimate, rather than the addition of the 
endogeneity in the random effect model that is responsible for the biggest increase in 
higher than that produced by the naïve model.  Note, it is the step which accounts for 
upil funding which is 66%  endogenous correction estimates a fixed effect of per p
estimated impact of funding per pupil, for example the random effect model with 
However, as expected, methods used to account for endogeneity increase the 
upils obtaining a level higher than level 1.   per pupil funding on the probability of p
model, which assumes funding is exogenous, finds a statistically significant impact of 
The naïve  shows the four estimated models for the logistic component.   12 - Table 4
d the Estimated Impact of Additional Funding an r ighe H
evel 2 or  L btaining  O upils  P robability of  P roportion/ P The 4.6.3.1
1855.82 2.11 1.36 0.93 0.53 1.27 1.80 £1,000
3.04 1.13 0.73 0.50 0.29 0.67 0.96 £500
Max P75 P50 P25 Min Std Dev Mean Per pupil £ increase
model E for R level 2 or higher) al per pupil funding (KS2 ean impact of addition M :  14 - 4 Table 
7.76 3.60 2.52 1.85 0.96 1.70 3.08 £1,000
3.94 1.91 1.35 0.99 0.52 0.87 1.63 £500
Max P75 P50 P25 Min Std Dev Mean increase Per pupil £ 
ean impact of additional per pupil funding (KS1 level 2 or higher) for RE model : M 13 - 4 Table 
10829.597 - 10838.571 - 10842.743 - 10975.487 - Likelihood - Log
2.707 (0.641) - Cov (RE,RC)
(0.340) 1.539  RC var
4.927 (1.216) 0.170 (0.040) 0.175 (0.042) RE var
0.002 (0.004) - 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003) -
Statemented%
- Non
0.010 (0.029) 0.046 (0.035) 0.014 (0.034) 0.080 (0.017) - Statemented%
0.008 (0.003) - 0.016 (0.005) - 0.013 (0.005) - 0.013 (0.002) - Ethnic Minority%
0.030 (0.004) - 0.034 (0.007) - 0.038 (0.007) - 0.032 (0.003) - FSM%
0.420 (0.088)  0.411 (0.152) 0.312 (0.149) 0.244 (0.055) Infant school
0.173 (0.128) - 0.191 (0.159) - 0.118 (0.158) - 0.119 (0.067) - school Junior 
(0.128) 0.799 - 0.254 (0.192) - 0.376 (0.191) - 0.247 (0.065) - Nursery school
0.300 (0.070) 0.292 (0.069) 0.290 (0.069) 0.262 (0.068) KS 2 English
0.433 (0.071) 0.425 (0.071) 0.423 (0.071) 0.323 (0.070) KS 2 Maths
0.685 (0.056) - (0.056) 0.683  - 0.683 (0.056) - 0.677 (0.056) - KS 1 Writing
0.682 (0.056) - 0.680 (0.056) - 0.680 (0.056) - 0.673 (0.056) - KS 1 Reading
0.161 (0.266) 1.085 (0.380) - - - Av fund per pupil
0.100 (0.201) 0.331 (0.125) 0.224 (0.120) 0.199 (0.089) Funding per pupil 
2.502 (0.433) 4.453 (0.678) 2.632 (0.238) 2.766 (0.167) Constant
RC
Endogenous 
RE
Endogenous 
Effect
Random 
Exogenous
Naïve 
Model Variable
Results egression R ogistic  Level 2 or Higher L : 12 - 4 Table 
186that at least some schools will have a negative coefficient associated with funding.
ion of the coefficient around the fixed effect clearly implies  assumed normal distribut
random coefficient is 1.539 which given the relatively small fixed effect and the 
specific random effect.  The (prior population) variation of the  - effect and the school
he impact for a particular school is the sum of both the fixed  insignificant.  However t
drops to 0.1 (half of what it was in the naïve model) and becomes statistically 
The most notable impact of the RC model is that the fixed effect of funding per pupil 
be across schools.
in identifying where the biggest impacts may  effect) it permits greater sophistication 
specific effects of funding (the random coefficient added on to the population or fixed 
- estimates school )  12 - Table 4 the Random Coefficient model (the final column in
means a school is closer to the 50% mark.  As  exam impact where the random effect
due to the logistic specification, the fixed effect necessarily translates to a bigger 
- linear model and not a result of different school efficiencies  - mathematics of the non
the above tables is purely a function of the  However, the heterogeneity implied by
should be separate effects estimated.)
one may wish to estimate KS 1 and KS 2 data separately to determine whether there 
for KS 2 subjects translate to smaller expected effects of additional funding (indeed 
pass rates  As expected and due to the same mathematical arguments, the higher initial 
of 3.94% and 7.76% respectively.
population coefficient into higher returns for their schools with a maximum increase 
whereas schools with lower initial rates turn the estimated  slightly in this component 
Unsurprisingly schools with almost 100% success rates are expected to benefit only 
universal across all schools with a standard deviation of 0.87 and 1.70 respectively.  
imply that the average increase of 1.63% and 3.08% are not  mathematics of the model 
pupil funding.  The  - relatively small increases for substantial increases in per
- expected to increase that figure to 86.63% and a £1,000 increase to 88.08% 
pupil funding across all schools would be  - writing an increase if £500 per or higher in 
The tables show that with an existing average of 85% of KS 1 pupils achieving level 2 
187Endogenous RC model school-specific funding effects 
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7. - shown in Figure 4
indicates a high degree of negative correlation also illustrated by a simple scatter plot 
cteristics.  The covariance between the random effect and random coefficient  chara
greater variation in underlying heterogeneity unrelated to funding or other observable 
implying far  – effect, the variation of the random effect increasing from  0.17 to 4.93 
introduction of the random coefficient has also had an impact on the random  The 
proportion of the distribution of effects lies in the negative section.
trivial  - the picture is one which Hanushek would probably find familiar i.e. that a non
hypothesis of a positive or zero impact,  - indicate that only 2 schools can reject the null
,  coefficient for each school, coupled with the fixed effect - with the estimated random
errors associated  - averaged effect is above zero and though the standard - population
However, though the population mean (0.074) and median (0.134) indicate that the 
igher H evel 2 or  L
Pupils Achieving  roportion of  P the ffects for E unding  F pecific  S - chool : Histogram of S 6 - 4 Figure 
or higher at key stages 1 and 2.
impact of funding on the proportion of pupils achieving level 2  an estimated negative 
shows the distribution of such effects and shows that 45% of schools have  6 - Figure 4
188Endogenous RC model school RC
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efficient at turning the increase in resources in to higher academic attainment.  A 
previously negative random effects estimates only had so because they were not 
ols which had had  random coefficient model be correct, that some of the scho
0.0765.  This suggests, should the  - significant correlation between random effects of 
- As can be observed there is no obvious pattern and indeed there exists a non
s for each school in both models. random effect
shows a scatter plot of the  8 - Figure 4 the random effects for each individual school? 
model to the endogenous random coefficient model, what happens to the estimates of 
ool between models.  That is as we move from the endogenous random effect  each sch
A further interesting comparison is available between the random effects estimated in 
separated.
datapoints per school it is perhaps optimistic to believe that such effects can be 
ying factors which affect general performance.  Indeed given the 3  funding and underl
the data, is perhaps unable to fully distinguish between heterogeneous impacts of 
This high degree of negative correlation is perhaps indicative of a model which, given 
odel RC M from  s oefficient Schools’ Random Effects against Random C : Plot of 7 - 4 Figure 
1898.24 1.91 0.39 6.55 - 30.55 - 6.74 1.91 - £1,000
5.62 1.20 0.20 2.60 - 13.04 - 0.31 0.51 - £500
Max P75 P50 P25 Min Std Dev Mean Per pupil £ increase
for RC model level 2 or higher) al per pupil funding (KS2 ean impact of addition M :  16 - 4 Table 
16.44 3.89 0.86 12.55 - 35.08 - 10.2 2.76 - £1,000
10.80 2.28 0.44 5.09 - 17.43 - 5.03 0.81 - £500
Max P75 P50 P25 Min Std Dev Mean Per pupil £ increase
ean impact of additional per pupil funding (KS1 level 2 or higher) for RC model M :  15 - 4 Table 
. small
25% and 50% in inputs, the median increases of less than 1% in output seem rather 
small and as a £500 and £1000 increase in funding represents increases approaching 
value is heavily influenced by a single outlier.  The median impact is positive, but 
negative funding impact.  Indeed the mean effect is marginally negative, though this
The variation is such that a substantial proportion of schools (over 25%) have a 
on the raw scale.
pupil funding increases  - iation in the distribution of the effect of per permits greater var
As expected the RC  14 - Table 4 and 13 - Table 4 coefficient analogous versions of 
are the random  16 - Table 4 and  15 - Table 4 endogenous random coefficient model, 
Returning to the incremental impact in the original metric as predicted by the 
random effect.
efficiency in turning additional funding into improved outcomes was captured in the 
negative random effects in the random coefficient model, i.e. their above average 
del 4 and  similar story may exist for schools whom have positive random effects in mo
190Endogenous RC model school RE
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simple comparison of coefficient values will not be misleading.
case, however, the distance between category thresholds is broadly similar and thus 
simple comparisons of coefficient values across models may be misleading.  In this 
different then  are also estimated.  If the distance between categories is significantly 
off points or thresholds between categories  - coefficient as in the ordered model the cut
naïve model.  Even greater caution than usual is required in interpreting the raw 
found in the  endogenous RE model estimates a coefficient that is 60% bigger than that 
increases as the endogeneity of funding is taken into account.  In this case the 
in that the estimated impact of funding  12 - Table 4 shows a similar picture to that of 
17  - Table 4 levels achieved by pupils given that they have achieved at least level 2.
The second part of the model focuses on measuring the impact of funding on the 
Estimated Impact of Additional Funding
and the  evel 2 At Least L btaining  r Conditional on O ighe H
2 or  s evel L btaining  O upils  P robability of  The Proportion/P 4.6.3.2
odels First Stage M cross  A ffects  : Comparison of Random E 8 - 4 Figure 
191of zero effect.  
specific effect, no school that has a negative coefficient can reject a Null hypothesis 
rs of the school  found to the left of zero and taking into account the standard erro
number of schools have an estimated negative effect of funding, far fewer schools are 
schools have an estimated negative impact of increased funding.  However, although a 
y large that some pupil funding is sufficientl - variance of the random coefficient on per
statistically significant and higher than that estimated in the naïve model.  The 
pupil funding is still positive and  - the first part of the model, the fixed effect of per
However unlike  specific effects via the random coefficient model.   - we allow school
pupil funding falls from the endogenous random effect model when  - fixed effect of per
When introducing a random coefficient and as with the first part of the model, the 
level 2 or above.
levels beyond 2 rather than on increasing the proportion of pupils who are reaching 
effect of increases in funding, certainly at KS1, are more apparent in movements in 
level 3 and in Key Stage 2 from levels 3 and 4 to level 5.  The figures imply that the 
At Key Stage 1 the impact of funding largely appears in moving pupils from level 2 to
on the original metric despite a single fixed effect being estimated.
linear there will be variation in effect  - effect model.  As before, since the model is non
- us random pupil funding across schools as implied by the endogeno - increase in per
show the distribution of impacts of a £500 and £1,000  19 - Table 4 and  18 - Table 4
generally negative. 
ndogenous correction i.e. increasing levels of pupil additional needs measures are  the e
other covariates are generally of the hypothesised sign and are largely unaffected by 
coefficients for the average funding variables are negative and values for the  - model 
ts are broadly similar to those estimated in the first part of the attainment  The resul
19224058.491 - 24073.46 - 24077.339 - 24294.923 - Likelihood - Log
1.087 (0.240) - Cov (RE,RC)
0.560 (0.122) RC var
2.209 (0.475) 0.091 (0.019) 0.097 (0.020) RE var
13.538 13.880 15.098 14.608 Cut point 4
6.522 6.869 8.087 7.629 Cut point 3
4.089 4.443 5.661 5.249 Cut point 2
0.396 - 0.037  - 1.181 0.794 point 1 Cut 
0.014 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003) 0.006 (0.002)
Statemented%
- Non
0.048 (0.021) - 0.059 (0.025) - 0.081 (0.024) - 0.048 (0.012) - Statemented%
0.001 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) Ethnic Minority%
0.014 (0.004) - 0.020 (0.005) - 0.022 (0.005) - 0.033 (0.002) - FSM%
0.199 (0.060)  0.293 (0.109) 0.225 (0.107) 0.110 (0.038) Infant school
0.282 (0.063) - 0.164 (0.105) - 0.115 (0.106) - 0.085 (0.035) - Junior school
0.397 (0.086) - 0.500 (0.143) - 0.573 (1.340) - (0.048) 0.298  - Nursery school
6.686 (0.095) 6.670 (0.095) 6.668 (0.095) 6.576 (0.095) KS 2 English
6.684 (0.095) 6.668 (0.095) 6.667 (0.095) 6.575 (0.095) KS 2 Maths
1.111 (0.045) - 1.106 (0.045) - 1.106 (0.045) - 1.088 (0.045) - KS 1 Writing
0.017 (0.039) 0.017 (0.039) 0.017 (0.039) 0.018 (0.038) KS 1 Reading
0.861 (0.175) - 0.729 (0.254) - - - Av fund per pupil
0.305 (0.116) 0.413 (0.086) 0.335 (0.080) 0.258 (0.060) Funding per pupil 
RC
Endogenous 
RE
Endogenous 
Effect
Random 
Exogenous
Naïve 
Model Variable
Levels 2 Through 6 Ordered Logistic Regression Results :  17 - 4 Table 
193Endogenous RC model school-specific funding effects 
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[0.01%]
0.02% 
[1.56%]
8.69% 
[3.37%]
3.21%  -
[1.77%]
5.41%  -
[0.06%]
0.10%  -
[Standard Deviation]
£1000
[0.00%]
0.01%
[0.83%]
4.22%
[1.75%]
1.30% -
[0.89%]
2.87% -
[0.03%]
0.05% -
[Standard Deviation]
£500
Level 6 level 5 level 4 level 3 level 2 Pupil Increase - Per
levels) for RE model dditional per pupil funding (KS2 ean impact of a M :  19 - 4 Table 
[0.00%]
0.00% 
[0.01%]
0.02% 
[0.11%]
0.24% 
[1.28%]
8.04% 
[1.38%]
8.31%  -
[Standard Deviation
£1000
[0.00%]
0.00%
[0.01%]
0.01%
[0.05%]
0.11%
[0.69%]
3.92%
[0.74%]
4.04% -
[Standard Deviation]
£500
Level 6 level 5 level 4 level 3 level 2 Pupil Increase - Per
ean impact of additional per pupil funding (KS1 levels) for RE model M :  18 - 4 Table 
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coefficient model it is 6%.
linearity of the model) whereas in the random  - (purely an artefact of the non
ard deviation is 0.69%  variation in this figure across schools as measured by the stand
predicted by both the random effect and random coefficient model, the average 
will enjoy an increase of approximately 3.8% of pupils achieving level 3 at KS 1 as 
l funding, the average school  changes.  For example with a £500 increased in per pupi
opposed to random effects) occurs through the standard deviation of the percentage 
21 show that the impact of the random coefficient model (as  - 20 and Table 4 - Table 4
11. - and as depicted in Figure 4 with a significant correlation of 0.42
the random effects estimated in both the random effect and random coefficient model 
coefficient.  However unlike before, there does appear to be a relationship between 
een a school’s estimated random effect and random  perfect negative correlation betw
7 i.e. an almost  - shows a similar relationship as depicted in Figure 4 10 - Figure 4
odel M utcome  O rdered  the O in  s ffect Random E and  s oefficient C andom  : Plot of R 10 - 4 Figure 
195Endogenous RC model school RE
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of 0.26 indicating a systematic relationship between the heterogeneity of schools in 
parts of the outcomes model.  The data demonstrate a significant pairwise correlation 
compares the school level random coefficients estimated in both  12 - Figure 4 Finally, 
[0.08%]
0.03% 
[13.37%]
5.91% 
[8.09%]
3.97%  -
[7.56%]
1.96%  -
[0.25%]
0.00%  -
[Standard Deviation]
£1000
[0.02%]
0.01% 
[6.92%]
2.83% 
[4.08%]
1.47%  -
[4.09%]
1.35%  -
[0.11%]
0.01%  -
[Standard Deviation]
£500
Level 6 level 5 level 4 level 3 level 2 Model
model RC levels) for 2  ean impact of additional per pupil funding (KS M :  21 - 4 Table 
[0.00%]
0.00% 
[0.09%]
0.04% 
[0.86%]
0.39% 
[11.54%]
7.55% 
[12.28%]
7.98%  -
[Standard Deviation]
£1000
[0.00%]
0.00%
[0.03%]
0.01%
[0.26%]
0.13%
[6.05%]
3.73%
[6.3%]
3.88% -
[Standard Deviation]
£500
Level 6 level 5 level 4 level 3 level 2 Model
model levels) for RC ean impact of additional per pupil funding (KS1  M : 20 - 4 Table 
odels Ordered Levels M RE and RC  the  ffects from  : Plot of Random E 11 - 4 Figure 
196School RC in 2nd part of model
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Models Logistic and Ordered Logistic  oefficients from  : Comparison of Random C 12 - 4 Figure 
STED reports.) f O
may be used as supplementary evidence in conjunction with other evidence (e.g 
e may be unwarranted, they  so although policy decisions based on these values alon
problematic, but as they represent time invariant effects it is indicative of efficiency, 
coefficient, make very definitive statements about efficiency  random of the 
s always, the philosophical nature  funding get focussed on an area of attainment?).  A
though it may indicate the emphasis of school policy (i.e. does extra  – coefficients 
definite statement on efficiency, it is not possible with schools with a mix of random 
ive coefficients permit a fairly  Whereas schools with either both positive or both negat
. ’ production function to attainment
funding  ‘ Whereas negative random coefficients indicate the opposite, a below average 
achieving the higher levels conditional on obtaining a score above level one.   terms of 
outcomes in terms of getting more pupils to record scores above level one and in 
school has an above average ability to turn funding into improved educational 
both parts of the model.  Positive random coefficients in both parts indicates that the 
197coefficients.
models underestimate the impact of funding by up to 66% on the regression 
actical and statistical significance of additional funding.  I find that the naïve  pr
that econometric misspecification has partly influenced the apparently odd low 
funding as (recursively) endogenous give additional weight to claims in the literature 
I find that comparison of the naïve exogenous funding models with models that treat 
y: In summar
of educational outcomes implied by different distributions of funding is required.)
necessary for fourth generation funding formula (where the effects on the distribution 
oduction functions.  This has both academic and policy implications and is  specific pr
- heterogeneous impact of funding across schools, i.e. it attempts to estimate school
Finally, the random coefficient variation of the model attempts to model the 
funding is having an impact.  
lysis to pick up greater detail on where additional  greater detail permits the ana
ordered outcomes rather than just proportion obtaining target level or above.  This 
literature include modelling the educational outcomes as proportions obtaining 
panel data approach, further departures from the conventional  In addition to the
funding variable and school random effect. 
random effects and a correction to account for a potential correlation between the 
econometric problem is thus one of common omitted variables which I address with 
outcomes follow inputs.  The  that is  – not strictly simultaneous, but recursive 
explored, I take the approach that the relationship between funding and outcomes is 
funding.  However, rather than use the IV approaches that are currently being 
ly deals with the potential endogeneity of  latest stages of the literature.  i.e. it explicit
Swindon primary school data is based on the regression models that appear in the 
The econometric model used to estimate an education production function using   
odel Econometric M Conclusions of the  4.6.4
198estimated intercept terms which bear  - random coefficient model leads to a set of re
part of the model, the step from random effect model to  In addition, for the first 
correlation between an estimated random effect and random coefficient for a school.  
indicate that there is a very strong negative  10 - Figure 4 and  7 - Figure 4 However, 
response to differences in funding and underlying intercepts.  heterogeneity in 
coefficient model which is essentially using 3 observations per school to estimate 
However it should be noted that these conclusions are drawn from the random 
are operating on the flat part of the production function.
higher attainment,  supportive of Hanushek’s assertion that many schools, those with
traditionally lower attainment may reap higher rewards.  Again this finding is 
and others which suggest that increases in resources for schools with  2005a) ( Papke 
s reinforces the findings of  more equitable distribution of educational outcomes.  Thi
schools which are relatively responsive to increases in funding is likely to lead to a 
below average distribution of above level 2 attainment.  This suggests that targeting 
ts are for schools with a  levels 2 or higher.  Similarly,  6 of the top 10 funding effec
are schools with a below average (mean and median) proportion of pupils achieving 
all of the schools with the top 10 highest funding effects for the first part of the model 
ficients reveal that  In terms of equity considerations, an inspection of the random coef
and 13% respectively in these probabilities. % implies a standard deviation of 12
or higher in KS 2.  The random coefficient model indicates school heterogeneity 
at KS 1 and 9% for level 5  in the probability of a pupil obtaining levels higher than 2 
funding appears larger. A 50% increase in per pupil funding implies a net 8% increase 
When considering the probabilities of pupils obtaining higher levels, the impact of 
at KS 1 and 8% at KS 2. increase is 16% 
heterogeneity across schools and that, within this sample, the maximum output 
success at KS 1 and 1.8% at KS 2.  The random coefficient model suggests 
pupil funding leads to an estimated 3% increase in pupil probability of  - increase in per
dichotomous outcomes) of a pupil obtaining level 2 (or higher) or not, where a 50%
strong.  This is particularly true if considering the impact on the probability of (the 
practical impact may still be regarded as, as Hanushek would put it, not particularly 
However, converting parameter estimates into a meaningful metric indicates that the 
199possible to completely break from Hanushek’s point of view that the estimated 
funding i.e. higher funding being directed towards areas of need.  However it is not 
to these models ignoring the endogenous nature of school  significant findings are due 
- statistical link between funding and attainment and that some of the early non
summarisation of the literature is that there is a demonstrative systematic and positive 
My own  ’ en school expenditures and student performance. relationship betwe
here appears no strong or systematic  t contested assertion by Hanushek that ‘
surrounding the estimation of educational production functions, in particular, the hotly 
chapter has then outlined the long and contentious research and argument  The 
incorporation of the societal welfare function.
explicit  – generation, and suggested what is required for fourth generation formula 
AEN) in the UK even though formula are currently barely approaching third 
3 funding crisis and costs of providing for  already been reached in practice (the 200
the limitations of the current latest (third) generation, argued that they have been 
the education production function.  The chapter has also identified  – economic theory 
ween formula generations and the underlying  given criteria and drawn the link bet
funding in education, identified a means of objectively assessing formula against a 
for formula  e practice in England and Wales.  It has defined the objectives and rational
evelopment of funding formula in theory and in  This chapter has outlined the d
Conclusions 4.7
efficient but also improve the equity of the distribution of educational outcomes.
efficient schools, as determined by their specific random coefficient, may not only be 
that additional funding directed towards  models.)  Thus the tentative conclusion is 
linear  - in this case it is purely a result of the mathematical properties of the non
will not only improve equity but will also lead to bigger absolute attainment (though 
targeting below average attainment schools  effect model are broadly similar i.e. that 
heterogeneous response to funding.  Nevertheless, the conclusions using the random 
distinguish between the impact of unobservable variables on attainment and a 
hat the data used here is insufficient to be able to  caution as it may be the case t
little resemblance to the initial set.  The results must therefore be taken with some 
200more directly).
achieving children  - (i.e. targeting these low how additional funding is spent by schools 
increased funding.  This implies there may need to be more control in determining 
the pupils who are, broadly, failing, are still liable to fail despite  – within schools 
across schools, it may do little for that  directed funding may improve aggregate equity
the impact on the probability of a pupil achieving a KS level above 1.  Thus although 
considers the distribution of successful pupils across the higher KS levels compared to 
additional funding is found when one  sterling.  Secondly a bigger response per 
off in addressing equity issues and maximising output per pound  - not be any trade
policy implications are broadly similar in each case.  i.e. that, in this case, there may 
able data.  Nevertheless, the findings and  of model demands given the limited avail
school suggests that the random coefficient models are perhaps a step too far in terms 
random effect and random coefficient and the fact only 3 years of data are used per 
ive correlation between a school’s estimated  the RC models are justified, a high negat
likelihood tests suggest  - characteristics and in the response to funding.  Although log
mix unaccounted for with simple observable population  - terms of underlying case
ubstantial heterogeneity across schools, both in  Random coefficient models suggest s
approach.
corrected funding effects are up to 66% higher than those estimated using the naïve 
- comparison against naïve models using the same data, I too find that endogenous
slightly different specification and using a  and the random effect.  Despite using a
endogenous variable correction to break any correlation between the funding variables 
endogenous funding models by using a panel data approach with an averaged 
a 3 year period.  The model departs from the convention  primary schools over
66 the population of  level heterogeneous education production function in  - school
The empirical content of the chapter is contained in an econometric estimation of 
highly inelastic.
increases in funding in the literature is modest and  practical impact of relatively large
201driven by the uncertainty, the ratios of two  , which calculation  of Perfect Information
Expected Value  effective.  An  - vention is cost the probability that the inter surrounds 
that  considerable uncertainty  conducted which shows the Sensitivity Analysis is 
Probabilistic  The lack of precision of the estimates is identified when  medication. 
effective  - is is that the evidence points to a cost NICE interpretation of the analys
reference case framework is adopted and expectations are shown as an ICER the 
Nevertheless, when the  there is that the health related quality of life will be increased.
greater certainty that costs will be increased than  statistical point of view there is a
From a narrow  significant, though indicate a positive impact of the intervention.   - non
are generally statistically  life is hindered by a lack of observation points and results
ct on a patient’s health related quality of  incremental cost declines to zero.  The impa
intervention is to increase these costs in the first instance, but over time this 
increasing trend in expected costs over time for patients and that the impact of the 
on survival of the intervention; there is an  statistical nor real practical effect 
models suggest that: there is no  econometric  The  the NICE reference case model.  
– attempts to use econometric models in an established framework of decision making 
y most obvious in the health economics chapter which  These differences are probabl
the dependent variable.
hypothesis testing; and the adoption of GLM models as opposed to transformations of 
; a lack of emphasis on  rather than just the conditional distribution 9 variable, 
as a function of a policy amenable  ; distribution of  actual  greater emphasis on the 
In practice this has led to: probably a  . (2004) would describe it McCloskey and  
as Ziliak  ’ s ‘ meant to be scientific with a small  It is or decision making processes.
t rather lead to more informed policy  each of the chapters is not to test a hypothesis, bu
are given context by being based on an underlying theory, the ultimate objective of 
.  Although the statistical methods  educational attainment) using econometric methods
fe and costs; of attendance and of  production functions (of health related quality of li
The general theme running through the course of this dissertation is the estimation of 
and Policy Implications Summary 5.1
Conclusions Thesis  5
202addressed in future research.  
appears to produce sensible results but has a number of limitations which may be 
attendance.  I tentatively suggest a practical measurement of this concept which 
off systems may influence  - shes a clear link by which play anomalies and establi
the new measure is that it reduces the potential for undesirable properties and 
similar in many respects to the current measures of match uncertainty.  The benefit of 
propose a concept of match significance that is  In doing so I  ems.   off syst - of play
altering the size or structure  of  issue the economic framework in which to address the 
there is a greater degree of defining  nlike in chapter two,  econometric model.   Thus, u
on which to build the  framework  theoretical  existing atisfactory  s that there is no 
argue  attendance within regular season games is supported by evidence.  In doing so I 
offs create increased  - question I address is whether the perceived wisdom that play
off designs.  The main  - season play - , specifically the impact of post competitions
In chapter three I identify the economic issues surrounding the design of sporting 
still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the estimate of the benefit.
appears to have a very marginal impact on both costs and benefits and that there is 
the intervention effective, the reality is that  - evidence suggests the intervention is cost
although the established framework of synthesising the  The overall conclusion is that 
life than it was in the trial.   - the ICER will be expected to be lower in real arguing that 
and/or elderly patients on fewer than 5 repeat prescriptions then there are grounds for 
of the trial population.  If it can be argued that PC would affect patients under 75 
he incremental cost of the intervention was lowest at the lower bound  the population, t
ICER.  The models show that although the benefits appear to be fairly uniform across 
out may have created a misleading  - population that could be affected in a national roll
lation and the possibility that it may not accurately reflect the   the choice of trial popu
One further point worth making is that the econometric models indicate that perhaps 
available.
but there is a very strong case for revisiting this decision once further evidence is 
effective  - dence suggests the intervention is cost the current limited evi Thus  research.
high value for future  very identifies a  small numbers and large population affected 
203th generation funding formula and suggest what a 4
rd the limitations of the current 3
the standard underlying education production function model.  In doing so I illustrate 
each ‘generation’ to  s and explicitly link funding has been evolved over recent history
how formula  of outline with an  however  ee years.  The chapter starts  authority over thr
endogenously allocated funding in primary schools in a single local education 
stage attainment as a function of school pupil population characteristics and 
The empirical content is provided by an ordered logistic regression model of key 
look at the economics of formula funding of education in England.  In chapter four I 
. sufficiently recognised and taken into consideration
season relegation, are  - an inferior team with an increased probability of first
promotion of  offs, the  - the chapter concludes by asking whether the costs of the play
offs to incorporating more teams would increase attendance, but  - extending the play
which may represent an unknown benefit.   The results also tentatively suggest that 
ers across teams  hitherto unknown effect on the equity of the distribution of support
(but collectively bigger) gains in supporters over the season.  As such, there is also a 
teams losing quite a few supporters and several teams picking up individually smaller 
s case a few  over the season.  The impact is not universal across all teams with in thi
However, the increase is rather modest, approximately a 1% increase in attendance 
off systems do indeed increase attendance at regular season games.   - notion that play
upport to the  results are robust enough to offer s however  multicollinearity problem, 
severe  is hindered by a potentially quite model  etric estimation of the he econom T
in which the theory may offer a firm conclusion.
thus an empirical question rather than one  dance is  offs do increase atten - whether play
demand variables such as match significance in to attendance.  The question of 
further down the league to smaller teams with perhaps lower ability to convert 
s more games.  Furthermore it tends to distribute significance  significance acros
in the result of the match.  It does so however by spreading a fixed stock of 
season significance  - of - significant number of matches where there is at least some end
off system has created a  - comparison is illuminating as it shows the play system.  This
assuming that individual match results would have occurred as was under the actual 
illustrated by building a counterfactual top three automatic promotion system and 
impact of the competition design on the distribution of significance is then  The
204minimum national standard.  This suggests that increasing funding further may not 
pupils who achieve at least the minimum outcome than those who fail to meet the 
er impact on those  and improved educational outcomes there appears to be a strong
Furthermore, although I estimate an inelastic relationship between increased funding 
movements along it.
focus on means of shifting the education production function rather than pursue 
perhaps  oduction function and that future policy should  flat part of the education pr
broadly in line with the third argument; that western economies are operating on the 
is in  Thus my conclusion  reveals the effect is still rather small in practical terms. 
tcomes  regression equation parameters, converting the parameters into education ou
chapter and although it makes a fairly substantial impact on the magnitude of the 
allocation of funding is an issue that I explicitly model in the empirical content in this 
ogenous  the predictable bias that may arise if such issues are ignored.  The end
econometric issues that occur when dealing with endogenously allocated funding and 
The second focuses on the  . given to the underlying policy questions of interest
little consideration  estimate with really very  focus on the statistical properties of an 
a narrow  – the type of empirical economics that this dissertation is striving to avoid 
To my mind this is precisely  statistically significant impact of funding on education.  
emonstrate a  as suggested, this argument focuses on the fact that most papers d
forward to explain these outcomes.  The first argues that the evidence is not as mixed 
Three arguments have been put  of studies finding no or even a negative effect.  
number  negligible  - non impact of funding but a  majority of papers suggesting a small 
studies on the education production function. The evidence is clearly mixed with the 
function which has lasted forty plus years has led to an incredible wealth of empirical 
education production  but a rather heated argument on the results produced by the 
There is very little on the former  the estimation of education production functions.
literature on social welfare functions in education and  The chapter then reviews the 
he underlying theory.   to the consideration of the implications derived from t
makers should give  - that policy 2003 funding crisis and thus illustrate the importance 
I also argue that these (predictable)  limitations  directly contributed to the  function.
of the societal welfare  explicit incorporation  ,  generation formula should incorporate
205framework would be more appropriate.  To some extent I think the  Bayesian
making theme of this dissertation, arguably a  - In accordance with the decision
something that I seek to incorporate in future work.
d that multivariate estimation is possible and it is  software is now sufficiently advance
models where the estimation of costs and benefits is conducted separately.  Panel data 
estimating model parameters.  This is most apparent in the economic evaluation 
plement an improvement in the means of simultaneously  I would also like to im
of interest and should be treated as such.
nuisance parameter to be purged from the analysis, rather they are a fundamental item 
And the parameters associated to such units are not a  the population of interest.
interest, they are  the basis that the units are not a random draw from a population of
on  nclined to use fixed effects  I would more i in future research  within an LEA, then 
dealing with explicit and permanent units of interest such as football teams or schools 
.  However when  to mind.  Firstly I extensively use random effects across all models
In terms of the econometric modelling a number of changes and improvements spring 
on such odds and hence a more direct measure of significance.
l be possible to model the impact of games  such betting markets do exist) then it wil
track, say the probabilities of teams being promoted over the course of a season (and 
outcomes per team rather than the odds within individual results.  If it is possible to 
etting odds, however the odds of season  surprisingly I believe the answer lies in b
significance in which I would like to make one further contribution.  Perhaps not 
it is the measure of match  of the social welfare function in education.  Of these 
ignificance of individual matches and estimation  Care, a better means of measuring s
the impact on the HRQoL of Pharmaceutical  further evidence on  conclusions section: 
A number of future research directions have already been clearly indicated in this 
esearch Outline of Future R 5.2
educational outcomes.
in  lead to greater inequalities y expensive policy but also  only be a relativel
206research.
however like to more formally explore the use of the Bayesian approach in future 
I would  less) Bayesian interpretation of the reported statistics. - is effectively a (prior
effective,  - matrix to construct a measure of the probability that an intervention is cost
covariance  - treatment of uncertainty in the NICE framework, using the variance
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223baten van farmaceutische zorgplannen. De baten zijn niet statistisch significant en de 
ot de  effect maken echter dat de onzekerheid nog behoorlijk groot is met betrekking t
- gezondheidsgerelateerde kwaliteit van leven en de kleine omvang van het interventie
interventie kosteneffectief lijkt te zijn. Het beperkte aantal waarnemingen van 
waardoor de  £20.000 tot £30.000 die men in Engeland over heeft voor een QALY,
gedeelde zorg. De daarbij behorende ICER van £10.000 ligt ruim onder de gangbare 
van £192 per patiënt en een gerelateerde stijging van 0,019 QALY’s met een jaar 
bevolking gemiddelde stijging  geringe mate stijgen door de interventie: een over de 
48 maanden verzameld in de RESPECT trial wijst uit dat de kosten en baten slechts in 
levensjaren gecorrigeerd voor kwaliteit van leven) aan de hand van data betreffende 
– Adjusted Life Years  - in Quality De schatting van kosten en baten (gemeten 
onderzoek in de toekomst, waarbij alle onzekerheid is verdwenen.
verliesfunctie waardoor een schatting mogelijk wordt van de waarde van perfect 
ijk voor NICE, maar het is een kleine stap naar de definitie van een  noodzakel
traditionelere statistische toets voor hypotheses te gebruiken). Het is weliswaar niet 
onzekerheid betreffende de parameterschattingen uit te drukken (in plaats van de 
Effectiveness Acceptability Curves (CEAC) om verdere  - puntschattingen en Cost
e  Effectiveness Ratios (ICER) voor d - gepresenteerd: als zogeheten Incremental Cost
referentie model moet informatie op zeer specifieke wijze worden samengevat en 
en apothekers van patiënten op leeftijd die veel herhalingsrecepten krijgen. Voor het 
huisartsen  evaluatie betreft een interventie die is ontworpen voor de zorgdeling tussen 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). De economische 
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt de economische evaluatie van een referentie casus van het 
elijk te maken.   beslissingen van beleidsmakers mog
beleidszaken gerichte theoretische basis, met de bedoeling beter gegronde 
hoofdstukken: de toepassing van econometrische methoden gestoeld op een op 
k van elkaar verschillen, maar er loopt zeker ook een rode draad door de  duidelij
professionele interesses weergeven. Het zijn weliswaar onderzoeksterreinen die 
zaken rond gezondheid, sport en onderwijs zijn onderzocht die mijn persoonlijke en 
econometrische essays waarin  - Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een aantal empirische micro
Samenvatting
224tal teams te zijn met een  uniform verdeeld is over alle teams. Er blijkt een klein aan
een nogal geringe verhoging die niet  – circa 1% hogere bezoekersaantallen leidden 
offs tot een  - 2001 geeft mijn model de schatting dat de play - Voor het seizoen 2000
an grotere naar kleinere teams. zwaarder weegt dan het herverdelen van significantie v
een empirische vraag of het creëren van meer wedstrijden met enige significantie 
offsystemen tot een minder bezoekers leidt. Om die reden is het  - mogelijk dat de play
aantallen om te zetten, is het goed  goed in staat zijn om vraagfactoren in bezoekers
kleinere clubs zijn die lager in de competitie staan. Als dergelijke teams een minder 
wedstrijdsignificantie over het algemeen plaats vinden van zulke grotere clubs naar 
etitie staan, zal de herverdeling van  een grotere aanhang bovenin de comp
herverdelen over de wedstrijden. Wanneer teams met meer middelen en van oudsher 
wedstrijden tot gevolg hebben, simpelweg door een vaste hoeveelheid significantie te 
offsystemen meer significante  - jk te laten zien dat play worden beïnvloed, is het mogeli
promotieschema’s te gebruiken en te stellen dat individuele wedstrijdscores niet 
het einde van de competitie een gunstig resultaat heeft bereikt. Door verschillende 
ers), zoals wedstrijdrelevantie en de kans dat een team aan  vraag sturen (demand driv
ontwikkeld dat het verband vaststelt tussen competitieontwerp en factoren die de 
worden om het econometrische model te formuleren, is een nieuw conceptueel model 
ontbreken van beschikbare theoretische modellen die gebruikt kunnen  Door het
gunstige competitieresultaat.
tot meer bezoekers doordat zij ervoor zorgen dat teams langer meedingen naar een 
offs leiden  - offs die men ziet en het niet op enig bewijs gestoelde geloof dat play - play
schrijven waren de zeer uiteenlopende vormen van  Aanleiding om het hoofdstuk te 
bezoekersaantallen bij reguliere wedstrijden in de Engelse betaalde voetbalcompetitie. 
offsystemen op de  - In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de impact geschat van play
gestoeld.
gen heroverwogen kunnen worden die op huidige informatie zijn  waarmee beslissin
zijn een goede reden om meer data te verzamelen of wellicht ook te genereren 
interventie wordt beïnvloed; deze wordt op £100 miljoen geschat. Deze bevindingen 
gezien de aanzienlijke omvang van het bevolkingsaandeel dat mogelijk door de 
t,  Verder is de geschatte waarde van verdere perfecte informatie behoorlijk groo
CEAC wijst uit dat er een kans is van 25% dat de interventie niet kosteneffectief is. 
225die in de politiek te winnen valt door hogere uitgaven per leerling aan te kondigen, 
en gegeven de populariteit  behalen op de bijbehorende leeftijden. In dit licht gezien
stijgingen van 2% in de percentages leerlingen die minimaal verwachte cijfers 
moderne literatuur opgaat: een stijging van 50% in financiering per leerling leidt tot 
ch, zoals voor het merendeel der  significant is. De resultaten zijn echter wel inelastis
financiering en uitkomsten tot gevolg heeft dat zowel positief als statistisch 
voor het effect van financiering, terwijl het meenemen ervan een verband tussen 
ten een neerwaartse bias tot gevolg heeft  dat de endogeniteit buiten beschouwing la
geheel genomen in lijn liggen met de bestaande literatuur. Dat wil zeggen, ik toon aan 
endogeniteit van financiering, heb ik schattingen  kunnen produceren die over het 
r een model te nemen dat rekening houdt met de  periode van drie jaar. Doo
een productiefunctie van onderwijs op 66 lagere scholen in Swindon gedurende een 
schattingen zijn inelastisch. Mijn bijdrage aan de literatuur bestaat uit schattingen van 
sitieve en statistisch significante relatie, maar ook deze  die consistent wijzen op een po
houden met de endogene toekenning van aanvullende financiering zijn er schattingen 
voorkomen. Als gevolg van methodologische ontwikkelingen die specifiek rekening 
rbij insignificante en/of inelastische schattingen nogal vaak  uitkomsten, waa
veertig jaar duurt, over de kracht en grootte van het verband tussen financiering en 
onderwijsprestaties. Dit mondde uit in een nogal verhit debat dat inmiddels meer dan 
1966 dat een onverwacht zwakke link vaststelde tussen financiering en  uit
huidige debat over de impact hiervan. Het debat gaat terug naar het Coleman Report 
) beschreven, gezien in het licht van het  formula funding onderwijsfinanciering (
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de ontwikkeling van op formules gebaseerde 
competitie.
riteit van de  offs opweegt tegen het gevaar dat zij vormen voor de integ - van play
hoogste divisie te degraderen, doet dit onderzoek de vraag rijzen of het gunstige effect 
offs zijn gepromoveerd meer gevaar lopen om in hun eerste seizoen uit de  - play
en dat teams die via  offsystemen is. Gegeven dat het bedoelde effect vrij klein is - play
aanzienlijker is dan de hogere bezoekersaantallen die het voornaamste argument voor 
offs een herverdeling van bezoekersaantallen is, die  - onopgemerkt gevolg van de play
gt dat een tot nu toe  wedstrijden met tenminste enige significantie). Hieruit vol
kleinere teams waar de bezoekersaantallen iets hoger lag (door het creëren van meer 
flink minder bezoekers (als gevolg van significantie die elders terechtkwam) en aantal 
226rk gestegen. leerling ste
overkwam tijdens de ‘financieringscrisis van 2003’, ook al was de financiering per 
iets dat de Britse overheid  – misschien bezwaar tegen de willekeurige keuze 
de productiefunctie is gekozen, maken degenen die financiering zijn kwijtgeraakt 
op welvaart. Wanneer het niet mogelijk is te rechtvaardigen waarom een bepaald punt
uitruil tussen doelstellingen opgenomen wordt, wellicht via een functie voor sociale 
billijkheid; een duidelijke vereiste voor vierdegeneratie formules is dus dat expliciete 
s problemen leiden als men ook nog met andere factoren rekening wil houden zoal
beleidsmakers niet echt zien welk punt zij zouden moeten kiezen. Dit kan tot 
bijbehorende financiering over scholen. Helaas laten derdegeneratie formules 
derwijsuitkomsten, en de  te kiezen, dat staat voor een scholenbrede combinatie van on
onderwijs en beleidsmakers hebben de mogelijkheid een specifiek punt op de kromme 
financieringsformules is kennis nodig van de productiemogelijkhedencurve van 
r beleidsmakers. Voor derdegeneratie  geduid dat interessant zou kunnen zijn voo
ontwikkeling van financieringsformules kan bovendien nog een gebied worden 
Door de theorie van de productiefunctie onderwijs expliciet te koppelen aan de 
staan bij bewegingen langs die productiefunctie.
er stil te  productiefunctie onderwijs als geheel te verschuiven, in plaats van nog lang
zouden beleidsmakers er wellicht goed aan doen te overwegen hoe de 
227